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Abstract
Multidisciplinary research and philosophical discourse have long explored the complex
relationship between the objective environment and subjective human perception. No two
humans perceive, experience, and form attitudes about the same phenomenon in exactly the same
way. Individual demographics (sex, age) and group identity (culture, religion, ethnicity, political
ideology) have been shown to have a profound effect on perception of phenomena; research has
also focused on the effect of the physical environment itself. Differences in perception,
experience, and resulting behavior have great implications for governance, particularly in regards
to planning and development. Recognizing these differences, modern urban planning
increasingly seeks to include varying degrees of public participation in the planning process, in
order to promote inclusiveness and citizen empowerment. The inclusion of measurement and
analysis tools, such as survey questionnaires and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), enable
policymakers, planners, and researchers to support their findings and formulate planning strategy
by utilizing objective, quantitative data. While previous research has explored perception
differences between the sexes, between residents of different cities, and within specific religious
groups, there has been little exploration or quantitative measurement of differences in
environmental perceptions and attitudes among the diverse, multicultural residents of Jerusalem,
a divided city with myriad planning, development, and equality issues.
In the summer of 2012, 225 Jerusalemites of varying religious, demographic, and social
backgrounds completed a questionnaire survey that was designed to quantify their individual
environmental perceptions, opinions of the city’s growth, and priorities for urban development.
While the results indicated great differences between the urban experiences and perceptions of
Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites, it was also found that these populations—commonly
characterized as enemies by popular media and their respective political establishments—shared

many issues in their day-to-day lives, particularly transportation accessibility, utility provision,
unemployment, and housing availability. The majority of respondents indicated that cooperation
between Israelis and Palestinians is necessary to solve such issues. These shared issues,
experienced in spaces that are segregated as a result of past and ongoing governmental action
and cultural divisions, may act as the foundation for cooperative solutions that seek to improve
the lives and urban experiences of all Jerusalem residents.
Keywords: environmental perception, survey questionnaire, participatory planning, Geographic
Information System (GIS), Jerusalem, Israel, Palestine
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I. INTRODUCTION
“It seems to me that all the races and colors and tongues of the
earth must be represented among the fourteen thousand souls that
dwell in Jerusalem.”
M. Twain, 1869
“The problem is, this is not a real dialogue...[but] two monologues.
The Israelis want peace and security, and the Palestinians want
peace and justice. It sounds similar, but these are two very
different sets of emotions and feelings. Nobody talks about this
because nobody knows how to quantify feelings and emotions.”
Yair Lapid, Israeli Minister of Finance, 2013

City planning is an official endeavor that has a tangible impact on the average citizen,
regardless of whether or not they were involved in the planning process. Even in the most
democratic societies, planning schemes and development initiatives are commonly perceived as
the purview of trained experts, elected officials, and the wealthy. City and regional plans can be
designed and implemented without the awareness, understanding, or consent of the citizens
whom they affect on a daily basis; however, the citizens of such societies have legitimate
avenues for protest, legal recourse, and resistance. When it comes to planning and development
under more autocratic governments, the citizen’s lack of power and expression has manifested,
in part, in forced migration, unannounced housing demolitions, and slum clearance without
satisfactory reaccommodation or compensation (Dupont, 2008; Hwang et al., 2007; Kulkarni,
2012). However, in recent decades various governmental and non-governmental organizations
have taken steps to incorporate varying degrees of public participation into the official planning
process, employing diverse methods with mixed results (Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2013;
Shmeuli 1998; Shmueli & Kipnis, 2008).
Considering the great variety of backgrounds, needs, worldviews, and levels of
environmental awareness expressed among diverse populations, particularly in denselypopulated urban settings, is creating a planning scheme that fully satisfies each and every citizen
1

even feasible? Depending on demographics, cultural background, past experiences, education,
mood, and a variety of other idiosyncrasies, each person perceives and forms ideas about the
same phenomenon or space in a way that is unique to them alone (Lowenthal, 1961; Lynch,
1960; Tuan, 1974). Association—by birth or by choice—with a certain group or ideology can
affect perception, and it is not uncommon for individuals within the same cultural, religious, or
ethnic group to similarly perceive and ascribe meaning to phenomena, and to form similar
attitudes about the same (Paradise, 2005; Vaughan and Nordenstam, 1991). Similar
environmental attitudes and worldviews have also been observed among members of the same
gender, age group, socioeconomic status, and level of education (Raudsepp, 2001). Conversely,
some research indicates that environmental worldviews correlate more with the conditions of the
percipient’s objective environment than with any socioeconomic or demographic characteristics
(Brody et al., 2005; Crow et al., 2006; Drori & Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002). The formation of similar
perceptions, attitudes, and worldviews among certain groups can ultimately result in similar
behavior (Schiff, 1970; Wood, 1970), which has significant implications for planning,
development, and governance. This is especially true if public participation methods are to be
employed in government processes. Because environmental perceptions, attitudes, and
worldviews are not directly observable—except in the behavior that they foster—researchers
have commonly employed survey questionnaire and interview techniques in order to quantify,
analyze, and compare these psychological components among diverse individuals and groups
throughout the world (Mesch & Manor, 1998; Paradise, 2005; Strier, 2005).
There are few cities where the world's spectrum of culture, ethnicity, ideology, and
spirituality shines as brilliantly as in Jerusalem. The city’s rich, multi-millennial history and
diverse population reflect its longstanding role as the cultural and commercial crossroads of
Africa, Asia, and Europe. It has been the stage for the narratives of some of the world's most
2

powerful and pervasive spiritual traditions, and is thus perceived as the center of the world by
many devout Christians, Jews, Muslims, and followers of other religious traditions. This history
of multicultural and multi-faith mixing in close quarters has not been without discord,
segregation, or violence. Today, as in many periods throughout its history, Jerusalem is known
more as a ground for geopolitical conflict than harmonious congruence. Proclaimed as the capital
of both the State of Israel and the inchoate State of Palestine, and home to hundreds of thousands
of members of both communities, modern Jerusalem is a city split along ethnic, religious, and
sociopolitical lines; going deeper, within these broad brushstrokes are shades of class, clan,
piety, and partisanship that create their own, often violent, internal strife. Yet, for the most part,
the city’s diverse residents coexist and interact on a daily basis, individually and collectively
experiencing the same urban landscape in a way that is unique for each person within each
diverse group.
Depending on whether they identify or are identified as Israeli or Palestinian—a
sociopolitical distinction that blurs the lines of ethnicity and religion—a Jerusalemite can
experience the same city quite differently. Although many of the physical barriers separating
Palestinian East Jerusalem (under Jordanian control for three decades following the
establishment of Israel in 1948) from Israeli West Jerusalem have been removed, a great chasm
separates the two halves not only in terms of the political rights and quality of life of residents
but also in terms of infrastructural, economic, and community development. The reunification of
the city following Israel’s victory over Jordan in 1967 revealed that, in the decades the city was
physically divided, Israeli Jerusalem had thrived while Jordanian Jerusalem stagnated. Today,
after more than four decades after reunification, the relative lack of modern development in East
Jerusalem still affects the daily lives of Palestinian residents in ways that are obvious to the
naked eye. A significant power imbalance and communication disconnect exists between the
3

Israeli authorities and the Palestinian community; discriminatory planning policies and
development initiatives are not only common, but are the norm. Because most Palestinian
Jerusalemites lack Israeli citizenship by choice, they often find themselves disenfranchised,
disillusioned, and at odds with official Israeli planning, which consciously and unabashedly
seeks to limit the geographic and demographic growth of Arab Palestinian communities in
Jerusalem while fostering that of Jewish Israelis. This disproportionate situation has created a
pressing, undeniable need for reform of planning practices in Jerusalem, with an emphasis on
more democratic, inclusive planning and cooperation between citizens and officials on both
sides. Undeniably, a prerequisite for such reform is the mutual recognition and understanding of
the goals, needs, mindset, and basic existence of the “Other”.
The goal of this research was to assess how key demographic, cultural, and
socioeconomic factors impact perceptions of, and attitudes toward, Jerusalem’s complex urban
landscape morphology and the processes at work within it. This assessment relied on survey
questionnaires administered to people who live, work, and attend school in Jerusalem. It was
anticipated that the survey responses would enable comparisons between and tentative
conclusions about environmental perceptions and attitudes among Jerusalem’s diverse
demographic groups. A review of previous research involving environmental perception and
urban planning, as well as Jerusalem’s historic and current planning policies, provided precedent
and context. Participatory planning methods—those incorporating some degree of public
participation in the planning process—were considered, particularly in regards to their
effectiveness in a multicultural and conflicted urban environment in the modern world. The
usefulness of geographic information systems (GIS), including participatory GIS, for facilitating
comprehensive, effective planning decisions and helping to solve Jerusalem’s many planning
issues, was also advanced.
4

Although Jerusalem is the crux of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given the proximity and
undeniable interdependence of the city’s two polarized communities—not to mention the myriad
other cultural, religious, and ethnic populations present between and within these catch-all
demonyms—it is also an ideal environment for dialogue, cooperation, and the promotion of
shared interests. This research seeks to discover those interests through the systematic
assessment of environmental perceptions, attitudes, and worldviews among the city’s diverse
individuals and groups. Further evaluation and promotion of common activities, values,
concerns, and goals, by researchers, elected officials, and citizens, Israeli and Palestinian alike,
has the potential to foster inclusive, empowered planning decisions and the development of a city
that is livable for all residents, shared instead of divided.

5

II. STUDY SITE
1. Location and Natural Environment
Jerusalem is wedged into a prominent crook in the border between Israel and the
Palestinian territory of the West Bank. The city covers 125 km2 (48 mi2 or 125,000 dunams) of
valleys and ridges within the Judaean Mountains, ranging between 600-850 meters in elevation
(Israel Regional Database, 2005). To the west, rocky pine-covered mountains slope down into
rolling foothills and the fertile coastal plain, meeting the Mediterranean Sea within 60 km (37
mi). To the east, the harsh Judaean Desert sprawls for approximately 23 km (14 mi) before
dropping sharply into the Jordan Rift Valley and meeting the Dead Sea, a hyper-saline lake that
is the lowest point on the Earth’s surface (Gertman and Hecht, 2002) (Figure 2.1.).
Surrounding Jerusalem, and throughout the West Bank, is a patchwork of Israeli and
Palestinian communities of varying sizes. Only 10 km (6 mi) to the north of Jerusalem is the
bustling and crowded town of Ramallah, the de facto administrative, political, and economic
center of the Palestinian government and community in the West Bank. Hebron, the most
populous Palestinian city in the territory, is 30 km (19 mi) to the south. Approximately 45 km
(30 mi) to the northwest is the densely-populated Tel Aviv-Jaffa Metropolitan Area, a series of
rings radiating from Tel Aviv and connecting large cities, smaller villages, farmland, and
kibbutzim (collective farms); 3.2 million people, about 42% of Israel’s population, live within an
area of less than 600 square miles (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012a). South of Tel-Aviv is the
Gaza Strip, one of the most densely-populated territories in the world with a population density
of more than 5,000 people per square mile. The territory capital, Gaza City, is home to over
500,000 Palestinians, making it the largest city in Palestine.

6

Figure 2.1. Map of Israel, the Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and
Surrounding Nations (Created by the author).
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The Jerusalem municipality is divided into sixteen quarters, which are further divided
into 52 sub-quarters or neighborhoods, whose populations are largely Israeli or Palestinian
(Figure 2.2.). Jerusalem’s physical, spiritual, and cultural core is the walled Old City, which is
divided into four distinct ethno-religious quarters: Armenian, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim.
Within these quarters are some of the most revered sites of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The
Old City sits between the Kidron and Hinnom Valleys, and covers the Tyropoeon Valley; the
highest points in the Old City are Mt. Moriah in east and the southwestern hill of Mt. Zion. Over
the centuries the walls have expanded and contracted, with the current walls dating to 1541 CE.
In the mid-19th century, large-scale permanent settlement expanded out of the Old City walls in
all directions, creating the modern, dynamic New City. Some of the first modern settlements
outside of the walls were those of the Haredim or Haredi Jews, also known as Ultra-Orthodox,
although some in the community consider this term pejorative (Shafran, 2014). Today these
communities remain highly insular islands of strict tradition and religious observance, often
conflicting with aspects of mainstream Israel’s modern secularism.
To the east of the Old City are three peaks: Mount Scopus to the northeast; the Mount of
Olives directly east, across the Kidron Valley; and the Mount of Corruption or Mount of Defense
to the southeast. Atop Mount Scopus is one of the four campuses of Hebrew University, Israel’s
top university. To the West of the Old City, across the Hinnom Valley, the New City rises up to
Mount Herzl, the site of Israel’s national cemetery. Jerusalem experiences an exceptionally
pleasant Mediterranean climate. The area receives an abundant 3,400 hours of sunlight a year
(Alpert, 1991) and experiences high amounts of rainfall, around 550 millimeters (21 inches)
annually, mostly between November and April (Israel Meteorological Service, 2007). Rainfall
feeds the city’s subterranean network of springs and aquifers, which were crucial water sources
for ancient Jerusalem and remain important spiritual and cultural resources for modern
8

Jerusalemites. These springs and aquifers are features of the area’s karst topography, resulting
from dissolution of the regional bedrock of Late Cretaceous limestone, dolomite, and chalk
(Amiel et al., 2010). This bedrock’s multi-colored varieties of limestone, known collectively as
“Jerusalem stone”, have been quarried for millennia to build structures throughout the city,
including the Western Wall, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, al-Masjid al-Aqsa (“the Farthest
Mosque”), and the various reincarnations of the Old City walls.

Figure 2.2. Quarters and subquarters of Jerusalem, by majority population group (Created by the
author; adapted from Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015).
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Due to Jerusalem’s cultural, historical, and spiritual significance, the preservation of its
unique landscape and cultural heritage is a top priority for Israeli and Palestinian authorities, as it
was for the British before them. Building and planning regulations that sought to maintain the
city’s character—such as limiting building height, banning industrial construction, and
mandating the use of stone on certain buildings—were established under British rule in the 19th
century (Efrat & Noble, 1988). The city functions primarily as an administrative, political, and
cultural center; industrial and manufacturing activities are limited. When compared to Israeli and
Palestinian cities of comparable size, but with higher levels of commercial and industrial activity
(such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, or Gaza City), Jerusalem enjoys a higher level of environmental quality
and lower levels of environmental hazards, such as air pollution and traffic congestion (Drori &
Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002). In particular, level of the air pollutants Carbon Monoxide (CO) and
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) are consistently lower in Jerusalem than in Tel Aviv-Jaffa (Jerusalem
Institute for Israel Studies, 2015g). The municipality maintains a large number of public parks,
gardens, “green corners”, and other green spaces, totaling an area of approximately 1,500 acres
(Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2013a). Western Jerusalem is also bordered by 300 acres
of new-growth pine forest. Public parks are common in West Jerusalem, numbering over 1,000;
45 public parks can be found in East Jerusalem, although it covers a larger area (B’Tselem,
2011).
Jerusalem is traversed by a public transportation system of light rail and city buses, and is
connected to the rest of Israel and the West Bank by train, intercity buses, and highways. The
Jerusalem Light Rail, completed in 2011, travels 13.5 km between Mount Herzl in the southwest
and the Jewish suburb of Pisgat Ze’ev in the northeast. The public bus system, made up of 68 bus
lines with 1,545 stations, covers West and East Jerusalem. Despite efforts by some Haredi
(strictly Orthodox Jewish) fringe groups, public transportation is not officially segregated by
10

gender. Jerusalem’s public transportation system is highly utilized by both residents and tourists
of all stripes. The light rail line is accessible to all residents and visitors, and announcements are
made in Arabic, English, and Hebrew. In 2012, there were 105,000 boardings of the light rail
line and 441,019 boardings of the buses per weekday (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies,
2013d). East Jerusalem is served by a separate fleet of 285 public buses, which do not venture
into West Jerusalem. Between 1998 and 2014, the number of passengers utilizing the East
Jerusalem public transportation system, increased from 18,000 to 91,280, and the number of
daily trips from 725 to 3,528 (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015f).
Given the city’s history of physical separation, many residents appreciate the connectivity
the system provides between the city’s diverse neighborhoods and between residents who might
not interact otherwise. As one older Jewish resident commented in 2011, “I never spoke to an
Arab before I rode this tram” (Teller, 2011). In a city separated by strong sociopolitical divisions,
the light rail tram is a shared space where diverse Jerusalemites interact peacefully on a daily
basis. An Orthodox Jewish man or gun-toting female Israeli soldier riding next to a Muslim
woman in hijab or an Arab youth in a keffiyeh (a scarf commonly used to symbolize Palestinian
nationalism) is a common sight. However, although the light rail was constructed with the goal
of connecting and promoting community between Jerusalem’s disparate halves, a recent slew of
attacks on Jerusalem’s public transportation—climaxing in the summer of 2014, during increased
hostilities between Israel, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Palestinians in the West Bank—have
created palpable tension and conflict within what was once a shared communal space. As in
other contexts, it is common for violent outbursts by both Israelis and Palestinians to concentrate
on centralized, active transportation modes and nodes.
Although the Jerusalem municipality, as a whole, encounters lower levels of
environmental hazards compared to other large Israeli or Palestinian cities, the environmental
11

quality of East Jerusalem is inferior to that of West Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem basic services
and infrastructure, such as connection to water or sewage networks, water treatment, solid and
medical waste disposal, and street and sidewalk maintenance, range from nonexistent to
insufficient, creating hazardous, substandard living conditions for residents of East Jerusalem
residents, who are mostly Palestinian Arabs (Dumper, 1992; Isaac & Hosh, 1997; Kaminker,
1997). Because it is extremely difficult for a Palestinian resident to obtain a permit for housing
construction or renovation, which is required for official connection to the main water and
sewage networks, many Palestinians must resort to illegal, unlicensed connections; over half of
Palestinian Jerusalemites are connected to the water network illegally, and over a third are not
properly connected to the sewage systems (EWASH, 2010). Even when homes are connected
legally, the existing water and sewage infrastructure in East Jerusalem is so dilapidated that some
residents must rely on septic tanks; at times, sewage overflows into streets and streams, posing a
massive health risk for Palestinian and Israeli residents.
This situation is due not only to strict housing regulations and a discriminatory planning
regime, but also to a lack of adequate municipal investment in infrastructural improvement. West
Jerusalem and Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem have, since the city’s reunification in
1967, received the lion’s share of investment by the municipality, in spite of the fact that nonJewish Jerusalemites pay the same municipal taxes (known as Arnona) as their Jewish
counterparts (Bollens, 1998b; Dajani et al., 2013). As a result, the environment of East Jerusalem
in particular, like its residents, has suffered the consequences. The inequality of planning
policies, infrastructural development, and service provision between West and East Jerusalem is
systematic, and a lack of sensitivity to the most basic needs of Palestinian Jerusalemites is deeply
ingrained in the municipality's modern planning policies and initiatives. The causes and effects
of such discriminatory planning and development policies are discussed in detail in Chapter III,
12

Section Planning in Jerusalem.
2. Population and Sociopolitical Distinctions
Jerusalem has been claimed as the capital of the State of Israel and as the capital of the
State of Palestine, formerly the Palestinian National Authority (The Associated Press, 2013;
Whitbeck, 2013). Both claims are disputed. In 1949, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion
declared West Jerusalem the capital of Israel and ordered the immediate transfer of government
offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (The Knesset, 2003); however, due to Jerusalem’s status as
an international city under United Nations resolutions, most foreign governments kept their
embassies in Tel Aviv. In 1980, the Basic Law of Jerusalem proclaimed that the entire city, both
East and West, was the unified, “eternal” capital of Israel (The Knesset, 1980). East Jerusalem—
the area of the city under the control of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 1948 to 1967—
was declared the capital of the State of Palestine in 1988 by the Palestinian National Council, the
legislative arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (United Nations General
Assembly, 1988). Jerusalem is the capital and largest city within the Jerusalem District, one of
the State of Israel’s six administrative districts, and the capital and largest city of the Jerusalem
Governorate, one of the sixteen administrative areas of the State of Palestine.
Jerusalem is divided socially, geopolitically, and, in certain areas, physically along the
Green Line—the border between Israel and Jordan from 1948 to 1967. This former border
separates the city into East Jerusalem, which has a majority of Arab Muslims who identify as
Palestinian, and West Jerusalem, which is mostly Jewish Israelis. Since the city’s reunification in
1967, ease and frequency of movement between the two areas of the city has improved, although
Palestinian neighborhoods are notoriously isolated from each other and from the rest of the city
by the high concrete separation barrier (called the “security fence” by Israeli authorities) and the
various roadblocks that Palestinian residents must pass through every day. Arab neighborhoods
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exist in West Jerusalem and Jewish neighborhoods exist in East Jerusalem; however, the latter is
much more controversial than the former. Settlement of Jewish Israelis in East Jerusalem is a
contentious practice denounced by the Palestinian, Arab, and international communities. Jewish
neighborhoods established in East Jerusalem after 1967 are often built on traditionally Arab land
that was expropriated, seized, or bought from Palestinian owners following the annexation of
East Jerusalem. Such activity—land seizure, politically-motivated building restrictions, and
state-led settlement that promotes a Jewish demographic majority—occurs throughout the West
Bank. In 2012 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported that there were 7 Israeli
citizens (termed “settlers”) for every 10 Palestinians living in the Jerusalem Governorate, for a
total number of 262,000 settlers throughout 26 settlements (Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics, 2012a).
As a center of culture, spirituality, and politics, Jerusalem mirrors the diversity of Israeli
and Palestinian society. As of December 2015 the population of Israel was estimated at 8.48
million, a 2% increase from 2014 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015b). The population consisted
of 6.4 million Jews, 1.8 million Arabs (including Muslims, Christians, and Druze), and 370,000
other residents (including non-Arab Christians, Armenians, Bahá'ís, Buddhists, Circassians,
Hindus, and Samaritans). At the end of 2015, the projected population of Palestine was 4.75
million, with 2.9 million residing in the West Bank and 1.85 million in the Gaza Strip. The
majority of residents of the Palestinian territories are Arab Muslims, with a significant Christian
minority. Approximately 43% of the Palestinian population in Palestine are defined as
“refugees” by the State of Palestine (Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Over 1.2
million refugees live in the densely populated 141 square miles (365 square kilometers) of the
Gaza Strip, and camps throughout the West Bank hold around another 750,000 people. Camps
near Jerusalem include Dheisheh (13,000 people), Shu`afat (11,000), and Qalandia (11,000),
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which are considered part of Greater Jerusalem and thus under Israeli authority (UNRWA,
2015). Myriad problems, including overcrowding, high unemployment, and insufficient
infrastructure (especially sewage) plague many of the camps and their residents. In addition, the
number of Jewish Israelis living in the West Bank continues to grow, often to the detriment of
existing Palestinian communities, as Israeli communities often enjoy preferential access to land,
water, and other resources.
During 2015, 28,000 people immigrated to Israel, including 7,000 from France, 6,720
from Ukraine, and 6,440 from Russia. Immigration from Ukraine and Russia can largely be
attributed to ongoing political instability and a continuing trend, since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, of Eastern European Jews migrating from former Soviet states. The surge of
immigration from France to Israel over the past two years was cited as an effect of both France’s
stagnant economy and of “a seemingly greater acceptance of anti-Semitism” in France (Bilefsky,
2014); in addition to lethal attacks on a Jewish school in 2014 and kosher supermarket in 2015, a
French watchdog group recorded 508 anti-Semitic incidents between January and May 2015, a
quarter of which were categorized as violent (Kaplan, 2015).
The population of Jerusalem totals 830,000, of which 61% (506,000) are Jewish, 36%
(299,000) are Muslim, and 2% (17,000) are Christian (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies,
2015b). The maintenance of either a Jewish or Muslim demographic majority in Jerusalem is a
common and controversial topic among residents, as both populations vie for physical, cultural,
and political control of the city. Between 1988 and 2013, both populations increased steadily;
however, while the Muslim population grew from 25 to 36% of the city’s population, the Jewish
population declined from 72 to 61%. The fertility rate in Jerusalem (3.87) is higher than the
Israeli average (3.03), with Jewish Jerusalemites having a higher fertility rate than Muslim
Jerusalemites (4.28 versus 3.46, respectively) (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015e).
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Both populations are also relatively young. With a median age of 23.7, the population of
Jerusalem as a whole is young compared to the populations of Israel (29.6), Tel Aviv (35.2), and
Haifa (38.2). The median age for the Muslim population (20) is lower than that of the Jewish
population as a whole (25.7) and that of Arab Christians (33.6); however, the median age among
Haredi Jews is 18 (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015c).
Jerusalemites are highly diverse in terms of culture, language, ethnicity, religion, and
their country of origin. Such diversity provides an ideal environment for the study of how such
factors affect environmental perception, attitudes, and worldviews within an urban context.
Approximately 511,400 residents of Jerusalem are classified as “Jews and Others” and 293,000
as non-Jewish “Arabs” (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2013b). After Gaza City, the
coastal capital of the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem has the second-largest Arab Palestinian population in
Israel and Palestine. The vast majority (around 93%) of Jerusalem's Arab Palestinian population
are not classified as citizens of Israel, but as permanent residents, a distinction that carries great
sociopolitical and legal weight. Permanent residents live and work in Israel without any special
permits, are able to vote in local municipal elections, and are entitled to health insurance and
other benefits through the National Insurance Institute; however, they cannot vote in national
elections, their residency status cannot be passed to a spouse or child (except under certain
conditions), and they are not granted “the right to return to Israel at any time” (B’Tselem, 2010).
Although permanent residents have municipal voting rights, most choose to abstain from voting
as a form of political protest against Israel. This decision severely limits Palestinian
representation and engagement in municipal processes, including planning and development
(Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2013). However, in recent years, the Israeli government has
experienced an uptick in the number of East Jerusalemite Palestinians applying for Israeli
citizenship. While only 114 Palestinians applied in 2003, 1,434 Palestinians applied for
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citizenship between 2012 and 2013, of whom 189 were approved and 169 were rejected, with the
rest remaining in bureaucratic limbo (Lubell, 2015).
There is great cultural, linguistic, and spiritual diversity among Jerusalem’s Christian,
Jewish, and Muslim residents. As of 2011, approximately 117,000 Jewish Jerusalemites were
born abroad. The majority (around 83,000) immigrated from Europe and the Americas
(especially the former Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and France), with an additional 20,000
from Africa (Ethiopia, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt) and 14,300 from Asia (Turkey, Iraq,
Yemen, Iran, and India) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012b). There is also a very small
community of Jews from Kaifeng, China, numbering less than 20 (Haas, 2011). All of these
immigrants (olim) are part of aliyah, the mass migration of Jews to Israel from throughout the
world; aliyah (“ascent”) is a basic tenet of Zionism, or Jewish nationalism. Jerusalem is a
common first place of residence for new immigrants to Israel. In 2011, 15% of all new
immigrants chose to settle in Jerusalem, compared to 5% in Tel Aviv and 7% in Haifa
(Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2013f). This trend is due, in large part, to government
policies that seek to maintain a strong Jewish demographic majority in the capital city by
providing incentives to olim who settle there.
Various sects of Islam, including Sunni, Shi`a, and Sufi, are represented in Jerusalem, as
are various denominations of Christianity, such as Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Roman
Catholic, Ethiopian Orthodox, and Egyptian Copts. There are significant populations of
Armenians, Bahá'ís, Bedouin, Circassians (former inhabitants of the Caucasus region), Druze,
Persians, Mormons, and Turks. The Old City of Jerusalem is home to a small community of
1,000-2,000 Domari, a formerly nomadic people who practice Sunni Islam and are ethnically
related to the Western European Romani, known colloquially as “Gypsies” (Shafrir, 2011: 497).
There are also sizable populations of Filipino, Chinese, and Thai migrant workers (Ellman &
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Lacher, 2003) and expatriate communities hailing from throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and the
Americas. This amalgam of cultural backgrounds contributes to remarkable linguistic diversity
within the city. The majority of residents speak Hebrew and/or Arabic (Israel’s two official
languages), and many can speak English, but a great variety of other languages are also spoken,
including Russian, Amharic, Yiddish, Armenian, Marathi (one of India's 23 official languages),
Romanian, Circassian, Domari, French, Italian, German, Chinese, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, and
Persian; furthermore, over 35 different languages are spoken throughout Israel (Language Policy
Research Center, 2013).
Israeli Jerusalemites are, on average, poorer than residents of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Israel
as a whole. The average monthly wage for Jerusalemites in 2010 was 7,639 New Israeli Sheqel
(NIS) (about $2,150), while Tel Avivim earned 10,837 NIS, Haifans earned 9,924 NIS, and the
average Israeli earned 9,013 NIS (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2013c). Palestinian
Jerusalemites are, on average, wealthier than Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with
increased employment and education opportunities; however, as of 2010, 77% of Palestinians in
East Jerusalem live below the poverty line, compared to 25.4% of Jewish Jerusalemites
(UNCTAD, 2013). The poverty rate among Haredi families is higher than among other Jewish
families and, while the Arab poverty rate decreased slightly from 2012 to 2013 (from 54% to
52%), the poverty rate increased significantly among the Haredi population, from 65% to 74%
(Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015h). In 2011 the per capita GDP (per capita income) in
the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) was 6,945 NIS ($1,955) and 3,769 NIS ($1,061) in
the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012b).
For both Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites, rates of participation in the workforce are
lower than those in the rest of Israel. Between 2008 and 2011, the rate of participation in the
Jerusalem workforce (“employees as well as unemployed persons who were actively seeking
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work, over the age of 15”) was 50% among the Jewish population (compared to 61% in Israel)
and 37% for the Arab population (compared to 41% in Israel) (Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, 2013f). Among Jews in Jerusalem, rates of participation in the workforce are higher for
Jewish women than for Jewish men, due to the high number of Haredi men who attend yeshiva
(school for the study of Jewish religious texts) full time; this situation is unique to Jerusalem,
which has the largest Haredi population in Israel. In contrast, Arab men in Jerusalem have a
higher rate of participation in the workforce (59%) than Arab women (15%), who are
traditionally discouraged from working outside of the home; a similar trend is present throughout
Israel.
Jerusalemites are a distinctly religious group. Between 2011 and 2013, while only 9% of
Israeli Jews (20 years and older) identified themselves as Haredi (the most religiously observant
branch of Judaism) and 10% as observant, 34% of Jerusalem’s Jews identified as Haredi and
19% as observant; conversely, while 43% of Israelis and 64% of Tel Avivim identify as
secular/non-religious, only 20% of Jerusalemites identify as such (Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, 2015d) (Figure 2.3.). The non-Jewish population is comparably religious. In the same
period, 15% of non-Jewish Jerusalemites defined themselves as “very religious” and 60% as
“religious”; only 4% said they were “not religious” and the remaining 21% said they were “not
very religious”.
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Figure 2.3. Jewish Population Aged 20 and Over in Israel, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv-Yafo and Haifa,
by Religious Identification, 2011-2013, from 2015 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook (Diagram
III/18; Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015d)
Jerusalem’s crime statistics are particularly intriguing, especially when compared to
Israeli cities of comparable size. The volume of crimes committed (by both adults and juveniles)
in Jerusalem is higher than in Tel Aviv or Haifa, but the character of the crimes is very different.
Of the 16,786 crimes committed in Jerusalem in 2010 (compared to 9,419 in Tel Aviv and 1,953
in Haifa) 29% were “licensing offenses”, compared to 0.5% in Tel Aviv, 1.1% in Haifa, and
6.6% in Israel as a whole (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2013e). Although information
on the demographics of perpetrators is not provided with this data, due to the frequency of
unpermitted construction in Palestinian neighborhoods, it is assumed that Palestinian residents of
Jerusalem are cited for such licensing offenses more frequently than their Israeli counterparts
(Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2013). Illegal building occurs in the Jewish neighborhoods of West
Jerusalem as well, but to a lesser degree and with less threat of legal repercussions (Chiodelli,
2012a). Offenses “against the security of the state” and “against public order” also comprise a
larger percentage of total crimes in Jerusalem than in Tel Aviv and Haifa. However, the
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percentages of “sexual offenses”, “moral offenses”, “property offenses”, “fraud offenses”, and
“offenses causing bodily harm” are much lower in Jerusalem than in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Israel
(Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2013e).
The myriad ethnicities, cultures, languages, and religious traditions displayed proudly
within Jerusalem society make the city unique among cities in the region and throughout the
world. The history of the city is also unlike any other, for no place has been so revered or
contested by such a variety of peoples. Each ruling authority has manifested their political
aspirations and cultural heritage in the city’s architecture, development, and pattern of growth,
creating a multifaceted urban landscape that exhibits a mosaic of traditions while simultaneously
striving for a place in the modern world.
3. History, Heritage, and Urban Development
The illustrious history of Jerusalem spans over five millennia, during which it has been
besieged twenty-three times, captured and recaptured forty-four times, completely destroyed
twice, and controlled by no less than fifteen kingdoms, empires, and nations (Cline: 2004). This
history has been detailed in innumerable secular and religious texts, filling pages as numerous as
the stars and occupying historians and exegetes for centuries. The brief—and by no means
exhaustive—history recounted here serves to provide social and political context for the policies,
processes, and phenomena that shaped Jerusalem’s landscape over the millennia; thus, historical
periods are distinguished by the prevailing forces at the time, such as Roman, Crusader, Muslim,
British, and so on. An understanding of modern Jerusalem’s physical form and its complicated
cultural, political, and economic inner workings is contingent upon an understanding of the city’s
political and spiritual past, as manifested in the planning and development policies imposed on
the urban landscape by its various authorities. As Cline writes, “it may be that the fires that
burned in this bitterly contested city can serve to illuminate the way ahead”.
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Canaanite and Egyptian Periods (3000-1000 BCE)
The evolution of Jerusalem’s physical and political landscape began early in recorded
history. The ancient world knew the area encompassing modern Israel, the Palestinian territories,
Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan as Canaan. This land was home to a variety of Semitic and nonSemitic groups, including the Canaanites, Hittites, Israelites, and Philistines (the origin of the
toponym “Palestine”) (Cline, 2004). Settlement of the Jerusalem area by the Canaanites
(traditionally regarded as descendants of Noah, the primary character of the Biblical flood
narrative) began in the Early Bronze Age (circa 3000-2800 BCE) on a raised area just north of
the intersection of the Hinnom, Kidron, and Tyropoeon Valleys (“Jerusalem”, 2000). This site
was chosen for its strategic elevated position and its access to the intermittent Gihon Spring,
which provided residents with fresh water in the harsh mountain environment. Today this small
area is known as the Ophel, a Hebrew word meaning “stronghold”. According to Abrahamic
tradition it was here that the Biblical patriarch Abraham was given bread and wine by
Melchizedek, the priest-king of the city of Salem; many years later, on God’s order, Abraham
would almost sacrifice his son on Mt. Moriah, just north of the Ophel. Today this site is marked
by the Foundation Stone within the Dome of the Rock, a shrine constructed by the Islamic
caliphate which holds great significance for members of the Abrahamic faiths.
One of the earliest possible references to ancient Jerusalem outside of scripture is found
in Middle Kingdom Egyptian execration texts dated circa 2000 BCE, which mention a place
called Rushalimum (Wenkel, 2007); however, the translation of this name is disputed among
some modern scholars. More agreed-upon and recognizable evidence of Jerusalem’s early
existence is found in the Amarna letters, a series of clay tablets containing correspondence
between Egyptian bureaucrats and local Canaanite rulers during the period of the New Kingdom
of Egypt, circa 14th century BCE (Na`aman, 1996). These letters reveal that the Canaanite city
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of Urusalim was ruled by a king named Abdi-Heba, who had been appointed by the Pharaoh as
the head of the local dynasty. Although archaeological evidence from this period is relatively
scant, the picture of Urusalim court society painted by the Amarna letters indicates some level of
sophistication, culture, and order. As a royal capital—albeit the capital of a modest kingdom—
Urusalim would have had a palace, temple, and small Egyptian garrison; in addition, Abdi-Heba
offered tribute to the Pharaoh and corresponded with Egypt using an educated court scribe. The
city also functioned as a commercial hub for the immediate area. By the Late Bronze Age, the
settlement had grown to 50 dunams, or around 13 acres, an average size for Canaanite
settlements of the time (Shiloh, 1980). Assuming a population density of 40-50 persons per
dunam, the population of Jerusalem at this point can be estimated as between 2,000-2,500 people
(Figure 2.4.).

Figure 2.4. Map of Canaanite Urusalim (Jerusalem) (Terrestrial Jerusalem, 2016).
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Israelite and Roman/Byzantine/Sassanid Periods (1000 BCE-637 CE)
By the 13th century BCE the Israelite tribes of Benjamin and Judah had laid separate
claims to the area surrounding Jerusalem, but the city remained under the control of the
Jebusites, a Canaanite tribe, for another 300 years. According to Biblical tradition, around 1050
BCE the newly-anointed Israelite king David captured the stronghold, then known as Jebus, and
established the capital city of the United Kingdom of Israel; the remnants of this ancient capital
make up modern Jerusalem’s oldest neighborhood and most extensively-excavated
archaeological site, the City of David (Emmett, 1996). The siting of the kingdom’s new capital in
an area with no tribal allegiances was a calculated move by David, who sought to create a unified
capital for all of the Israelite tribes. Under David’s four decades of leadership, the kingdom grew
and prospered. His son, Solomon, built the First Temple and extended the city to the north of the
Ophel (Figure 2.5.).
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Figure 2.5. Map of Jerusalem under David and Solomon (Terrestrial Jerusalem, 2016).
The northern Israelite tribes seceded from the kingdom after Solomon’s death in 931
BCE—resulting in the northern kingdom of Samaria and the southern kingdom of Judea—but
Jerusalem remained the royal capital of the southern tribes and a hub of Israelite society. The fall
of Samaria to the Assyrians in 721 BCE and the ceding of certain Judean provinces to the
Philistines by the Assyrian ruler Sennacherib around 701 BCE created an influx of refugees from
the north into Judea and, as a result, archaeological evidence suggests that Jerusalem increased to
three to four times its previous size within just a few decades. While Jerusalem was
approximately 44 dunams under David and around 150 dunams in the 8th century, by the 7th
century the city had increased to at least 500 dunams, with approximately 24,000 inhabitants
(Broshi, 1974). In response, Hezekiah (ruler between 715 and 686 BC) expanded the city to the
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west, enhanced the existing fortifications, and greatly improved the city’s water supply by
building a series of well-engineered aqueducts and tunnels, which remain intact and functional
today. Excavations west of Hezekiah’s walls also suggest the existence of an unfortified
suburb—an unsurprising method of adaptation to the explosive growth of the city.
In 587 BCE the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar destroyed Jerusalem (including the
temple) for the first time and enslaved many of the city’s residents. This period of slavery would
last for 50 years, until the renowned Achaemenid Persian king Cyrus the Great defeated the
Babylonians. In a display of humanity and goodwill rare in the ancient world, Cyrus not only
freed the Jews from slavery but also provided funds to rebuild Jerusalem and the Jewish temple
(Reyner & Philips, 1975). Cyrus cited his actions as directives from God; these actions are
recounted not only in scripture (Ezra 1:1-6 New International Version) but also on the Cyrus
Cylinder, a clay cylinder discovered in Mesopotamia and dating to the 6th century BCE. The
area of former Judea thus became the autonomous province of Yehud Medinata within the
Persian Empire.
The rebuilding of Jerusalem and construction of the Second Temple, completed in the
mid-6th century, was directed by the province’s governor Nehemiah and is documented in his
titular book of the Hebrew Bible. In the next few centuries Jerusalem would fall to the Greeks
under Alexander the Great in 332 BCE. Under Greek rule, like many other cities conquered by
the empire, Jerusalem took on a Hellenistic character, including the construction of a public
gymnasium, theater, hippodrome, and amphitheater (Levine, 2002). Foreign non-Jewish rule
prompted a series of revolts by Judaeans and the establishment of the Jewish Hasmonean
dynasty, which ruled until the mid-1st century BCE with Jerusalem as its capital. The Temple
would stand through this period, a concrete symbol of Jewish faith, culture, and power. In 37
BCE the city was taken by Herod, king of the Roman province of Judaea, who proceeded to
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greatly expand the Temple complex and further strengthen the city’s fortifications (Figure 2.6.).
It was during the Herodian period that the events of the Christian Gospels, recounting the life,
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, occurred in Jerusalem and the surrounding region. The
area is thus regarded as the birthplace of the Christian faith and Jerusalem as its most sacred city.

Figure 2.6. Map of Hashmonean and Herodian Jerusalem (Terrestrial Jerusalem, 2016).

Jewish revolts and riots against the Romans continued throughout the next few decades,
until Jerusalem and the Temple were completely destroyed for the second time by the Roman
general (and future emperor) Titus in 70 CE. The event is commemorated in a relief on the Arch
of Titus in the Forum of Rome, which depicts Roman soldiers carrying the Temple’s grand
menorah and other spoils (Figure 2.7.). According to the firsthand account of the Jewish-Roman
historian Josephus, although the western wall of the Temple was spared to provide shelter for a
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Roman garrison camp and three of the city’s towers were left to hint at the power the Romans
had defeated:
...as for all the rest of the wall [surrounding Jerusalem], it was so thoroughly laid
even with the ground by those that dug it up to the foundation, that there was left
nothing to make those that came thither believe it had ever been inhabited. This
was the end which Jerusalem came to...a city otherwise of great magnificence,
and of mighty fame among all mankind (Josephus, 75/1737).

Figure 2.7. Arch of Titus relief panel, showing Roman soldiers with the spoils of Jerusalem
(Steven Zucker, 2010).
The city was left in ruins, depopulated and unlivable, and remained so for several
decades. Between 120 and 130 CE the Roman emperor Hadrian returned to the spot and
established a Roman colony, Aelia Capitolina, within the Roman province of Syria Palaestina.
Jews and Christians were forbidden from entering the city (Reyner & Philips, 1975: 329). As
with the Greeks, the character of the city was altered by its Roman rulers and their architectural
and planning standards. Roman Jerusalem was replete with temples to Roman gods and
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goddesses (the site of the Second Temple became that of the Temple of Jupiter); the cityscape
included a Forum and the standard Roman cardo, the main street running north to south,
beginning at the northern Damascus Gate, and the east-west decumanus street (Figure 2.8.).
Aelia Capitolina and its cardo are prominently featured in the Madaba Map, located in a church
in Madaba, Jordan (Figure 2.9.). This Byzantine floor mosaic, dating to the second half of the 6th
century CE, is the oldest surviving depiction of the Middle East and Holy Land (Donner, 1992:
14). A well-preserved fragment of the cardo survives in the Old City’s central HaKardo Street.
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Figure 2.8. Map of Aelia Capitolina (Roman Jerusalem) (Base map from Terrestrial Jerusalem,
2016; Annotations by the author).
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Figure 2.9. Madaba Map segment depicting Aelia Capitolina (Roman Jerusalem). [Because the
map is oriented eastward, the north-south cardo runs horizontally. Annotations by the author].

Constantine the Great—Rome’s first Christian emperor—took a particular interest in
Jerusalem’s Christian history and character. In the early 4th century, he ordered the construction
of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre on the site traditionally regarded as site of Jesus’
crucifixion, which was then occupied by a temple to the goddess Venus. Constantine would build
several other churches and basilicas throughout the area, fostering Jerusalem’s identity as a
Christian city (Hunt, 1997). The area would remain under Roman control until the 7th century,
when it fell to the Persian Sassanid Empire following the Siege of Jerusalem. It would pass
between the Byzantines and Persians before finally being captured by Muslims under Caliph
`Umar I in 638 CE, a few years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam.
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Muslim and Crusader Periods (638 CE -1516 CE)
After capturing Jerusalem from the Byzantines, `Umar I put great care and energy into
manifesting the city’s Islamic character (Figure 2.10.). He built al-Masjid al-Aqsa, located on the
Temple Mount or al-Haram ash-Sharif (the “Noble Sanctuary”), by then the site of a Byzantine
basilica. Over the next seven centuries, successive caliphs of the Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid,
and Fatimid caliphates would follow his lead, constructing mosques, shrines, and other splendid
monuments throughout Jerusalem and the rest of the growing Islamic world. One of the most
magnificent and ambitious of these architectural endeavors was the Dome of the Rock,
completed in 691/692 CE by Caliph `Abd al-Malik. This structure encloses the Foundation
Stone, asserted by Muslim tradition to be the site from which Muhammad ascended into heaven
after his “Night Journey” from Mecca to Jerusalem in 620 CE. It is also a site of significance for
Christians and Jews, as the Foundation Stone is traditionally regarded as the site where Abraham
almost sacrificed Isaac. Modeled after contemporary Byzantine churches—indeed, designed to
surpass them—the Dome of the Rock became the first monumental building of Islam. It was
promoted as a site of pilgrimage and Islamic culture, drawing a multitude of Muslims to the
previously Judeo-Christian and Roman city, both as pilgrims and as permanent residents. Today,
the monument’s striking gold dome and breathtaking blue mosaics stand out in a sea of pale
Jerusalem stone, a treasured centerpiece within the sprawling cityscape (Figure 2.11.).
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Figure 2.10. Map of Umayyad and Abbasid Jerusalem (Base map from Terrestrial Jerusalem,
2016; Annotations by the author).

Figure 2.11. Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque on the Old City’s al-Haram ash-Sharif.
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Under the caliphs, Christians and Jews—members of the other monotheistic Abrahamic
faiths, known as “People of the Book” or dhimmi—and other non-Muslims, such as Zoroastrians,
were protected but lived under stricter laws than their Muslim neighbors. It was during this postconquest, pre-Crusader period that the current configuration and distribution of faith-based
quarters began to emerge as the Muslim population grew—by natural increase, immigration, and
conversion—and the Christian populations splintered into different sects (Hopkins, 1971),
reflecting a greater trend in Christianity throughout Europe. Christendom was experiencing an
internal conflict that would eventually lead to the Great Schism: the split between the Eastern
Orthodox and Western Catholic Churches. The Oriental Orthodox Churches (including
Armenian, Coptic, and Ethiopian) had separated seven centuries earlier with their rejection of the
Council of Chalcedon. In 1096, at the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II incited Christian
clergy and laymen to march toward Jerusalem and reclaim it for Christendom. The source of
Urban’s ire was the encroachment of Seljuk Turks on the Eastern Byzantine Empire but at
Clermont he stressed the importance of Jerusalem to the Christian faith and tradition—“the city
in which He dwelt and suffered”—and lamented its capture by Muslims (Krey, 1921: 37).
According to the French priest Fulcher of Chartres, who was in attendance, Urban beseeched
Crusaders to go to the aid of their fellow Christians in the East and “expel that wicked race from
our Christian lands before it is too late” (Fulcher of Chartres, 1127/1971). Waves of Crusaders
began their eastern march the following year.
In Jerusalem, anti-Christian riots began a series of public interfaith conflicts that
culminated in the expulsion of Christians by the ruling Fatimid caliph in 1099. That same year,
the first wave of Crusaders arrived outside of Jerusalem’s walls. After a month-long siege they
entered and sacked the city, indiscriminately slaughtering Jews and Muslims. The city would
serve as the capital of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1099 to 1187, during which
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Christian pilgrimage and the construction of Christian structures flourished (Figure 2.12.). The
Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque were converted to a church and a palace, respectively;
indeed, a 12th century Christian map of Jerusalem indicates the unmistakable Dome of the Rock
as Templum Domini, “Temple of God”, and depicts a cross topping the massive dome (Boas,
2001; Gilbert, 1987).

Figure 2.12. Map of Crusader Jerusalem (Base map from Terrestrial Jerusalem, 2016;
Annotations by the author).
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In 1187 the city was retaken by Muslims under the military leadership of Saladin.
Muslim shrines and mosques were converted back into Islamic centers of worship. This cycle of
destruction, construction, redesign, and reappropriation—mirroring the growth and decline of
power among the different religious populations—would continue for more than three centuries
as Jerusalem was passed back and forth between Muslim and Christian rule. These rulers showed
varying degrees of tolerance. In 1267 the Catalan Jewish scholar Nachmanides (also known as
Ramban) traveled to Jerusalem and prayed at the Western Wall. He noted that there were two
Jewish families in the city.
Ottoman and British Periods (1517-1948)
The Ottoman Turks captured Jerusalem in 1516 and would retain control for four
centuries. Most growth was contained within the Old City walls, which were expanded by
Suleiman to their modern position in the 1530s. The policies of the Ottoman Empire—and the
empire’s relations with rising European powers—affected Jerusalem in ways that continue to
resonate today. Although its political and economic influence was minimal under Ottoman rule,
the city remained an important spiritual center. Pilgrims from all three monotheistic faiths
continued to flock to the city from Europe and the rest of the known world, establishing a
tourism economy that continues to thrive (Doumani, 1992). Jerusalem continued to grow and
become more open to missionaries and pilgrims of various religions and denominations. Under
the Ottomans, Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine benefited from the modernizing tanzimat
(“reorganization”) reforms, which established administrative divisions, a postal service, and a
census. Increased administration also meant increased safety, encouraging growth outside of the
protection of the Old City walls.
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At the middle of the 19th century, the only structures in the hills surrounding Jerusalem
were cemeteries, small villages, farms, and the seasonal residences (qusur) of wealthy
Jerusalemite Muslims. Islamic mosques, shrines, and dilapidated religious complexes, all
manifestations of Muslim identity remaining from the late 13th and early 14th centuries, dotted
the countryside (Kark & Landman, 1980). By 1851, Jerusalem’s population had passed 25,000
and was largely contained within the roughly 130 acres (.2 square miles) of the walled Old City.
Sanitation issues, disease, overcrowding, and water insecurity plagued residents. Ottoman
administrative and infrastructural improvements in Palestine included not only increased security
and pavement of the roads leading from Jerusalem to Jaffa on the coast and through the
mountains north to Nablus, providing a conduit for safe, fast travel to and from the holy city, and
creating a focal point for expansion. Various European authorities began to take a greater interest
in Jerusalem’s political and religious significance. Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox churches
sought improved services and greater protection for their pilgrims to the Holy Land. Last, but not
least, mid-century Ottoman land reforms enabled non-Ottomans to own land in Palestine. The
opening of Palestine to outside influence would begin a period of accelerated immigration,
demographic change, and duplicitous political bargaining that continue to affect Jerusalem and
the surrounding region to this day.
Beginning in the mid-19th century, Christian and Jewish families and groups—largely
utilizing funds from European benefactors, such as the Russian government and the Jewish
British banker Moses Montefiore—began to move outside of the walls in search of more livable,
spacious conditions and increased business opportunities (Kark & Oren-Nordheim, 2001).
Christian groups constructed schools, hospitals, and other public buildings; many, such as the
formidable Russian Complex, stand today. Foreign and local Christians and Jews began to
establish residential neighborhoods, isolated homes, and public institutions outside of the walls
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around the 1850s. Wealthy local Muslims established permanent, non-seasonal dwellings north
of the city walls, particularly in the area of the modern Palestinian neighborhood of Sheikh
Jarrah, where they could maintain easy access to the Muslim Quarter and al-Haram ash-Sharif;
beginning in the early 1870s (Kark & Landman, 1980). Most structures built outside of the walls
were veritable fortresses boasting thick, high walls and gates that were locked at night. In 1860
the first Jewish neighborhood built outside of the walls, Mishkenot Sha’ananim (meaning
“Peaceful Habitation”), was established by Montefiore to the southwest of the Old City. In 1874
the neighborhood of Mea She’arim (“one hundred gates”)—known today for being one of
Jerusalem’s most insular and strictly-observant Jewish enclaves—was established to the
northwest by Haredi Jews seeking to segregate themselves from the rest of Jerusalem society as a
way of maintaining their religious traditions and practices (Fenster, 2005). Such insularity was
common within these new communities, regardless of religious or ethnic orientation. It was
merely a continuation of Jerusalem’s status quo, as such ethno-religious divisions had dictated
territory and interactions within the walls throughout much of the city’s existence. In the late
Ottoman period the various non-Muslim populations also began to enjoy greater rights and
opportunities, thus attracting immigration, particularly by European Jews seeking solace from
growing anti-Semitism in Europe.
With the end of the 19th century came the first wave of large-scale Jewish immigration—
around 35,000 people—into Ottoman Palestine. Successive surges of immigration—referred to
as Aliyah, “ascent”—would bring almost half a million Jews to Palestine, with the largest surge
coming in the decade leading up to World War II. Although Jewish communities had existed in
the area for generations, this massive, sudden influx of European Jews created great tension
between the new immigrants and local Arabs. Mass Jewish immigration from Europe to
Palestine was promoted by the ideology of Zionism, a political movement articulated by the
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Austro-Hungarian author and activist Theodor Herzl in his pamphlet Der Judenstaat (The Jewish
State), first published in 1896. Herzl advocated the establishment of an independent Jewish state
as a means of combating growing anti-Semitism in Europe. As to the location of such a state,
Herzl stated, “Shall we choose Palestine or Argentine? We shall take what is given us, and what
is selected by Jewish public opinion” (Herzl, 1896/1988: 96). A Jewish population had existed in
Argentina since the expulsion of Sephardic Jews from Spain in the 16th century, reaching its peak
in the early 20th century; Herzl also noted fertile soil and a mild climate as potential draws.
However, going beyond physical considerations, he described Palestine as “our ever-memorable
historic home” and cited this aspect as a potent draw for Jews to a newly-established Jewish
state. It must also be noted that Herzl—in a show of cultural self-superiority common among
Europeans of the time—characterized the presence of a Jewish state in Palestine as “a rampart of
Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism”; while he explicitly
stated that Christian holy places would be protected with extra-territorial status, no consideration
was given to the concerns of the local Muslim population and their centers of worship. The next
year, Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland and established the Zionist
Organization (ZO), later the World Zionist Organization, with the stated goal of establishing a
Jewish state in Palestine (Figure 2.13.). Many of the administrative institutions established and
developed within the ZO would survive as administrative divisions of the State of Israel, with
some remaining in place today.
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Figure 2.13. Hebrew poster for the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel, 1901. Lower caption reads,
“May our eyes behold your return to Zion with mercy”.

Concurrently with the Zionists’ concentrated work to establish a Jewish state in Palestine,
the actions of Arab, British, French, Ottoman, and Russian powers were culminating to forever
alter the boundaries, politics, and power structures of the Middle East. While some might claim
that the modern Arab-Israeli conflict began with Isaac and Ishmael (sons of Abraham by Sarah
and Hagar who are claimed as progenitors of Jews and Muslims, respectively) in reality, the
conflict that rages today is a direct result of a series of events beginning with British and French
colonialism in the Middle East between the 18th and 20th centuries, as well as the oftenconflicting goals of Arab and Jewish nationalism, and culminating in the establishment of an
independent Israel by the leaders of Zionism in Palestine in 1948.
Two of the most significant events in the history of Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East,
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were the issuance of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in May 1916 and the Balfour Declaration in
November 1917. The former was the result of a series of negotiations between Mark Sykes, a
British diplomat, and François Georges-Picot, a French diplomat, which determined the
partitioning of Ottoman territory following the Ottomans’ defeat by the British and French in
World War I. In short, the French would control Greater Syria (where they had commercial and
religious interests) and the British would directly control the area of Iraq, in order to exploit the
regions existing oil resources and railroad infrastructure; Palestine, including Jerusalem but
excluding Haifa, was distinguished as an International area, and the agreement would also
distinguished areas of indirect British and French control (Figure 2.14.). The Balfour Declaration
is regarded as one of the singular most important documents of Jewish, Israeli, and Zionist
history. In November of 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour wrote a letter to Walter
Rothschild, a prominent figure in the British Jewish community, which stated:
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing nonJewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country (Balfour, 1917).
In truth, the British were playing both sides, placating the interests and demands of both Arab
and Jewish nationalists, all while pursuing their own economic and territorial goals in postWorld War I Palestine, the Middle East, and Asia.
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Figure 2.14. Map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria, and Western Persia by the British Royal
Geographical Society (1910), with annotations by Mark Sykes & François Georges-Picot dated
“8 May 1916” and signed by both men in the lower right corner. [Annotations: Blue coloring,
Direct French Control; Red, Direct British Control; Yellow, International Zone; Area A, Indirect
French Influence; Area B, Indirect British Influence].

On December 27th, 1918, Sir Edwin Samuel Montagu—the Liberal Secretary of the State
of India—and Faisal bin Husayn al-Hashimi—the imminent ruler of the Arab Kingdom of Syria,
including the Sanjak of Jerusalem—met in London. Among the topics of discussion were Syria,
the nationalist Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, the burgeoning Wahhabi Islam movement, and
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Zionist activity in Palestine. According to a contemporary record of the meeting, when
questioned on the last subject:
Feisal remarked that the Arabs were under deep obligations to Great Britain, and
that it would ill become them to make difficulties over a question of which they
regard the British Government as the best judges. The Arabs recognise that many
conflicting interests are centered in Palestine… [and] admit the moral claims of
the Zionists. They regard the Jews as kinsmen whose just claims they will be glad
to see satisfied. They feel that the interests of the Arab inhabitants may safely be
left in the hands of the British Government (Shuckburgh, 1918).

Throughout the first three decades of the 20th century, Jews from around Europe—fleeing
growing anti-Semitism that would culminate in the horrors of the Holocaust during World War
II—continued to immigrate en masse to Palestine, leading to fear and anger among Palestinian
Arabs over their economic opportunities, access to holy places, and the future of an Arab state in
Palestine (Sela, 1994). The unfettered sale of land to Zionist groups was also a point of extreme
contention. In August 1929, this animosity erupted in violence when a series of riots led to the
deaths of 133 Jews and 110 Arabs, the former having been killed by the latter and the latter
killed by British forces trying to restore order. The subsequent British investigation and report of
the riots, the Shaw Commission, would suggest that a solution would be increased limits on
Jewish immigration to Palestine and increased efforts to understand and accommodate
Palestinian Arab goals regarding the establishment of their own independent state. However, by
that point, the floodgates had been opened for too long to stem the tide of Jewish immigration;
even after strict quotas were created, massive numbers of illegal Jewish immigrants continued to
pour into Palestine. Spurred by the rise of Nazism in Germany and its effects, which were felt
throughout Europe, almost 300,000 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine between 1929 and
1939, during what is termed the Fifth Aliyah. Most settled in growing Tel Aviv, but many were
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absorbed into existing Zionist agricultural communes (moshavim or kibbutzim) or founded their
own on land either purchased or illegally seized from Arabs.
Between 1936 and 1939, Palestinian Arabs staged a revolt against British forces, angered
by their continued political and military support of Zionist causes, including arming Zionist
paramilitary organizations. The revolt began with a national Arab strike called in 1936, to which
British forces responded by demolishing Palestinian homes in both urban and rural areas. Over
the next decade, the cycle of Arab and Zionist violence and failed British peacekeeping attempts,
would continue. Jews would continue to pour in from Europe, Africa, and the Arab nations
surrounding Palestine. Tensions and violence between the British and the Zionists in Palestine
climaxed on July 22, 1946, with the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem—the
headquarters of British Mandatory authorities—by the Zionist military organization Irgun. Both
Irgun and Haganah, of which Irgun was an offshoot, would later become the Israeli Defense
Forces. The following year, the British forces would announce their withdrawal from Palestine,
having been unable to broker a solution between Palestine’s Arabs and Jews. The United Nations
(UN) scrambled to devise a solution and, in November 1947, adopted a resolution to implement
a partition plan that would create both an Arab and Jewish state, with Jerusalem distinguished as
an international zone administered by the UN (Figure 2.15.). Jewish leaders and the majority of
the Jewish population accepted the plan; however, Arab leaders in Palestine and elsewhere
rejected it on the grounds that they would not accept any partition of Palestine, as such a plan
would violate their right of self-determination (United Nations, 2003). On May 14, 1948, the
British Mandate in Palestine expired; the same day, Zionist leaders gathered to announce the
establishment of the independent State of Israel. The next day, members of the Arab League—
including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and several other Arab nations—declared war and invaded.
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Figure 2.15. Map of the UN Partition Plan adopted November 1947, showing the proposed
boundaries of separate Arab and Jewish states, as well as international zone surrounding
Jerusalem.
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Israel and Palestine (1948 – Present Day)
In the years since Israel’s foundation, the nation has been in a constant state of conflict—
both active and inactive, physical and political—with the local Arab population and surrounding
Arab nations. The war of 1948, regarded by Israelis as their war of independence but known to
Palestinians as al-Nakba (“the Catastrophe”), resulted in the expulsion and evacuation of more
than 750,000 Palestinian Arabs to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and other Middle Eastern nations.
Forced to abandon their homes, these Palestinian refugees—and their descendants, estimated to
number over 5 million today—live in a state of limbo, refusing Israeli citizenship and refused
citizenship by the Arab nations to which they fled (UNRWA, 2016). Today, more than 1.5
million of these Palestinians refugees live in 58 refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Gaza
Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; since the beginning of the Syrian civil war,
Palestinian refugees living in the country have been uprooted yet again. Concurrently with the
mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs from Israel, over 850,000 Jews living in Arab nations, such as
Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, were also forced to abandon their ancestral homes; however,
unlike Palestinian refugees, these Jewish refugees were fully absorbed into the new Jewish state
and automatically granted the rights of Israeli citizenship (Hoge, 2007).
Subsequent open warfare between Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab nations, including the
1967 Six-Day War (when the defeat of Jordan by Israel led to the annexation of the West Bank
and the reunification of East and West Jerusalem), 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1982 and 2006
Lebanon Wars, 2008 Gaza War, and the First and Second Intifadas (1987-1993 and 2000-2005),
as well as various skirmishes, citizen violence, rocket launches, and riots, have prevented the
deep wounds of conflict from healing for over 50 years; the majority of Israelis and Palestinians
have lived their entire lives in a state of conflict, fear, and open mistrust with each other, despite
the fact that they often live within a few miles or even a few hundred feet of one another.
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4. The Modern City
Modern Jerusalem struggles to balance between its expansive, volatile history, its status
as a thriving capital and tourism hub, and the needs of both its diverse, growing population and
the steady stream of tourists it welcomes year-round; of the 3.3 million people who visited Israel
in 2014, 82% visited Jerusalem. Within the five decades since reunification (or, in the minds of
many Palestinians, occupation) of East and West Jerusalem, the city has changed immensely,
both physically and culturally. Israelis and Palestinians living in West or East Jerusalem move
across the former Green Line with relative ease and interact on a daily basis. Areas that were
regarded as No-Man’s Land between 1948 and 1967 have become posh, gentrified Israeli
neighborhoods, complete with upscale shops, art galleries, and coffee houses (Figure 2.16.).
Tourists and pilgrims of all religions can visit and worship at their holy places freely—although
access to the Temple Mount or al-Haram ash-Sharif for is fraught with stipulations and heavy
security, and non-Muslims are not allowed to pray openly in the area.

Figure 2.16. Mamilla area, circa 1964 and 2013. Once an inaccessible No-Man’s Land, the area
is today a thriving shopping center.
While Jerusalem’s inter-ethnic and inter-religious struggles receive the most press
coverage and international attention, significant tensions regarding religiosity, ethnicity, and clan
loyalty exist within the city’s different communities. The divide between Haredi Jewish Israelis
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and secular Israelis is a common point of contention throughout Israel, and is nowhere more
apparent than in Jerusalem. The cityscape is frequently the backdrop for protests by the Haredi
community against various manifestations of secular Israeli society, including mandatory
military service, Judaic archaeological finds on construction sites, and public services operating
on Shabbat. The community, equaling 34% of Jerusalem’s population and about 10% of Israel’s
(Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015d), are a significant presence in local and national
politics. Yet, as when they established isolated neighborhoods like Mea Shearim, the Haredi go
to great lengths to ensure that their traditions and identity are preserved, and resist assimilation
into mainstream Israeli society (Figure 2.17.). The most recent point of contention between the
Haredi community and mainstream Israeli society has been the expansion of the mandatory
military draft to include Haredi Israelis who, since Israel’s inception, have been exempt from the
draft. According to various sources, this exemption has enabled the male Haredi community to
focus on studies in the yeshiva, school for the study of the Torah and Talmud, and has allowed
Haredi men and women to avoid assimilation into secular Israeli society. However, like members
of any other culture, Haredi Jews are not a monolith—any assumptions made about behavior or
temperament can quickly be upended by the behavior and actions of individuals (Figure 2.18.).
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Figure 2.17. Haredi men protest against the army draft, in Jerusalem’s Mea Shearim
neighborhood, December 22, 2015 (Sindel, 2015).

Figure 2.18. Haredi man plays electric guitar in Zion Square, Jerusalem (Photo by the author).
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Significant tensions also exist within the Palestinian Arab community, particularly
between different familial clans. Palestinian clans or family associations (called hamail, singular
hamoola) consist of multiple interconnected extended families (ailat), which are further made up
of many individual households (buyut) of varying clout and wealth; the number of individuals
within a single hamoola can range from a dozen to several thousand (Landinfo, 2008). However,
sometimes families within a clan’s structure are unrelated to the central family of the clan,
having pledged their loyalty in return for the clan’s protection or integrated themselves over time
in order to increase their influence. Such hierarchies, which provide a network of social security,
financial assistance, and physical protection, exist throughout settled communities in the West
Bank and Gaza, as well as within refugee camps in Palestine and other nations; the Hebron area,
about 20 miles south of Jerusalem, is particularly noted for its inter-clan activity and conflicts
(Zilberman, 1996). For Palestinians lacking a central, unified government in those areas, clans
signify a protective, powerful authority and provide avenues for political representation, dispute
arbitration, and recourse under clan law. As one researcher observed: “Where states are strong
and can reliably protect citizens, clans weaken; where states are weak, clans are strong”
(Robinson, 2009).
A large aspect of all levels of the Palestinian hamail structure, from the individual to the
hamoola, is the sense of collective honor, which can often lead to the escalation of personal
conflicts between members of different clans. These inter-clan conflicts—which can be triggered
by anything something as minor as a traffic accident—are often dealt with outside of legal
channels, and have the potential to erupt in violence. In the Palestinian communities of Gaza,
refugee camps, and rural parts of the West Bank, some clan groups can also function as armed
militias or criminal groups engaged in smuggling, kidnapping, and contracted killing (Ze’evi,
2008). In 2012 multiple Palestinian Jerusalemites remarked that the Israeli security apparatus,
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normally proactive and swift when it comes to dealing with the Palestinian community, often
allows inter-clan conflicts to escalate to violence without intervening—until it gets to the point of
affecting Israeli citizens or tourists; in short, one resident claimed that the Israeli police “do not
come for us” (A. Duplantis, personal interview, June 2012).
Tension also arises from the disparity in service provision, security, and environmental
quality between different Jerusalem neighborhoods. A survey conducted in Jerusalem between
2013 and 2014 found that Arab residents consistently expressed lower feelings of satisfaction
with their area of residence more than Jewish residents (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015c).
Residents of Jerusalem also expressed less satisfaction with the conditions of their area of
residence more than Israelis in other localities and Israelis in general (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Measures of Satisfaction with Area of Residence among Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem,
and among Israelis in General and in Other Localities (Adapted from “Selected Data on the
Occasion of Jerusalem Day (2013-2014)”, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015c).

JERUSALEM RESIDENTS
% of
Arabs
Satisfied
with
Measure

% of
Jews
Satisfied
with
Measure

% of All
Residents

Area of
residence

64%

81%

75%

Level of
cleanliness

26%

39%

Amount of
parks and
green areas

~15%*

MEASURE

Public
transport
State of
roads and
sidewalks
Feel safe
walking
alone at
night

NAT’L.
AVG.

RESIDENTS OF OTHER LOCALITIES IN
ISRAEL

Ashdod

Haifa

Petah
Tiqwa

Rishon
Leziyon

Tel
AvivYafo

84%

-

-

-

-

-

35%

54%

51%

54%

43%

70%

53%

45%

30%

55%

66%

57%

49%

73%

65%

34%

40%

38%

40%

-

-

-

-

-

30%

43%

38%

57%

-

-

-

-

-

67%

71%

70%

72%

-

-

-

-

-
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Average of
All
Measures

44%

53%

48%

60%

-

-

-

-

-

[*The source did not indicate the percentage of Arabs satisfied with the amount of parks and
green spaces. This figure was estimated using available figures for the measure and by assuming
that the percentage of all Jerusalemites satisfied with a measure is the rough average of the
percentage Arabs and Jews satisfied with the measure.]
The neglect of many East Jerusalem neighborhoods by the Jerusalem municipality
becomes obvious past the former Green Line. Following the route of the light rail line northeast,
as it turns along HaTsanhanim Street from downtown West Jerusalem, to the Damascus Gate
leads through a slice of former no-man’s land that is dominated today by a public transit hub and
a bend of Israel’s Highway 60—also known as Jerusalem’s Road 1. As its name implies, Road 1
is a crucial north-south artery connecting Jerusalem to the rest of Israel; the road also connects
the city to the Palestinian cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem, but travelers to these cities are
subjected to long waits and searches at Israeli military checkpoints (Pullan, 2007). Highway 60
stretches from Nazareth, 25 miles from the Lebanese border, to Be’er Sheva, Israel’s
southernmost large city located in the Negev Desert 30 miles southeast of Gaza City.
Continuing northeast on Sultan Suleiman Street, into the core East Jerusalem, many
notable changes will become apparent: shop signs change from Hebrew to Arabic; Orthodox
Jewish Israelis, ubiquitous in the Orthodox enclaves northwest across Road 1, are replaced by
women in varying degrees of hijab. Further, the quality of buildings, roads, and service provision
deteriorates. Sidewalks along West Jerusalem’s busiest thoroughfares are wide, well-maintained,
and dotted with municipal trash cans (decorated with the Lion of Judah) every 100 meters or so;
the streets are cleaned regularly. East Jerusalem sidewalks along the bustling streets of Sultan
Suleiman or Salah ad-Din are cramped (when they exist), so that pedestrians sometimes must
brave traffic to walk in the street. Municipal trash cans are scarce and garbage often collects in
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piles in the sidewalks and gutters, frequently spilling into the road.
The disparity between Arab and Jewish areas of Jerusalem is the result of neglect by
Jordanian authorities from 1949 to 1967, and by Israeli authorities since annexation following
the Six-Day War. Jerusalem Plan No. 2000, the first municipal plan to include both East and
West Jerusalem, was completed by the Jerusalem Municipality in 2004 and approved by the
Israeli government in 2009. Despite its comprehensive scope and insistence that it seeks to
address the needs of all residents, the plan states that its primary objective regarding society and
population is “maintaining a Jewish majority in the city of Jerusalem while attending to the
needs of the Arab minority” (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004). While the strategy promoted for
Jewish areas is primarily one of expansion—expanding existing neighborhoods or creating new
ones, particularly in East Jerusalem—the main strategy for Arab areas is one of densification—
increasing the limits of height or volume of existing residences, thus restricting horizontal
development (Chiodelli, 2012b). This is partially achieved by zoning the remaining open areas in
East Jerusalem as “green” or leaving them un-zoned, thus proscribing any development by
Palestinian residents—who cannot receive a construction permit for improperly zoned land—and
thus leaving any structure built within that area vulnerable to demolition.
Like pre-existing planning policies, the plan was framed by a Jewish Israeli perspective.
Arab residents and officials were almost entirely excluded from the planning process, which
actively strove to include aspects of public participation. Of the 95 representatives who
collaborated on the plan—including local government officials, urban planners, and experts from
a variety of fields—only one representative was Arab (Jabareen, 2010). Furthermore, while the
planning committees distributed a survey—published only in Hebrew—in Israeli neighborhoods,
to question residents about their “neighborhood vision” and assess the needs of their
communities, Palestinian residents were not surveyed, thus completely excluding their
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perspective from the process The language used by the municipality framed Palestinians areas as
riddled with issues of service provision and infrastructure, but failed to advance an organized
program to deal with these specific issues, focusing instead on curbing illegal Palestinian
construction and restricting Palestinian territorial expansion. The municipality characterized
Palestinian areas of Jerusalem as chaotic, but failed to acknowledge its own hand in feeding the
chaos. It is imperative that future planning initiatives in Jerusalem acknowledge that Jewish
Israelis are not the city’s only population, and that plans that give preferential treatment to one
ethnic population at the expense of many others, are not sustainable, ethical, or effective. It is of
crucial importance that Israeli citizens and Palestinian permanent residents in Jerusalem demand
comprehensive, inclusive planning and development solutions, and that authorities on both sides
attempt to understand the perspectives of all Jerusalemites, regardless of their ethnicity, religion,
or political ideology.
Jerusalem in Numbers
The situation on the ground in Jerusalem, like that of any site of conflict or divided city,
changes quickly. In order to contextualize this research, the following section provides a
statistical snapshot of Jerusalem, for the period surrounding 2012, when this research was
conducted.
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Figure 2.19. Population of Arabs and Jews/Others in Jerusalem, 1922-2013 (Adapted from
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015a) [*In 1998, the classification groups were changed
from “Arabs and Others” and “Jews”, to “Arabs” and “Jews and Others”].

Figure 2.20. Age Structure of Jerusalem, by Population Group (Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, 2015i)
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Figure 2.21. Total Fertility Rate (Children per woman) in Jerusalem, by Population Group, 2006,
2010, 2013 (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015j).

Figure 2.22. Poverty Rate in Jerusalem, by Population Group, 2013 (Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, 2015k).
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Figure 2.23. Jerusalem Residents Suspected of Crime, by Type of Offense, 2013 (Adapted from
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2015l).

Figure 2.24. Demolition of houses built without permits, and people/minors left homeless in East
Jerusalem, 2004-2015 (Adapted from B’tselem, 2015).
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW
This research addressed commonalities and differences in environmental perceptions and
world views among Jerusalemites, a highly diverse and conflicted population. It was motivated
by previous research across several disciplines, and its objective was twofold. The primary
objective was to capture Jerusalemites’ perceptions of the urban landscape and its growth
through survey methodology, and compare the responses to find shared interests and issues
across different groups. The foundation of such research was the line of discourse—beginning
with the ancient Greeks—regarding the interplay between perception, knowledge, and the
objective environment. Given its implications for planning and governance, the relationship
between perceptions, attitudes, and behavior was also highly relevant, as were the effects of
cultural and religious background, demographic makeup, and past experiences.
The secondary objective of this research was to explore a combination of questionnaire
surveying, participatory planning, and geospatial analysis as a method for the fair, objective, and
inclusive mitigation of planning issues in Jerusalem. The city’s current political, environmental,
and regulatory realities were examined, and the challenges of comprehensive, inclusive, and
effective planning in divided cities—as evidenced through the experience of other divided
cities—were addressed. Participatory planning, in theory and in practice, geographic information
systems (GIS), and participatory GIS (PGIS) was discussed as potential methods and tools to
mitigate Jerusalem’s planning and development issues. Previous endeavors employing these
methods, in Jerusalem and beyond, were also examined.
In short, this review will explore the relationship between the objective city of Jerusalem
and the unique, subjective realities experienced by each Jerusalemite. It will examine various
strategies for reconciling these perspectives, in order to facilitate inclusive, effective, and
mutually-beneficial planning and development.
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1. Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Behavior
Objective Reality, Subjective Perception
An understanding of how Jerusalemites perceive and form attitudes about their city
begins with an understanding of how humans perceive, gain knowledge, and form attitudes about
an environment and the phenomena within it. Discussion of the relationship between reality and
a person’s conception of the world emerged early in classical philosophical thought, amid
discussions of the meaning of knowledge and the methods by which it is obtained. Socrates
rejected the idea of knowledge as purely perception from the senses, arguing that knowledge is
not gained through sensory experiences alone but through an educated reasoning of those
experiences (Plato, 360/1969). He noted a newborn baby’s ability to perceive sensations, such as
the sound of flowing water, despite lacking the experiences, mental capacity, and education to
contemplate the “reality” or “usefulness” of such sensations, and thus acquire and retain
knowledge about them (Chappell, 2004). Aristotle continued this line of thought in Metaphysics
by characterizing animals that are able to form and retain memories from sensations as more
intelligent than those that cannot remember; he stated that man’s superior capacity for
intelligence resided in his unique ability to connect many memories of a single object, space, or
event in order to form a single experience, to which reason could then be applied (350/1953:
Book 1, Section 1).
Through sense perception humans interact with the same objective reality using sense
organs that we share, for the most part. The way that our minds filter, evaluate, and organize the
details returned to us by our senses is highly subjective, relying on our previous knowledge,
experiences, and views of the world to “make sense” of it all. Each component involved in the
process of human experience and the development of knowledge is unique, but also inherently
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connected and dependent on one another. In his treatise On the Soul, Aristotle would further
contemplate the development of human knowledge through sensation, thought, and desire
(Aristotle, 350/1931). Sensation is a passive process in which we are constantly engaged as we
perceive the world with all senses simultaneously, thereby consciously and unconsciously
gaining a wealth of information. Thought is the more active process of the mind that manipulates
the information gained about reality as we perceive it, through sensation, without coming into
direct contact with that reality. This is the part of the mind that uses logic and reason to gain
lasting knowledge about external beings, objects, events, and the relationships between them;
with this knowledge, an individual forms attitudes, personal opinions, and worldviews. The
knowledge gained through the reasoning of sensations and the attitudes formed as a result of that
knowledge are manifest as urges, words, and actions. Classical discussions of the connections
between reality, perception, knowledge, and action, formed a solid foundation for future
philosophical and geographical discourse.
Geographers intrigued by the relationship between perception of the objective, external
environment and the formation of subjective, personal worldviews are indebted to Immanuel
Kant, a philosopher for whom geographical enlightenment was both a practical and theoretical
necessity. Kant valued geographical knowledge to such a degree that, in his forty years of
teaching at the University of Königsberg, his lectures on geography—collected in his Physical
Geography—were outnumbered only by those on logic and metaphysics (Church, 2011). His
writings and lectures on the nature of knowledge, space, and geography constitute a significant
part of the Kantian corpus, and fostered further work on geographical epistemology,
geographical space, and environmental perception from the 19th century onward. Kant
characterized geography—the physical description of the earth, its processes, and their
relationships—as preliminary knowledge for further understanding of the world through the
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natural sciences, such as physics or chemistry (Richards, 1974: 7). Like geographers who
commonly summarize the value of their field by stating, “everything happens somewhere”, Kant
emphasized the inherent existence of sense data—the raw, original material of human experience
and knowledge—in the bounds of space and time. Thus, as the study of space and time,
respectively, “geography and history encompass the entire range of knowledge” by acting as a
“propaedeutic [preliminary instruction] for knowledge of the world” (Kant, 1802/2012: 450).
Kant’s theories of perception, knowledge, and space formed the basis for his geography
lectures throughout the late 18th century and would be expounded further in his Critique of Pure
Reason, which was published within the same period. Central to the Critique is the notion that
knowledge originates in perceptions of external stimuli, acquired through the senses, and the
mind’s reasoned understanding of those perceptions. Kant distinguished between a phenomenon,
the representation of a physical object, accessible to humans through sense perception alone, and
a noumenon, “the object in itself”, the imperceptible object that is the cause of the perceptible
phenomenon (Kant, 1781/2010).
The existence of a phenomenon in our world is dependent on our senses, the mode of our
perception, and thus it cannot exist without a percipient or subject; as Kant wrote, “if we take
away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only
the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves
disappear...these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us” (Kant, 1781/2010).
In contrast, a noumenon is not dependent on our senses for its existence. It exists as itself in
objective reality but, due to the mind’s filtering of sense information in a way that is unique to
the individual, humans cannot perceive or know the object as it is, but only as it is represented to
us by our senses, through phenomena.
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Phenomena are objects as they appear to us, but noumena are objects as they are; we see
the world as it appears to us, not as it truly is. This appearance depends as much on us—our
emotions, opinions, and preconceptions—as it does on the object or event we witness. Kant did
not go so far as to deny the existence of an external, objective world in favor of an internal,
subjective “factory of our minds”, but favored an interaction between the two and the
understanding that “some of the properties we observe in objects are due to the nature of the
observer rather than the objects themselves” (Livingstone & Harrison, 1981). The subjectivity of
perception and knowledge, as theorized by Kant, has significant implications for studies
addressing the effects of cultural background, demographic makeup, and socioeconomic
characteristics on the formation of environmental perceptions, attitudes, and worldviews. Yet,
despite his love of geography and his insistence on the importance of knowledge of the world,
Kant never left his native Königsberg and had no desire to do so. Furthermore, he actively
avoided discussing the ways in which the shared culture or history of a certain group might
influence how an individual within that group perceives the world, gains knowledge, and
organizes their views of reality; indeed, Kant dismissed such discussion as “matters of ‘mere
anthropology’” (Livingstone & Harrison, 1981).
Neo-Kantians expanded upon Kant’s epistemological discourse by finding a place for
knowledge that is culture-specific, such as art, history, traditions, and social values. This type of
cultural, historical, or social knowledge was categorized as idiographic science—focused on
unique, specific, and subjective qualities—and differentiated it from the generalized, objective
natural sciences, which he called nomothetic (Thomae, 1999). This distinction between the
natural and social sciences remains ingrained in modern academics. However, Kant’s successors
encouraged interaction and collaboration between the two, in order to form a more holistic view
of the world—a direct effect of the Kantian legacy. Kant stressed that the achievement of a
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comprehensive worldview begins with an understanding of geography—a science that is both
qualitative and quantitative in nature—which provides knowledge of the world, its processes,
and the relationships between them.
Alongside Neo-Kantianism and the other surging philosophical currents of the late 19th
century, there also emerged the philosophical movement or practice of phenomenology. This
movement, pioneered by Edmund Husserl, emphasized the description of phenomena as
manifested to the percipient or “experiencer”, but without the “misconstructions and impositions
placed on experience” by religious or cultural traditions, common sense, or science; in short,
before phenomena could be explained they must be “understood from within” (Moran, 2000).
Phenomenology, with its focus on reality rather than the mind, was touted by adherents as a
fresh, innovative way of addressing philosophical problems and, thus, was considered a radical
rejection of dominant methods of philosophical inquiry at the end of the 19th century.
Landscape, Culture, & the Behavioral Environment
Discussion of the nature of geographical knowledge, the effect of the environment on
man (and vice versa), and the resulting formation of worldviews thrived throughout the late 19th
and early 20th century. More efficient methods of communication and travel fostered
globalization and the growth of geographical subfields that focused on specific regions of the
world, their inhabitants, and the processes at work within those regions. The evolution of the
field of Geography during this time was heavily influenced by French geographer Paul Vidal de
la Blache, whose work focused on the concepts of landscapes (paysages), settings (milieux),
“lifeways” (genres de vie), and their unique manifestations within different regions of the world.
This line of thought encouraged greater development of regional and political geographies,
which, focusing on qualitative descriptions rather than quantitative calculations, relied on
methods that were more idiographic than nomothetic in nature. The effects of the interaction
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between man and different environments became a pervasive theme within the field, giving rise
to the concept of environmental determinism. Seeking to explain the great spectrum of culture,
ethnicity, and lifestyles that had been detailed by regional geographers—as well as why some
societies were more “successful” than others, or at least perceived as such by Westerners—
proponents of this controversial theory proposed that such variety was caused by the earth’s
equally diverse array of environmental conditions. The theory was succinctly stated by Semple
(1911), a famous American adherent that “man is a product of the earth’s surface”.
Into the 20th century, interest in the unique qualities, inhabitants, and landscapes of
different regions of the world would continue to grow within geography; the subjectivity of the
human experience would be at the forefront of geographic research. Studies of areal
differentiation—termed chorographia (“description of land”) by Strabo and chorology by
modern geographers—and the interdependence of phenomena across space, occupied many in
the field. The nature of geography as the study of space, landscapes, and the man-environment
relationship, as well as the role of subjectivity within the field, was paramount in the work of
Sauer, Hartshorne, and Wright, which built upon work by Kant, Ritter, von Humboldt, de la
Blache, and Hettner. In his treatment of the Morphology of Landscape, Sauer (1925/1969)
examined the interrelationship of all objects and phenomena within a landscape, which he
described as “the unit concept of geography” and defined as “an area made up of a distinct
association of forms, both physical and cultural”. Through the empirical morphologic method
(the focus of Sauer’s seminal work) the different forms within a landscape, valued differently by
different individuals or fields of study, are classified, ordered, and organized into a system.
These systems of forms, or morphologies, can then be compared, contrasted, and related to one
another, within both scientific discourse and the mind of the experienced individual.
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Different forms comprise different landscapes and are manifested in different ways.
Sauer’s theory differentiated between the physical landscape—the collection of natural forms
that man can exploit, alter, and subtract from, but not add to—and the cultural landscape—the
forms which man has created and imposed on the natural landscape, as a result of his culture.
While the former includes climate, vegetation, and mineral resources, the latter is comprised of
populations, residential and commercial structures, and modes of communication and
production. Much like Plato’s eternal Forms, these forms are general in the abstract but made
specific in reality. The same natural and cultural forms exist in every physical and human
landscape, but how they are manifested in reality depends on the specific location and specific
culture. Every physical location on earth has a climate, but with areal differentiation comes
different kinds of climates, whether tropical, polar, or something in between. The existence of a
productive population is inherent in the man-made cultural landscape, but whether a population
relies on agrarian or industrial modes of production depends on the culture of that population. In
this characterization, description of the cultural landscape was less concerned with the specific
customs, values, or practices of a culture, but more with “man’s record upon the landscape”, the
manifestation of these subjective cultural tenets. Sauer’s theories were a direct, unapologetic
rejection of environmental determinism, constituting a turning point in modern geography.
Like Kant, Sauer described a general typology under which physical or cultural specifics
might be organized; unlike Kant, Sauer did not regard culture or history as matters of “mere
anthropology” but as crucial elements of the cultural landscape, the physical landscape, and
geography as a whole. Sauer insisted that the comparison of areal differentiations across cultural
and physical landscapes was a crucial endeavor within human and physical geography. He
encouraged interdisciplinary mixing between geography, anthropology (“the sister discipline”),
and the physical sciences (such as climatology and geomorphology) in order to learn new
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methods and techniques, and to form a more holistic view of the relationship between man and
the environment (Sauer, 1941). In addition, although his exposition of landscape did not
explicitly mention the role of human perception (which can be as much of an expression of
culture as the cultural landscape itself), Sauer did note that certain features of a landscape are
distinguished and valued over other features through the selective, personalized nature of
geographic description.
This selective nature characterizes human perception in general. The individual—
geographer or otherwise—focuses on qualities, objects, and events that are of value or interest to
her or him. While the layman might pass an outcrop of limestone without a second glance, the
same phenomenon could captivate the karst geologist for hours—or even years—on end.
Although the two individuals possess the same sense organs and perceive the same outcrop, the
layman does not possess the specialized education, experience, and interest of the geologist, and
thus his perception and valuation of this landscape element is relatively reduced. In Sauer’s
explanation, the value placed on a phenomenon is a matter of interest, which may or may not
arise from or be augmented by culture. To extend the metaphor, a Chinese geologist and Israeli
geologist might both take interest in this limestone outcrop, but their distinctive cultural
backgrounds might affect their perception of that outcrop in different ways, regardless of their
similar training. While the sight or feel of the limestone might, for the Israeli, evoke images of
sun-gilded blocks of Jerusalem stone or the busy quarries of Bethlehem, the Chinese geologist
might recall the stunning karst towers of the Shilin Stone Forest and the palatial caves of
Wulong. Again, the interplay of culture, education, and past experience—the subjectivity of
perception—cannot be discounted. Subjectivism would be the focus of Wright’s discussions of
the nature of geography and the study of geographical knowledge, which he termed geosophy
(Wright, 1947) and promoted as a critical element of geographic education and training.
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Hartshorne expounded prodigiously on the nature of geography (1939), the lineage of
geographical theory and methodology, and the field’s role as the science of space (1958). He
would also, through his work, become a main critic of Sauer’s definition of landscape as the core
unit of geography and his dualist conceptualization of landscape. Hartshorne demonstrated that
landscape had become an ambiguous concept, confused by the wide variety of connotations
applied to it by various geographers following its translation to English from German
(Landschaft) and French (paysage). He insisted that, for the benefit of the field and the reader,
the term would either need to be standardized or abandoned altogether. Although he avoided
stating his own conceptualization of landscape, Hartshorne did note that the underlying thought
connecting the various uses of the term is the existence of a visible, tangible surface of the earth,
composed of both natural and man-made phenomena (1939).
Hartshorne took great umbrage with Sauer’s differentiation of the natural and cultural
landscapes, arguing that there was only one total, real landscape, which could be qualified
further based on its level of interaction with humans. He claimed that a landscape altered or
inhabited by humans, for any period of time, was no longer natural. Rather, he argued that the
natural features of an area should be termed the “natural environment”; a landscape untouched
by man should be termed “primeval”, although today such a place is rare if not entirely vanished.
A landscape that had been inhabited and altered by man could be “primitive” (with very little,
usually negative alteration), “wild” (once inhabited or altered but then left to “grow wild”), and
“tamed” (its character totally under human control) (Hartshorne, 1939).
Despite their differences, the combined work of Sauer and Hartshorne concerning the
nature of geographic inquiry and the conceptualization of landscape is of great significance to the
present work and the field as a whole; however, perhaps more important is their contribution to
the discussion of perception and the formation of environmental attitudes. Early on, in The
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Morphology of Landscape, Sauer noted the subjective, selective quality of an individual’s
valuation of certain aspects of a landscape, based on their interests. In his Foreword to Historical
Geography, Sauer characterized environmental response—the relationship between man and
environment or “habit and habitat”—as behavior fostered not by physical stimuli or logic but by
culture, which involves attitudes, skills, and preferences that are acquired, learned, and invented
(1941). Furthermore, he explained that changes in a group’s culture (their habit) would
inevitably lead to changes in the valuation and interpretation of the environment (their habitat).
Finally, as Kant noted that our subjective perceptions do not form independently of the objective
environment, so did Sauer note that a cultural complex (a precursor to the cultural landscape)
originates “in a certain time in a particular locality” within the physical landscape. Hartshorne
directly addressed perception to a lesser degree, noting that the value of physical geography in
expanding one’s perception of the world and, within his greater treatment of landscape’s many
connotations, that some geographers characterize landscape as a collection of sense perceptions
of phenomena within a certain area. However, Hartshorne (1958) spurred future interest in
perception within the field of geography by emphasizing and reevaluating the contribution of
Kant to discussions of space and the acquisition of knowledge. From the mid-20th century
onward, environmental perception would become an important theme in geographic inquiry,
promoted by the development of new theories, methodologies, and tools of inquiry.
Discussions of subjective cognitive and behavioral responses to an objective
environment, as well as the physical changes imposed on that environment as a result of these
subjective responses, continued to grow in volume and significance within modern geography
throughout the 20th century. Interdisciplinary collaboration with the growing field of psychology
fostered the emergence of perception geography and behavioral geography, which focused on the
systematic assessment of the effect of the man-environment relationship on human patterns of
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movement, decision-making processes, spatial organization and reasoning, and the acquisition of
spatial knowledge. One of the most significant contributions of psychology to geography was the
theory of Gestalt, literally “form” or “shape”, which set forth a series of fundamental principles
governing human cognition, perception, and pattern recognition. Koffka, one of the leading
Gestalt psychologists, encapsulated the theory with the oft-repeated phrase “the whole is
something other than the sum of its parts”, commonly misquoted as “the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts” (Koffka, 1935). The idea that several simple parts combine to form a
complex, separate whole—a process referred to as emergence—was not new. Aristotle had
addressed the same concept in Metaphysics: “the totality is not...a mere heap, but the whole is
something beside the parts” (350/1953).
The principles of Gestalt applied the concept of emergence to the complex processes of
the human mind, in order to explain how the brain organizes the innumerable sense perceptions
of external stimuli, encountered every moment of one’s life, into lasting memory and knowledge.
Gestaltists demonstrated that the brain’s capacity for organization and recognition was so
powerful that, having previously encountered a certain stimuli through sense perception, a
percipient could still recognize the stimuli even if parts of it had been altered, rearranged, or even
removed. An intriguing example of this process in action, as explained by Wertheimer, was
recognition of a familiar tune. For instance, upon hearing the basic melody for “Yankee Doodle”,
which is composed of seven tones, the average American adult will easily recognize the tune.
However, even if the melody is transposed into a different key, and is played using seven
different tones, the melody itself will remain the same and will still be recognized as “Yankee
Doodle”. According to Wertheimer, recognition of the melody as a whole is due to the existence
of something more than the sum of the seven tones, “[an eighth] something, which is the formquality, the Gestaltqualität, of the original [seven]” (1924/1997). The impact of Gestalt
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psychology on geographic theory and practice was immediate and long-lasting. To this day, an
assessment of basic Gestalt principles is standard practice in modern courses on cartography and
other visual representations of data, geographic or otherwise. Dissemination of the revolutionary
principles of Gestalt would constitute a watershed event in geographic thought in the mid-20th
century, as geographers began to incorporate these same principles of perception and cognition
into their work on natural environments, hazards, patterns of human movement, settlement,
consumption, and the myriad other phenomena that constitute the complex relationship between
humans and the physical environment.
The study of human-environment interaction has also benefitted greatly from the
development of the interdisciplinary field of environmental psychology. With a holistic focus on
the effects of an environment on its inhabitants, environmental psychology research seeks to
solve environmental problems—crowding, noise, air pollution, litter—in order to create spaces
that are both functional and pleasing to the senses, thus improving the experience of inhabitants.
Such research frequently addresses the interplay between the environment, human perception,
and behavioral responses (Fransson & Gärling, 1999; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). Survey
methods are commonly utilized to gauge environmental attitudes and values among different
demographic groups or citizens of different countries, with the goal of predicting how such
psychological components will result in “ecocentric” or “anthrocentric” behavior that will, in
turn, affect the environment (Schultz & Zelezny, 1999).
Kirk was one of the earliest and most impactful geographers to explicitly address
environmental perception within larger discussions of the nature of geography, by combining
philosophical theories of the interaction between objective reality and subjective human
perception (and the resulting knowledge) with Gestaltist theories of cognition, perception, and
recognition. Expounding on the role of geographers and geography as a bridge between the
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physical sciences and humanities—and, echoing Kant, stressing an understanding of space and
time as a crucial component of such a role—Kirk dismissed the idea that environment and man
are “two entities of unreconcilable [sic] character” as regressive (1952/1990). Instead, closing the
gap between the two, he advanced the revolutionary concept of the behavioral environment, an
internal universe suspended between the external, physical world (the “Phenomenal
Environment”) and the internal world of the individual mind, the latter of which could be
affected as much by group culture as by reality and experiences (Figure 3.1). In this space
between reality and the mind, objective facts perceived through the senses are arranged into a
culturally-conditioned structure that varies for each observer; thus, the filtration of stimuli and
spatial information through the individualized behavioral environment means that the same
physical phenomenon or space affects and appears differently to each percipient, based on their
experiences as both an individual and as a member of a group, whether cultural, religious,
socioeconomic, demographic, political, or otherwise. The behavioral environment, like the
natural environment and the human mind, is constantly in flux.
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Figure 3.1. Kirk’s initial visualization of the active relationship between the behavioral
enviroment (B), physical environment (A), the physical human group or individual present in
this environment (C), and group culture (D). From Kirk, 1952/1990.

It is within this behavioral environment that elements of physical reality take on value,
meaning, and importance, which, in turn, “attract or repel human action” (1952/1990). The manenvironment relationship, being reciprocal, dynamic, and ceaselessly active, thus creates a
behavioral environment that is constantly changing and adapting to new input. The changing
structure of an individual’s behavioral environment acts as a catalyst for decisions and actions,
and can thus lead to changes in the phenomenal environment. The frequency, magnitude, and
impact of such changes differ between individuals, as does the value of different phenomena.
While a negative experience within a certain area of a city might lead a short-term visitor or
apathetic citizen with no connection to the area to simply alter their route to avoid the area in the
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future, the same experience by the empowered citizen, elected official, or city planner might
compel them to use their influence in order to mitigate the perceived or actual cause of the
negative experience, which can result in physical changes in the phenomenal environment. As
Kirk posited: “the greater man’s knowledge of the environment, the greater his awareness of its
potentialities, the greater not less does it influence his actions” (1952/1990).
Perception Studies in Geography
After the geographers of the early to mid-20th century laid the theoretical and practical
groundwork for research on the relationship between the environment, perception, attitudes, and
behavior, the field witnessed a deluge of perception studies that sought to understand the effects
of an individual’s demographic, cultural, or socioeconomic makeup on that relationship. Such
studies were aided by the advent in geography of the “quantitative revolution”, and the methods
and goals of such studies, like the characteristics they study, were diverse.
Lynch, with his elegant exploration of The Image of the City (1960), framed the study of
environmental perception within a modern urban context, advancing a greater understanding of
perception as a path for creating more beautiful, harmonious, and well-planned cities. The titular
image, formed from the constant, combined operations of the senses, is “soaked in memories and
meanings” gained from the citizen’s experiences during their lifetime; it is a product of the
reciprocal human-environment relationship. The image acts as a unique filter through which an
individual processes incoming stimuli and endows meaning on phenomena and places, which
thereby “limits and emphasizes what is seen”. Lynch’s specific focus was what he termed the
“imageability” of a city: the potential for its parts to be recognized and organized into a coherent
pattern, thus facilitating an emotional response or feeling of connection in an observer. Such
coherence and connection would endow that observer with a sense of “emotional security”,
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facilitating a harmonious, positive relationship between the individual and the external world,
thus creating a deeper, more intense human experience.
Using case studies of three American cities (Boston, Jersey City, and Los Angeles) and
the environmental perceptions of their inhabitants, Lynch’s research relied on two distinct but
complimentary elements: in-depth interviews with a small sample of long-term residents of each
city, which included place descriptions, imaginary trips, and sketches; and extensive field
reconnaissance of areas less than 4 square miles, which included mapping of key features,
subjective judgments of the visibility of those features, image problems (such as broken paths,
direction ambiguity, and characterless areas) and the connections and disconnections between
features, all of which combined to form the city image (Figure 3.2). Subjective images and
physical reality, gained through interview material and field reconnaissance results, respectively,
were then compared. Finding that analysis and mapping of the study areas accurately predicted,
to some degree, the images derived from interviews, Lynch postulated that the physical form of
the environment “played a tremendous role in the shaping of the image”. Often, various
respondents would use the same words and phrases to describe the same area or feature. Lynch’s
examination of standard urban features—nodes, paths, landmarks, districts, and edges—their
qualities, and their interrelations, and of how they compared to residents’ perceptions, fostered a
renewed understanding of the experience of the urban resident and the importance of designing
cities in such a way that their separate, distinct parts come together to form something greater—
“a source of daily enjoyment to millions of their inhabitants”. Lynch’s work remains a seminal
moment in the study of perception of the environment, particularly in the dynamic, complex
context of the modern urban landscape.
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Figure 3.2. The visual forms of central Boston and Los Angeles, “as seen in the field”. Both
maps employ identical scales, orientations, and legends. From Lynch, 1960.
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From the mid-20th century onward, geographers would continue to develop the theory,
vocabulary, and methods of perception geography. Such development was often couched within
broader discussions of the nature of geography, its methods, values, and its role in answering
questions about the world, often fostering work that read like philosophy. Indeed, Kirk (1978)
observed that geography and philosophy search for answers in the hazy area between empirical
and formal inquiry, between what can be observed and what can be deduced. Lowenthal (1961)
asserted that geographical knowledge and geographical discourse is “shared by billions of
amateurs” around the world, as all humans experience and are affected by the planet’s various
geographic phenomena: the sun rises and sets; one observes, interacts with, and moves through
the various elements and features of their landscape; areas of the planet are distinguished by
various interlaced natural or manmade groupings, whether climates or countries. Despite
different locations, languages, cultures, and levels of economic development or education,
humans share a common world—it is the way that the world is perceived that is unique. This
perception can be affected not only be demographics or culture, but also by physical or
psychological states, such as blindness, schizophrenia, or phobias of closed or open spaces. Like
a dream, a person’s subjective perception of the objective world makes sense only to them, the
one who has experienced it firsthand. The role of the perception researcher is to develop methods
and tools to gauge and measure that experience and its effects on the real world, whether one is
specifically interested in planning, hazards, economics, or otherwise. Brookfield (1969) stressed
that care must be taken when attempting to isolate, classify, and analyze elements of the
perceived and real environments; the former he characterized as “ephemeral”, and not subject to
the rational, physical laws of the latter. Scientific study of perception and the perceived
environment, being a relatively new research path at the time, would require time to develop a
coherent, defendable methodology and understandable nomenclature.
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Schiff (1970) was one of the first researchers to distinguish a working terminology for the
study of perception, including wading through the various connotations and uses of the word
perception, and distinguishing it from the related concept of attitudes. Schiff insisted that what
perception geographers termed perception would more accurately be called “social
perception”—the impressions an individual has of an environmental stimulus or group of stimuli,
as those impressions are affected by the percipient’s past experiences and mood—as opposed to
the study of the physical, neurological process perception, wherein the sense organs and the brain
process external stimuli to retrieve and store information about the external world. Awareness of
stimuli, being the initial act in the perception of those stimuli, is a separate concept, although one
of equal research value. Schiff also stressed that the term perception should only be used when
“there is an actual stimulus to be perceived”; in contrast, when studying a series of processes
over time or a collection of beliefs, belief or cognition would be more accurate. Attitudes she
defined as “an organized set of feelings and beliefs” that are taught and/or learned, that both
influence and are influenced by perception, and which themselves influence behavior. The
biggest difference between perceptions and attitudes, which both form from experience and can
both affect behavior, is that perception occurs when a stimulus is or has been physically present,
while an attitude is a set of beliefs regarding that stimulus, which are harbored over an extended
period. The measurement of attitudes requires attention to both the direction of the attitude
(whether it is positive or negative) and the magnitude (the strength of the attitude). A Likert
scale, employed within a survey questionnaire, is a crucial tool for measuring both the direction
and magnitude of an attitude (e.g. creating a Likert scale of attitudes ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree, with varying degrees of disagreement or agreement in between).
Tuan framed the study of perception as a crucial aspect of the study of space and of the
concept of topophilia: “the affective bond between people and place or setting. Diffuse as a
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concept, vivid and concrete as personal experience...” (Tuan, 1974). Without an understanding of
the attitudes or values that binds a person or group to a place, Tuan argued, any solution to an
environmental problem will be inadequate due to its lack of such a crucial piece of any
“environmental calculus”. Like Schiff, Tuan endeavored to pin down meanings for the various
vague terms that are found throughout perception and behavioral research—perception, attitude,
world view—and his exact definitions will be listed here, as they are critical to the discussion at
hand and beautifully effective in their simplicity:


Perception is both the response of the senses to external stimuli and purposeful activity in
which certain phenomena are clearly registered while others recede in the shade or are
blocked out.



Attitude is primarily a cultural stance, a position one takes vis-à-vis the world. It has greater
stability than perception and is formed of a long succession of perceptions, that is, of
experience.



World view is conceptualized experience. It is partly personal, largely social. It is an attitude
or belief system; the word system implies that the attitudes and beliefs are structured,
however arbitrary the links may seem, from an impersonal (objective) standpoint.
(Tuan, 1974)
Tuan’s exposition on these various concepts, within the greater discussion of topophilia

and how it affects real-world behavior, left no stone unturned. He described how perception is
affected by the operation of the senses—sight, smell, touch, sound, working individually and in
concert to reveal a phenomenon or space’s “essential character”—and, in turn, affects what is
sensed in the future. Culture exerts a powerful influence that is inbred by the environment and
practices of that culture—for instance, while citizens of most Western nations rely largely on
sight to navigate their structured environment of the modern city, individuals of other cultures
(such as, in Tuan’s example, the Aivilik Eskimo) place greater importance on their senses of
smell and touch to move through their world. A percipient’s sex can also affect their view of the
world, as men and women not only differ biologically but also in their interactions with the
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world; this is particularly true in traditional cultures that have strictly-defined roles for men and
women, such as within the Orthodox Jewish or Muslim communities of Jerusalem. In such
communities, outside space is regarded as the realm of men, filled with action and violence,
while women are relegated to the more passive indoor spaces, which are perceived as safer.
Finally, it is important to note the stark differences in perception of a space by those who live in
it, versus how it is perceived by a visitor. While a tourist’s view of a city is affected by the city’s
most immediate characteristics (aesthetics, smells) and an experience that might last a few days,
the citizen’s view of their home city is the result of layers of experience and daily activity that
accumulate over many years. However, it should be noted that a well-trained outside observer—
lacking the familiarity that causes certain phenomena to recede into the fog of daily routine—
may have a heightened sense of awareness and perception when observing and experiencing a
particular area of a city, enabling them to develop important insights into a certain issue, such as
a troublesome intersection or ill-designed public space.
Tuan also explored how our brains work to compartmentalize and make sense of the
world’s myriad phenomena. An interesting example is the human tendency to arrange things in
opposing pairs: life and death; male and female; us and them; north and south; heaven and earth.
These manmade groupings are then transposed onto physical reality, further affecting what is
perceived and how it is perceived. Relevant to the discussion at hand is the common bifurcation
of Israeli and Palestinian; to the average Israeli, Palestinian, or outsider (all of whom will have
varying degrees of knowledge about the conflict), places, objects, or people associated with
either group take on a certain connotation, which can be positive or negative, depending on past
experiences and the percipient’s world view. An interesting research path would be to present
similar objects, places, or people to various respondents in Israel and Palestine, and determine
their reaction to these stimuli when they are labeled as “Israeli/Jewish” or “Palestinian/Arab”.
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Even more interesting would be to present an identical object or place (for instance, a piece of
artwork) at different times, employing a different label each time; one day the painting is
described as being painted by an Israeli artist, the next by a Palestinian—based on this small
difference of provenance, would the percipient react differently each time?
Tuan also discussed the role of perception and experience in the formation of ideas about
place. Places are not only dots or areas represented on a map, but are “centers of meaning”
constructed through experiences, and having the power to evoke strong, visceral feelings in the
percipient (Tuan, 1975). Like spaces, places are experienced at different scales, from the
immediate room one currently occupies to the nation state of which one is a citizen. Unlike
space, which has a connotation of open emptiness waiting to be filled, a place is filled with
objects, people, architecture, symbols, and a barrage of sensual stimuli and experiences, all of
which having varying layers of meaning and value. At all scales, places evoke certain emotions
and attitudes; these, in turn, evoke certain behaviors. The same place does not mean the same
thing to two different people or groups; indeed, they may even call the place by different names.
The power of language and words to create, construct, and impart a place with meaning and
value, is a crucial aspect of place-making (Tuan, 1991). Jerusalem exemplifies this idea.
Simultaneously it is Jerusalem, Yerushalayim, and al-Quds; these places mean different things to
different people, yet the physical reality is the same. Speaking from experience, the Hebrewspeaker and Arabic-speaker might argue voraciously over whether the Old City market they are
standing in is in fact the “shouq” or the “souq”—and they would both be correct! But, as Tuan
notes, “naming is power...to impart a certain character to things”, and names matter. To the
Israeli and the Palestinian, whether you call the esplanade at the Old City’s core the “Temple
Mount” or “al-Haram ash-Sharif”, or whether the area between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean is called “Israel” or “Palestine”, matters. As researchers and authorities attempt to
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mitigate issues of territory, planning, and development in Jerusalem, Israel, and Palestine, these
differences in perception and valuation of place and space—subtle or invisible to the outsider,
stark and of critical importance to the resident—must be at the forefront of any “environmental
calculus”.
As geographers explored the potential of behavioral and perception research, substantial
critiques were also leveled against the progress of behavioral and perception geography, and
against geography in general; of these critiques, none were more cutting than those by fellow
geographers. The most common charge against the field as a whole was a lack of coherence in
theory and methodology—unsurprising, given the wide variety of geographic specialties
(economic, political, urban, biological, feminist) and the field’s dynamic position as mediator
between the quantitative and qualitative (Kirk, 1963). Incohesive, exploratory methodology was
also stressed within critiques against behavioral and perception geography (Wood, 1970), along
with inconsistent terminology (Johnston, 1973) and what was characterized as an incorrect
approach to the subject of human behavior, its internal and external motivations, and its effects
on the physical environment (Bunting & Guelke, 1979). Such critiques were not aimed at Kirk,
Sauer, or Wright—those who had established the theoretical basis for perception and behavioral
research within geography—but, rather, at the geographers who used these original key theories
for their own work on environmental perception, without making any significant contributions
themselves. The most searing and comprehensive critique of these geographers and their work
was made by Buting and Guelke, who claimed that the most damning weaknesses of such studies
were their core assumptions and basic methodological approach. The questionable assumptions
were: first, that “identifiable environmental images exist that can be measured accurately”,
having been extracted—with risk of distortion—from the minds of percipients who have been
asked to entrust their innermost thoughts and deeply personal experiences with strangers; and,
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second, that “strong relationships between revealed images and preferences and actual (realworld) behavior” are guaranteed and can be scientifically measured. The prevailing methodology
of perception and behavioral studies of the time was also criticized. Instead of first focusing on
internal perceptions and environmental images among individuals and groups, Bunting and
Guelke argued, behavior studies should focus on just that—behavior. Only after a thorough
examination of overt behavior patterns had been made, similarities and differences between
subjects realized, and their real-world effects quantified—only then could any useful exploration
of the underlying perceptions and attitudes fostering those behaviors begin. Bunting and Guelke
also stressed the importance of a renewed focus on the individual, rather than solely utilizing
aggregated statistical data about generalized demographic and social groupings. Indeed, in-depth,
personal conversations with key individuals—each with their unique story to tell—invariably
yield richer insights about a place or issue than random sampling using a static, generalized
questionnaire survey; a balanced combination of the two is ideal. A detailed, objective
examination of the individual’s or group’s historical, social, economic, cultural, and political
background is also a prerequisite for a comprehensive understanding of their behavior,
perceptions, and world view. Each individual’s behavioral environment is unique to them alone,
the sum that is something different than the parts of demographic makeup, personal and
collective experiences, and identification with various groups.
Religion, like physiology, political ideology, or culture, exerts a powerful influence on an
individual’s perception, attitudes, and behavior. Events recounted in myths or scripture, such as
creation narratives, help construct the world in which an adherent lives by ascribing meaning or
value to various phenomena, in a manner that is consistent with that religion’s doctrine,
traditions, and values. A particularly striking example of this phenomenon is the perception of
mountains in different cultures. Mountains for the ancient Hebrews represented peace, strength,
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and, in their grandeur and might, a sign of God’s existence: “As the mountains surround
Jerusalem, so the Lord surrounds his people both now and forevermore” (Psalms 125:2). The
Prophet Muhammad received his first revelation from the angel Jibreel (Gabriel) on Jabal anNour, the Mountain of Light, where he had retreated to pray and contemplate existence away
from the crowds and noise of Mecca. In contrast, the Greeks and Romans perceived a
mountainous landscape as wild and hostile; mountains complicated transportation and trade, and
were obstacles to conquest (Hyde, 1915). In both cultures the peaks of Mt. Olympus were the
sacred home of the gods, from which they cast judgment, chaos, and destruction on the mortals
below. Perhaps in a continuation of this perception within Greco-Roman culture, the violent
eruptions of Mt. Etna and Mt. Vesuvius are often viewed by southern Italian Catholics as
retribution for sinful behavior (Chester, Duncan, & Dibben, 2008). The association of mountains
with deities also existed outside of Western cultures. Within pre-Buddhist Tibetan mythology,
mountain gods existed on each of the thousands of peaks throughout the Himalayas. The
perceived temperament of each god depended on the perception of the mountain he occupied:
communities that benefitted from an adjacent snowy mountain’s abundant nutrient-rich glacial
meltwater deified those mountains as “benefactors of mankind”; isolated, densely-forested
mountains far from civilization were shunned as the fearful abodes of evil deities (Jisheng,
2001).
Because religion is such a personal experience—disparate even among members of the
same denomination or congregation—the interplay of religion and worldview varies greatly
among individuals. Secular education and personal experiences can also alter the extent to which
religion affects worldview. Paradise (2005) examined how adherence to Islamic ideology and
traditions can affect perception of earthquake risk and, in turn, attitudes and behavior regarding
earthquake preparedness, earthquake-resistant construction, and seismic forecasting. Like
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volcanos to the Italian Catholics, earthquakes are viewed by Muslims as events of divine
retribution and signs of God’s might. In Agadir, Morocco—a city devastated by a 5.7 magnitude
earthquake in 1960—surveys about the 1960 earthquake and earthquake risk in general elicited
overwhelmingly religious responses from Muslim respondents. When asked if and when another
large earthquake would strike the city, 53% of respondents replied “Allahu a’lam”, meaning
“God knows best” or, literally, “God is the universe”. This response was more common among
respondents with little formal education. Furthermore, many respondents characterized seismic
prediction, earthquake preparation schemes, and the construction of earthquake-resistant
structures as haram and “akin to fortunetelling, undermining God’s omnipotence”. The
prevalence of such attitudes among residents of a seismically-active region have immense
implications for disaster evacuation preparedness and education. Paradise found that respondents
who regularly watched television exhibited a greater understanding of the 1960 earthquake and
its destruction, leading to the conclusion that television is an efficient tool for disseminating
important information and providing education about hazards (or any subject) quickly and over a
wide area. Obviously, religion and culture are powerful forces; any consideration of
environmental worldviews must account for the conscious and unconscious effects of such forces
on society at large and in the minds of individuals.
However, when considering the effects of personal and group traits on perception, it is
also crucially important to remember that religious and cultural worldviews do not form in a
vacuum. The attitudes of certain traditions towards a phenomenon are formed from or affected
by the existence and experience of that phenomenon in the region where the traditions were
formed. Romans viewed mountains as terrible obstacles because the frozen, treacherous Alps
complicated their northern military campaigns and colonial endeavors. The Qur`an is filled with
references to earthquakes (containing an entire chapter, Surat al-Zalzala, devoted to the subject)
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and Muslims differentiate them from other disasters because Islam arose in and initially spread
throughout the seismically-active area of the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant. Ancient Tibetans
deified mountains as good or evil based on how those physical features benefitted the
surrounding communities. In short, although the subjective factors of demographics, cultural and
religious traditions, and individual physiology have massive effects on perception and the
formation of attitudes, the effect of the objective environment—the space in which the perceived
external stimuli operate—cannot be underestimated within any discussion of the relationship
between man, mind, and nature.
As world populations have become increasingly urbanized, the interaction between
humans and the urban landscape has become an increasingly relevant area of research throughout
the world. Perceptions and attitudes towards urban environments—and the behavior fostered by
those internal phenomena—are of particular interest to researchers involved in planning research,
as well as the planners, architects, and elected officials who rely on the insights that such
research provides. Many researchers, while accepting the effects of demographic, cultural, and
socioeconomic characteristics, have chosen to focus on the objective environment as the
dominant factor in the formation of environmental perceptions and attitudes. Brody, Highfield,
and Peck (2005) recognized the effects of gender, level of education, and political ideology on
perceptions of water quality, but found, using geospatial analysis, that location had a comparable
effect. Their results demonstrated that environmental perceptions are—to some degree—
“spatially dependent”.
Perception Studies in Israel and Palestine
Previous research on perception among different groups in the context of Israel and
Palestine has unveiled key insights into how these groups perceive their shared environment.
Israeli and Palestinian society are both decidedly urban, with 92% of people in Israel and 75% of
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those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories residing in cities (World Bank, 2012). Due to
this longstanding and ongoing trend of urbanization, localized research on perception of urban
phenomena within Israeli and Palestinian communities is not lacking, even within the specific
context of Jerusalem.
Seeking to gauge divisions in perception and the functional and spatial relationships
between East and West Jerusalemites, Romann (1989) measured familiarity with sites in the two
sectors among Israeli and Palestinian high-school students, an age group that (in 1982, when the
surveys were conducted) had spent their entire lives in a united Jerusalem. The research
measured familiarity in two ways: (i) by asking students to locate and describe sites throughout
Jerusalem, such as main streets, popular cinemas, and transportation hubs, and to indicate if they
had ever visited the site; and (ii) questioning the purpose and frequency of visits to the opposite
sector, how they felt when they went, if they went alone or as a group, and if they desired to
learn more about the other side. Unsurprisingly, it was found that Israelis were more able to
identify sites in West Jerusalem and Palestinians more able to identify sites in East Jerusalem;
proximity to “the other side” did not make students more familiar, e.g. Arabs living within a mile
of the Green Line were no better at identifying western sites than Arabs living on the city’s
periphery. Romann posited that limited familiarity with the other side was a direct result of
“persisting, widespread patterns of institutional, functional, and spatial segregation” which, in
turn, reflected and reinforced segregation in reality. Interestingly, Romann also found that Arab
students were 70% more adept at locating sites in West Jerusalem than Jewish students were at
locating sites in East Jerusalem. In addition, Jewish outings in East Jerusalem tended to be
primarily general outings, visits to religious or cultural sites in the Old City, or shopping trips,
while Arab outings in West Jerusalem were motivated by a specific purpose, such as work, a
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medical or administrative appointment, or a visit to a specific public site, such as a pool, park, or
zoo.
These findings led Romann to hypothesize that Arabs feel a greater sense of reliance on
more developed Jewish West Jerusalem than Jews on the less-developed Arab East Jerusalem; as
a result, Arabs are compelled to learn more about West Jerusalem as a matter of survival and to
take advantage of the benefits the sector has to offer, while Jewish Jerusalemites feel no such
compulsion or drive. It is also interesting to note that, while all of the Jewish respondents had
visited East Jerusalem at least once, 12% of Arab males and 17% of Arab females had never set
foot in West Jerusalem; Jewish students were also more likely to feel totally at ease on the other
side, while 35.5% of Arab males said they felt “totally uneasy”. Finally, when it came to their
level of desire to learn more about the other side, females of both populations expressed a much
greater desire to “become much more familiar” than their male counterparts; indeed, a much
larger percentage of male respondents indicated that they had “no desire to become more
familiar”. Romann concluded that these findings showed that Arabs and Jews, as a result of their
segregated populations and a general lack of information about the other side, utilize very
different mental maps of the city: “a clear case of divided perception of a united city”. The
research at hand is along the same vein as Romann’s, in that it sought to quantify different
perceptions of Jerusalem among members of different groups; however, while Romann made no
attempt to connect his findings to real-world issues faced by Jerusalem’s citizens and authorities,
such as the effects of spatial segregation, biased planning practices, or unequal development, this
research seeks to understand differences in perception as well as shared issues, for the purpose of
creating more comprehensive and inclusive planning and development initiatives. In addition,
while Romann interviewed high school students alone—a population with little active
connection to the economic and political systems of Israel and Palestine—this research sought to
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gain perspectives from members of society who are of legal age and thus engaged in such
systems in their day to day lives. In any case, sociopolitical circumstances and the landscape
change frequently and quickly in Jerusalem; as Romann’s survey was conducted over 30 years
ago, a reassessment of perception among Jerusalemites in the 21st century is in order.
Other research has also revealed differences in perception among Israelis, whether
focusing on the effect of the objective environment on perception of environmental hazards, or
differences in how poverty—a common issue among Jerusalem’s Haredi community—is
perceived by men and women (Strier, 2005). Drori & Yuchtman-Yaar (2002) used survey
questionnaire methods to gauge perceptions of environmental hazards (air quality, water quality,
noise, congestion, sewage, etc.) among residents of Israel’s three largest cities, Haifa, Tel Aviv,
and Jerusalem, which exhibit high, medium, and low levels of hazard risk, respectively. It was
found that actual levels of environmental hazards played a larger role in residents’ perceptions of
those hazards and their attitudes towards them, while respondent socioeconomic characteristics
(age, education, income) were of lesser importance. Residents of Haifa, which has a higher level
of environmental hazards than the other cities due to greater industrial activity, were consistently
found to give their city the lowest rankings of environmental quality across all hazard measures,
whereas residents of Jerusalem (which has very little industrial activity and strict regulations
regarding environmental hazards) gave their city the highest rankings; residents of Tel Aviv,
which has less industrial activity than Haifa but deals with a very large volume of cars and buses
creating noise, congestion, and air pollution, gave their city moderate rankings of environmental
quality. The researchers concluded that the objective environment has a more statisticallysignificant effect on environmental perceptions and attitudes than age, education, and income.
Notably, religion was not included as a respondent characteristic, nor was its potential to affect
environmental perception, attitude formation, and behavior discussed. This is surprising, given
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the fact that Jerusalemites are noted for their religiosity, while Tel Aviv and Haifa are often
lauded (or, conversely, condemned) as secular bastions within Israel. While the researchers’
findings conclusively showed that the objective physical environment affects subjective
perceptions of that environment more than socioeconomic considerations, one could argue that
religion— something that is actively practiced and often a dominant component of one’s identity,
if not the dominant component—may be more powerful than circumstantial socioeconomic
characteristics. Thus, given Jerusalem’s diverse religious communities and their rich traditions,
the research at hand must address how such traditions might affect a Jerusalemite’s perception of
their city and how they judge and value its various phenomena and spaces.
Jerusalem in the Abrahamic Religions
Like Mecca or the Vatican City, Jerusalem is inextricably linked with the spirituality of
millions; however, unlike those other holy cities, Jerusalem bears monumental spiritual
significance for followers of more than one religion. This quality has undoubtedly affected how
the city is perceived and valued within societies based in monotheistic Abrahamic tradition, by
both the pious and the secular individual. As Paradise (2005) and others have shown, faith can
greatly impact perception of environmental phenomena. Given Jerusalem’s status as a holy city
for Christians, Jews, and Muslims, as well as the fact that residents of Jerusalem are (on average)
more religious than Israelis and Palestinians in general, the value and meaning of the city that is
imbued throughout the traditions of these religions, is a critical part of any discussion of
environmental perception among Jerusalemites.
For Jews in Israel or throughout the world, there is no location on the planet—historically
or currently—that holds more significance than Jerusalem. The city has been the stage for much
of Jewish history, from the establishment of the United Kingdom of Israel by King David and the
rule of the wise King Solomon, to the building and destruction of both Temples; throughout the
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highs and lows of the Jewish people, Jerusalem has stood witness. Psalm 137, in which the
Israelites mourn the destruction of the Temple and their enslavement by the Babylonians (and
said to be written during that period of captivity), reads: “If I forget you, Jerusalem, may my
right hand forget its skill. May my tongue cling to the roof of my mouth if I do not remember
you, if I do not consider Jerusalem my highest joy”. Today the Western Wall—the last remnant
of the Second Temple—is the ultimate site of Jewish pilgrimage and worship; Jewish
congregations face Jerusalem when they pray. However, within the grounds of the Temple
Mount itself, non-Muslim prayer is forbidden by the Islamic Waqf, the religious trust that
administers the site; in 2013 the Waqf’s director, Sheikh Azzam al-Khatib, asserted “this place
belongs to the Muslim people, and no others have the right to pray here” (Booth & Eglash,
2013). Non-Muslims are still allowed to walk the grounds, but any open display of prayer or
worship is not allowed. Some rabbis, including the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, have asserted that
Jews should not even walk the grounds, as it could inadvertently lead them to walk over the site
of the former Temple’s innermost sanctuary, the Holy of Holies; a sign is in place on the grounds
that warns Jewish visitors of this risk (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3. Sign at the entrance to the Temple Mount, warning Jews that entering the area is a
violation of the Torah (Ranjha, 2016).
On occasion, the zealous devotion to the site of the former Temples has taken a dark turn.
Talk of construction of a Third Temple on the Temple Mount—known to Muslims as al-Haram
ash-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) and today the site of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa
mosque—was long considered taboo by Jewish authorities; however, since the 1980s, such a
concept has become increasingly normalized in Israeli and Jewish society, and is a frequent
talking-point for Israeli politicians and pundits, much to the horror and anger of Muslims
throughout the world (Armstrong, 1998). A highly-publicized visit to the Temple Mount by
Israeli president Ariel Sharon in 2000, meant to symbolize or assert the right of Israelis to visit
the site, is cited as the catalyst of the Second Intifada, a violent 5-year period of increased IsraeliPalestinian conflict (Greenburg, 2000). It is unfortunate that the dominant narrative and activity
of Israeli and Palestinian authorities reinforces the spatial and social division between Jews and
Muslims, despite the fact that the space being contested has shared meaning for both religions.
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Suggestions that the site and right to worship openly should be shared among all faiths, have yet
to gain any real traction or support.
Jerusalem holds special significance for Christians, a population that often gets lost in the
shuffle of sensationalized conflicts between Jews and Muslims over the city and its holy sites.
The ancient city and the surrounding area are regarded as the site of the ministry, death, and
resurrection of Jesus Christ; Bethlehem, a few miles south, is regarded as Christ’s birthplace.
Like Judaism before it, Christian tradition also regards Jerusalem as the center of creation. The
arrangement of the world with Jerusalem at the center was a pervasive theme in European
cartography between the 6th and 17th centuries, epitomized by so-called “T and O”, or orbis
terrarum, maps. Tuan notes that cartographers who employed this theme were less concerned
with practical use than with “expressed beliefs and experiences of a theological culture that
placed Christianity—and its topographic symbol, Jerusalem—at the center” (1974). In 1581,
German theologian-cum-cartographer Heinrich Bünting depicted the metropolis as the center of
a three-leaf clover, with the leaves of Africa, Asia, and Europe radiating outward to the unknown
(Figure 3.4.). A need to control the city and restore its Christian character—articulated by Pope
Urban II at the Council of Council of Clermont in 1096—was the primary catalyst for the
Crusades. Today, the thriving Christian Quarter of the Old City serves as the end-point for
Christian pilgrims visiting the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which is purported by some sects
to be built on the site of Christ’s crucifixion and burial. Other sites of Christian pilgrimage
include the Garden of Gethsemane (where Christ communed with God before his arrest by the
Romans), which lies beneath the Mount of Olives, where Christ is said to have conducted many
of his sermons and later ascended to heaven.
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Figure 3.4. Heinrich Bünting’s Clover World Map, from Itinerarium Sacrae Scripturae (1581).

Although the Arabic name of Jerusalem (Bayt al-Quds, “the holy sanctuary”) is not
explicitly mentioned in the Qur`an, the city has been highly venerated throughout the history of
Islam. Before the emergence of Islam, Jews and Christians had long regarded Jerusalem as the
site of divine interactions between God and the most revered figures of monotheistic theology,
namely Abraham, David, Solomon, and Jesus. Islam, as the continuation of the Abrahamic
religious and prophetic tradition, maintains the same reverence and regards Jerusalem as its
third-holiest city, after Mecca and Medina. This tradition is directly linked to the teachings and
actions of the Prophet Muhammad, as recounted in the Qur`an and the hadith. In his review of
Jerusalem in the Qur`an, El-Khatib (2001) details 70 possible references to the holy city. The
most important and, according to El-Khatib, most unanimously accepted reference is found in
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Surat al-Isra (“the Journey”), which recounts Muhammad’s miraculous journey from Mecca to
Jerusalem in one night: “Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from al-Masjid al-Haram
[the Sacred Mosque of Mecca] to al-Masjid al-Aqsa [the Farthest Mosque], whose surroundings
We have blessed, to show him of Our signs” (Qur`an 7:1). A particular sunnah—a record of the
actions of the Prophet Muhammad, as recorded by his companions—suggests that the first
Muslims faced Jerusalem instead of Mecca, as they do today (El-Khatib, 2001; Sahih al-Bukhari
1). The tradition goes that one day, in the middle of prayers, the Prophet turned from Jerusalem
to Mecca and instructed early Muslims to do the same, claiming that Allah had instructed them
accordingly. This intriguing tradition is supported by an unusual architectural feature of at least
three contemporary mosques, which have two separate niches (miḥrāb) indicating the direction
of prayer (qibla): one pointing to Jerusalem and the other to Mecca. The most well-known is
Medina’s Masjid al-Qiblatain, “Mosque of Two Qiblas”, a common stop for Muslims
undertaking the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. Another Masjid al-Qiblatain stands in ruins in the
once-prominent port town of Zeila, Somalia, reduced to rubble by time and the civil war of the
late 1980s; a third, more obscure, double-qibla mosque, Masjid as-Shawadhinah can be found in
Nizwā, Oman. All three mosques date to the 7th century (Bandyopadhyay, 2005). Recent
renovations of the Medina mosque converted the Jerusalem miḥrāb to a blind arch; however, the
rare feature and the tradition behind it continue to draw visitors, and an informational sign at the
mosque’s entrance describes the story of the first qibla. Although the idea of the double qibla is
contested by some Muslims (Saifullah et al., 2001), the tradition of the original qibla remains
strong within Islam and Jerusalem continues to occupy a unique place in the hearts of Muslims
(St. Laurent & Riedlmayer, 1993). For members of all the Abrahamic faiths, the city is a symbol
of faith, a destination of pilgrimage, a connection to a shared past, and the site of a shared future.
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2. Planning and Space in Divided Cities
With an understanding of the interaction between the objective environment and
individual’s subjective perception of that environment—and how demographics, culture, or
experience might affect perception, attitudes, and resulting behavior—a review of planning and
space in politically and ethnically divided cities is in order. The unique challenges of effective
planning and governance in a contested urban landscape will be examined; history does not lack
for examples of the issues that have faced divided cities and attempts to mitigate those issues. It
may be that planning policies implemented in a divided Berlin, Johannesburg, Nicosia, or Beirut
might illuminate potential solutions for Jerusalem’s modern planning problems.
The Divided City
Whether at the local or regional level, designing and successfully implementing planning
policies and initiatives means conquering various challenges, such as zoning requirements,
infrastructure renovations, budgetary restrictions, environmental regulations, and objections of
the general public. In divided cities the situation is further complicated by especially delicate
sociopolitical circumstances, such as ethnic, nationalistic, or religious intergroup conflicts, which
have the potential to erupt in violence, and often do so. Different groups within any city will
perceive the city’s various phenomena differently and have different priorities; if those groups
are actively in conflict, the differences in perception and attitudes will be even starker, and
planning issues will be even more challenging to mitigate. This is particularly true when one
party of such a conflict occupies a position of power or authority over the other, as is the case
with Israeli municipal authorities and Palestinian residents in Jerusalem. However, while the
close proximity of different groups within a city can exacerbate the conflict, it also has the
potential to foster interdependence and pressure authorities on all sides to compromise and find
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working solutions, which may in turn have a positive impact on related regional, national, or
international conflicts (Bollens, 1998a). Decisions on housing construction, lot allocation,
zoning, or other public actions thus become part of a greater political or cultural conflict, with
consequences that have the potential to radiate from the local to the international scale. In this
context and atmosphere, the building of a new Israeli housing project in a Palestinian area of
Jerusalem is not just a construction project: for Israelis it is a show of Jewish pride, development,
and resourcefulness; for Palestinians, it is perceived and regarded as another act of Zionist
aggression, and perhaps even an act of war.
Another issue that often arises in divided cities is a lack of trust in the prevailing social
institutions of the ruling majority among the disenfranchised minority; that minority population
may even denounce or reject such institutions outright, viewing them—and any decisions they
make—as illegitimate and inherently unjust (Bollens, 1998b). Although Palestinian permanent
residents of Jerusalem do have the right to vote in municipal elections, the vast majority choose
to abstain; this act of political protest not only disenfranchises Palestinian Jerusalemites even
further, but gives the Israeli municipal government absolute control over all planning and
governance decisions in the city. The resulting decisions are shamelessly partisan, having been
designed and implemented based on how they will benefit and promote the growth of one ethnic
group while hurting and limiting the growth of another.
A common theme in research on divided cities is the importance of shared, communal
spaces as places where disparate groups might congregate peacefully, interact at a distance, and,
perhaps, begin to realize they are not so different, after all. Public recreational spaces, such as
parks or shopping malls, are good examples of such environments (Kuo et al., 1998).
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Planning in Jerusalem
Throughout its history, the urban planning and development of Jerusalem has been a
direct reflection of the values and goals of the ruling authority, which has been in constant flux.
In controlling and molding one of the world’s most famous, beloved, and symbolic cities to fit
their needs, the Israelites, Romans, Muslims, Crusaders, Ottomans, British, Jordanians, Israelis,
etc. have used the city to project their power and influence to the world. Although the entirety of
Jerusalem’s planning history is significant, for the purposes of this research, this review will
focus on planning policies implemented in Jerusalem’s modern period, since the beginning of the
British mandate period.
Although the Ottomans had enacted sweeping modernization reforms in Palestine during
the tanzimat period, which included building roads and official structures, modern planning
standards and practices—those which emphasized social, aesthetic, and economic concerns as
well as physical infrastructural needs—were first implemented under the British (Efrat & Noble,
1988). The preservation and maintenance of the holy places, and the establishment of a uniform
architectural character, were primary concerns of the new British planners and authorities. Many
of the planning and design standards put in place by the British remain largely in use today, such
as limits on building height, prohibition of construction immediately adjacent to the Old City
walls, and the use of domed roofs and Jerusalem stone for exterior walls was meant to imbue
buildings with that essential traditional character and allow them to visually merge with the
rocky landscape. The Old City, the cultural, architectural, and social core of the city, was
separated from the spreading New City by green belts around the walls; initially, new
construction was focused to the west, southwest, and north, in order to maintain the sweeping
panoramic views of the eastern hills. Patrick Geddes, the Scottish planner who is best known in
Israel for his plan of Tel Aviv, worked in Jerusalem between 1919 and 1925. His plan of
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Jerusalem followed the building standards and zoning put in place by the British, and created the
first visualization of Jerusalem’s future growth and development, with repercussions that are felt
today (Figure 3.5.) However, it also reflected a colonial, pro-Zionist perspective, with little
regard for existing local populations, their needs or values, or the political reality on the ground
(Rubin, 2011).

Figure 3.5. Patrick Geddes’ 1919 Plan for Jerusalem (Rubin, 2011).
With the expiration of the British Mandate and the establishment of Israel in 1948, and
the subsequent division of Palestine into Israeli and Jordanian-controlled territory, Jerusalem was
torn in two. Jews and Arabs who found themselves on the wrong side of the border promptly
fled, were evacuated, or were forcefully ousted, further dividing and homogenizing the city’s
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halves. Between 1948 and 1967 Jordanian Jerusalem suffered from economic stagnation and a
lack of cohesive planning, while Israeli Jerusalem thrived and continued to practice the modern
land use standards and infrastructural development processes first implemented by the British
(Tsimhoni, 1983). The new Israeli government immediately declared Jerusalem the capital of
Israel, and transferred most government offices from Tel Aviv; thus, the city’s status as an
administrative center and a symbol of Israeli nationalism was further cemented. Physical and
demographic control, not administrative claims, became a priority, a trend that continues today.
The city also became—and remains—the primary settlement point for new immigrants, who
were continuing to stream in by the tens of thousands every year; as a result, residential,
commercial, and industrial construction to support the growing population, occurred at a
prodigious rate. All development during this period was focused westward. A particular issue of
the time was the difficulty in planning effective transportation routes through the divided city.
In contrast, East Jerusalem and the Jordanian West Bank did not experience the same
level of organization and development; the planning of roads and allocation of land for public
buildings and commercial or industrial use failed to take future growth into account
(Abdelhamid, 2006; Efrat & Noble, 1988). In 1967, with the defeat of Jordan in the Six-Day
War, Israel annexed not only the area of East Jerusalem but also an additional 64 km2 of the
West Bank, including parts of the municipalities of Bethlehem and Beit Jala, two prominent
Arab Christian towns. However, the borders of the new “united” Jerusalem were carefully
gerrymandered to include as much open land and as few Arabs as possible (B’Tselem, 2010).
Sometimes peripheral Palestinian towns, villages, and neighborhoods were even split in half by
the new borders. Arabs who fell within the new borders were granted status as permanent
residents of Israel, while those who were excluded were subject to Israeli military rule in the
West Bank, lacking both permanent resident status and Israeli citizenship.
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In the decades since reunification, although hundreds of thousands of Palestinians
became subject to Israeli law in 1967, the Israeli authorities have given little thought to
improving the lives of Palestinian Jerusalemites. Relative to West Jerusalem and newly-built
Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the infrastructural development and funding of Arab
areas of East Jerusalem has been purposely insufficient. Bollens (1998b) noted that municipal
spending in Jewish versus Arab neighborhoods was consistently cited by both Israeli and
Palestinian planners as a ratio of 8:1; Amirav (1992) found that 4% was the highest amount of
the infrastructural development budget ever allocated to Arab areas. Even as recently as 2013,
only 10% to 13.6% of the city budget was invested in Arab East Jerusalem, despite the fact that
residents comprise 37% of Jerusalem’s population (Ir Amim, 2014). In 2011, an Israeli city
engineer estimated that it would cost $520 million to close the development gap between East
and West Jerusalem (Miller, 2015). In 2014 the Israeli government approved a five-year budget
of $52 million to be used to upgrade East Jerusalem’s physical infrastructure, improve security in
Arab neighborhoods to combat crime, and invest in community centers and vocational training.
A significant piece of the budget was allocated to improving transportation infrastructure and
road paving, which is severely lacking in the city’s eastern half.
However, despite what is touted as progress on budget reports, city plans and
development initiatives continue to neglect the needs of Palestinian Jerusalemites. Jerusalem
Plan No. 2000, the first municipal master plan to include both East and West Jerusalem, was
completed by the Jerusalem Municipality in 2004 and approved by the Israeli government in
2009. Despite its comprehensive scope and insistence that it seeks to address the needs of all
residents, the plan states that its primary objective regarding society and population is
“maintaining a Jewish majority in the city of Jerusalem while attending to the needs of the Arab
minority” (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004). While the strategy promoted for Jewish areas is
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primarily one of expansion—expanding existing neighborhoods or creating new ones,
particularly in East Jerusalem—the main strategy for Arab areas is one of densification—
increasing the limits of height or volume of existing residences, thus restricting horizontal
development (Chiodelli, 2012b). This is partially achieved by zoning the remaining open areas in
East Jerusalem as “green” or leaving them un-zoned, thus proscribing any development by
Palestinian residents—who cannot receive a construction permit for improperly zoned land—and
thus leaving any structure built within that area vulnerable to demolition.
Like pre-existing planning policies, the plan was framed by a Jewish Israeli perspective.
Arab residents and officials were almost entirely excluded from the planning process, despite the
insistence that the plan actively strove to include aspects of public participation. Of the 95
representatives who collaborated on the plan—including local government officials, urban
planners, and experts from a variety of fields—only one representative was Arab (Jabareen,
2010). Furthermore, while the planning committees distributed a survey—published only in
Hebrew—in Israeli neighborhoods to question residents about their “neighborhood vision” and
assess the needs of their communities, Palestinian residents were not surveyed, thus completely
excluding their perspective from the process. The language used by the municipality framed
Palestinian areas as riddled with issues of service provision and infrastructure, but failed to
advance an organized program to deal with these specific issues, focusing instead on curbing
illegal Palestinian construction and restricting Palestinian territorial expansion. The municipality
characterized Palestinian areas of Jerusalem as chaotic, but failed to acknowledge its own hand
in feeding the chaos.
One does not need a specialized education or planning background to recognize
Jerusalem’s current division or the detrimental effects of biased Israeli planning and
development. Crossing the former Green Line or looking at the towering separation wall, the
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social, spatial, and infrastructural chasm separating Palestinian East and Israeli West is as plain
as the nose on one’s face. As Bollens notes, “When there is a single dominating ethnic group in
control of the government apparatus, the morally based doctrines of that ethnonational group
regarding sovereignty and cultural identity will merge with the state's urban policy” (1998a). The
result is that the dominant ethnopolitical ideology—a product of collective and individual
perceptions, experiences, and world views within the dominant group—is manifested in the real
world through discriminatory planning policies and the biased allocation of resources and
territory, all at the expense of the non-dominant groups. Authorities will, in turn, seek to justify
and defend such policies as necessary for security or for larger government goals. Jerusalem
exemplifies such a situation. Since Israel gained control of East Jerusalem in 1967, the explicit
official policy of the Jerusalem municipality has been to promote Jewish demographic growth
and territorial control while limiting that of Palestinian Arabs; this policy has been replicated
throughout the West Bank territory as a whole. Because Israel is touted as The Jewish State and
Jerusalem its capital, the state and municipal authorities work tirelessly to ensure a Jewish
demographic majority and cultural dominance in the city. This is accomplished through blatantly
insidious measures, such as: making building permits prohibitively expensive and extraordinarily
difficult for Palestinians to obtain, resulting in building or renovations that are technically illegal
and thus frequently subject to demolition (Chiodelli, 2012a); creating plans that place
Palestinian-owned land outside the boundaries of the approved building area and designating
Palestinian land within the planned area as reserved for “public use”, thus severely limiting the
amount of land that can be legally built on (if the owners can obtain a permit) (Kaminker, 1997);
and erecting separation barriers and restricting roads in such a way that Palestinian communities
have become veritable islands, enclosed, isolated from one another, and difficult for residents to
access (Thawaba, 2011). The Israeli authorities also employ less-obvious measures to promote
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the Jewish presence in Jerusalem, such as transliterating Hebrew place-names into Arabic script
on official road signs that show both official languages; this practice, termed Hebraicizing,
further erodes the presence of Arab culture and identity in Jerusalem, a city long famed for its
cultural diversity (Figure 3.6.).

Figure 3.6. Highway 1 sign outside of Jerusalem, which transliterates the Hebrew name for the
city (Yerushalayim) into Arabic, instead of using the Arabic name (al-Quds) (972 Mag, 2015).

Municipal developments that are touted as progress by the Israeli government are, from a
Palestinian perspective, perceived as biased, harmful, and regressive. The continued expansion
of the separation wall from Jerusalem into the surrounding area, and throughout the West Bank,
is the defining example of how Israeli planning decisions routinely disregard the needs of the
Palestinian population. The wall, touted as a security measure to prevent violent terrorist attacks
on the Israeli population, frequently cuts through Palestinian neighborhoods and farmland,
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severing ties between communities and drastically reducing Palestinian quality of life by
restricting access to economic opportunities, healthcare, education, and other community
services. In 2014 the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the state’s decision to expand Begin Highway
(Highway 50), which runs north-south through West Jerusalem, eastward to connect with
Highway 60, in order to facilitate growing traffic between West Jerusalem and a cluster of West
Bank settlements known as Gush Etzion. While the Israeli government lauded the decision as
beneficial to Jerusalem’s interconnectedness and a boon to the communities of Gush Etzion,
Palestinian residents of the southwest Jerusalem village of Beit Safafa were outraged, as the
construction will physically divide their community in half and prevent them from constructing
new homes within the highway’s vicinity (in other words, anywhere in the village). Several
residents perceived that they would not be able to access the highway and, thus, it had no value
to them; many claimed that the Israeli government was trying to push them out of the Jerusalem
municipality and into Bethelehem, where they would lose their status as permanent residents.
One 60-year resident of the village observed:
“What’s legal for them is illegal for the village, because it destroys it... My family
will live on the other side of the highway... It’s for the Jews, and I’m not talking
[with] prejudice, I’ve lived and worked with Jews all my life and am not against
the people. It’s just that the plans they’re making are good for them, and no one
else” (Eisenbud, 2014).
As of December 2015 the municipal initiative to connect Highway 50 —known as the South
Begin Expressway Extension Project—was expected to be complete by April 2016, and was
lauded by Israel’s Minister of Transportation as a positive element in the country’s “transport
revolution” (Jerusalem Municipality, 2015). Whether Palestinian residents of Jerusalem will
benefit from the revolution remains to be seen.
Bollens (1998b) examined four model urban planning strategies that planners of a divided
or ethnically-polarized city can undertake: (i) neutral, in which planners seek to remain “color104

blind” and to separate urban issues from politics by framing them as technical issues that can be
solved using standard planning practice; (ii) partisan, in which citizens are identified by their
ethnicity, enabling decision-makers to prioritize the needs and values of the empowered ethnic
group while ignoring those of the disenfranchised ethnic group; (iii) equity, which uses ethnic
affiliation and status as a way of determining where inequalities can be mitigated and where
resources should be allocated, based on “affirmative action policies”; and (iv) resolver strategy,
which seeks solutions to planning issues by focusing less on the symptoms of urban inequality
and more on the causes, such as power imbalances or competing ethnic identities. Israeli
planning policies in Jerusalem, being undeniably partisan and a reflection of the values and
priorities of the Israeli government in general, show little to no regard for the glaring needs of the
Palestinian population. This is a reflection of a more general social mindset among Israelis,
which justifies a situation in which the most basic needs of the Palestinians—workable utilities
infrastructure, adequate housing, economic opportunity, freedom of movement through their
home city—are secondary, if considered at all, to a need for Jewish demographic supremacy and
security. Thus, asking Israeli planners and authorities to practice a more “neutral” planning
approach, would be akin to putting the cart before the horse. The first step is convincing Israeli
authorities that all of Jerusalem’s population could benefit from plans and initiatives that take the
needs of all populations into account. This is no easy feat, as it would require the challenging of
a deeply-entrenched mindset and fear of the Other. However, a plan that promotes its
participatory aspect but restricts the opinions it seeks to those of Hebrew-speaking Jerusalemites,
as the current master plan has done, is a shameful excuse for a comprehensive city master plan,
and wastes the extraordinary opportunity to alter the status quo of planning in Jerusalem, which
is undeniably biased and divisive, and results in development that is unsustainable and
ineffective.
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Change must come from both communities. In the current situation, the Israeli
government yields overwhelming political power, military force, and control over planning and
development decisions, which affect the daily lives of Palestinians but in which they have very
little to no input, often by choice. A first step to obtaining more leverage in the current system
involves Palestinian permanent residents practicing their rights as Jerusalemites, such as the right
to take part in municipal elections. The situation for Palestinians in Jerusalem will not and cannot
improve unless the Palestinian community attempts to work toward beneficial change and reform
within the existing political systems. Although they regard the Israeli municipal government as
illegitimate, they must attempt to work within that system, as a step toward their own
enfranchisement and right to self-determination. This would enable them to take some measure
of control of their own destiny, empowering them to assert their needs, opinions, and goals
within their beloved city. Abstention from voting and refusal of Israeli citizenship is a method of
fostering Palestinian autonomy and identity, which must be respected; however, there comes a
point where ideology must be tempered with reality, on both sides. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian
authorities will relinquish claims to Jerusalem; neither community is going anywhere, thus both
must cooperate to solve the issues that plague all Jerusalemites. This relationship must be
reciprocal: the Jerusalem municipality and greater Israeli state must actively pursue cooperative
efforts and seek the input of Palestinians, if they are truly invested in creating policies that
protect the rights and address the needs of all residents; Palestinian residents must be willing to
cooperate with the Israeli officials and leverage their rights in the municipal government to
obtain basic rights in their city. Only then could a combination of the “equity” and “resolver”
planning strategies—considering the different needs of distinct populations, and working to
develop solutions to planning issues—be possible, and only then could Jerusalem’s planners
make any claims regarding inclusivity, public participation, or a sustainable future.
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3. Participatory Planning and GIS Methods
In his review of perception studies in geography, L.J. Wood asserted that “town planners
have no direct mechanism whereby they can discover what people want; hence, plans are often
made in terms of what people ought to want” (1970). Various planning professionals,
researchers, and both private and public entities have sought to rectify this issue by developing
and employing a more democratic and inclusive planning process, using a variety of methods
and tools. This final section of the review will discuss the theory, history, and motivations of
participatory planning models and methods, which have been employed in a variety of contexts
in cities throughout the world. Participatory planning initiatives in Jerusalem, Israel, and
Palestine will be examined, in particular. A combination of GIS (Geographic Information
System) technology—a revolutionary advance in modern city and regional planning—and
participatory planning methods, resulting in Participatory Geographic Information Systems
(PGIS), will be advanced as a potential tool to address Jerusalem’s unique politically-charged
planning and development issues.
Participatory Planning Theory and Methods
The concept of incorporating public participation in the planning process emerged
among American and European planners and researchers around the middle of the 20th century.
In America, citizen participation was first mandated in 1954 as part of the Urban Renewal
Program, a federal effort to combat the physical deterioration and spread of “blight”—building
deterioration, unsanitary conditions, lack or deficiency of adequate public services,
overcrowding—in the industrial cities of the East and Midwest and in southern cities with large
concentrations of impoverished African American communities (Johnstone, 1958). The growth
of the participatory planning movement largely began as a reaction to critiques of the failure of
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traditional planning practice to sufficiently incorporate the needs of disadvantaged populations;
this resulted in experimentation with advocacy or pluralistic planning, in which plans are
developed on behalf of a society’s many disparate socioeconomic groups (Damer & Hague,
1971). Over time, the trend became not just planning on behalf of disenfranchised populations,
but fostering and enabling the active participation of those populations in processes that were
previously the purview of experts and elected officials. Since its emergence, the subject of
participatory planning has amassed an immense, diverse, and dynamic body of literature. As
planning theory and methods continue to evolve, the successes and failures of participatory
planning initiatives will generate new models and avenues for exploration and improvement.
The first question to ask in a public participation effort is, “Who are the public?” The
word denotes “ordinary people in general; the community” (Oxford Dictionaries). In the context
of city planning, “public” refers to those individuals not traditionally involved in the planning
process, i.e. anyone who is not a trained city planner, government official (elected or otherwise),
or private developer. The public are those who interact with the environment being planned, who
experience the space on a daily basis, and who—for the most part—pay the taxes that will fund
aspects of the work at hand, including its planning, construction, operation, and maintenance.
While public participation was once an experimental feature of planning, in the United States,
governments at all levels—from the district to the state—have mandated that citizen input be
sought and considered when developing and adopting plans (Brody et al., 2003). But what does
“participation” entail? Some of the most common methods of obtaining citizen input are public
hearings or community forums, workshops, and citizen advisory committees (Creighton, 1992;
Sanoff, 2000). Survey questionnaires on specific issues are also useful, as they enable the
quantification of perceptions and attitudes for further analysis. Visualization techniques, such as
sketches, GIS mapping, and digital modeling, are also useful tools for enabling enhanced citizen
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participation, identifying issues and brainstorming solutions, and increasing public understanding
of proposed plans (Al-Kodmany, 1999).
The goals of participatory planning are admirable: increased citizen responsibility and
interest in their environment; greater accountability of elected officials and developers to their
constituents and the people whose lives will be affected by official activities; and neighborhood,
city, and regional plans that are inclusive of a wide array of stakeholder needs, not just those
with the most money or political influence. However, many issues also arise in a participatory
effort. Cost is a frequent issue, both in terms of money and time; in short, working to gain the
myriad diverse opinions of citizens requires extensive meetings, interviews, surveys, and
analysis. Depending on the scale, context, and objectives of the participatory planning initiative,
such an effort can require a varying amounts of time, money, coordination, and communication
between public agencies, private entities, and a diverse array of citizens, all with unique
motivations and goals. However, the upfront cost of a participatory effort pays off in a public
sense of ownership, reduced chance of future stakeholder conflict, increased quality of resulting
plans, and more enduring and equitable solutions to planning issues. The ideal public
participation planning effort recognizes the diverse perspectives of different parties, incorporates
the needs of all stakeholders fairly, and empowers citizens of all stripes to actively connect and
enact positive change in their communities.
In her Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969), Arnstein stressed the redistribution of
power as a key to effective public participation efforts. Her model illustrated eight levels, or
“rungs”, of a citizen’s power to affect decision-making efforts, ranging from lower rungs of
“nonparticipation” to middle rungs of “tokenism” and upper rungs of genuine “citizen power”
(Figure 3.7.). Truly effective citizen participation efforts would transfer some level of real
power—the upper rungs of the ladder—to the “have-not” citizens (in this context, racial/ethnic
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minorities in urban America), thus facilitating their participation in the processes that affect them
and enabling them to enact real change in their communities. Many initiatives incorporating
citizen participation—such as elements of Lyndon Johnson’s Model Cities and Community
Action Programs within wider urban renewal efforts—failed, Arnstein claimed, because
participants’ power was limited to the lower rungs of the ladder, rendering their participation an
“empty ritual” affecting no actual change. Only in the 6th rung and higher are “have-not”
participants able to rise above merely voicing their opinions and needs in a consultative or
advisory atmosphere, to being able to engage with powerful stakeholders in meaningful ways
and, ultimately, become the decision-makers themselves. In the meantime, while the middle
rungs—particularly Informing and Consultation—cannot alone constitute genuine participation,
they are important first steps to fostering the evolution of citizen power to the higher rungs.
Within those higher rungs, the success of a citizen-focused initiative often relies on two factors:
“the quality of technical assistance…in articulating their priorities; and the extent to which the
community has been organized to press for those priorities” (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein’s ladder
focused on federal government programs in urban areas, but she insisted that the same typology
could be applied to any situation where the power imbalance between a governing authority and
its citizens, students, workers, or congregants must be addressed and mitigated.
Connor’s new ladder of citizen participation (1988) was designed to prevent, address, and
resolve controversy over public or private policies, programs, and projects, whether in urban,
suburban, or rural contexts (Figure 3.7.). Unlike Arnstein’s ladder, in which rungs represented
levels of citizen participation and power from lowest (least effective or genuine) to highest (most
effective and genuine), the rungs of Connor’s ladder represented the steps taken in a systematic
approach to resolve or prevent a conflict involving the general public, with each rung acting as a
basis for the proceeding rung and all having a cumulative effect. As they climb higher, both
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ladders increase the amount of active public participation in the planning or resolution process.
The crucial first step in Connor’s ladder is ensuring that both parties are educated about each
other and about the issue at hand: the public must be informed of stakeholders’ objectives and
activities; the public or private entity seeking the public’s participation must first understand the
needs, perspectives, and goals of that public. Surveying can be an effective method of gaining a
greater understanding of the public, while also revealing information gaps, negative myths, and
stereotypes before they have a negative effect on the process.

Figure 3.7. Arnstein's (left) and Connor’s (right) respective Ladders of Citizen Participation
(Arnstein, 1969 & Connor, 1988)
A particular weakness of the public participation process, noted by both Arnstein and
Conner, is that it is costly, time-consuming, and labor-intensive, but success is not guaranteed at
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any point—even after implementation. All parties must be dedicated to investing time (group
meetings, consultation sessions, workshops), money (to compensate those involved, purchase
and distribute media, litigation costs), and energy into the initiative, and seeing it through to
resolution. However, the widespread use of the Internet throughout the world—a medium and
trend that most people could not have fathomed before the 1980s—creates a very different
situation. Where once information on a government initiative might be spread through
newspapers, phone calls, flyers, and door-to-door campaigners, the same information can now be
rapidly distributed over a large area through online news platforms, social media, and E-mail.
Digital media allows for fast, responsive content creation and enables stakeholders to respond to
questions or concerns in real time. Internet tools also facilitate the information-gathering phase
of the process. While Connor suggested the use of “reply-paid postcards” to survey the public,
the use of online survey tools—many of which are free to use—and crowdsourcing methods
could drastically reduce the amount of time and money used to collect responses (Brabham,
2009; Hanzl, 2007). Greater connectivity across any distance through communication programs
such as Skype or Google Hangouts, and the ability to steam live or recorded events and conduct
meetings with participants anywhere in the world, can enable parties to attend elements of the
planning or resolution process at their convenience, and without having to physically cross
borders.
Support for participatory methods in public work only continues to grow. In 2007, the
International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) published their “Spectrum of Public
Participation”, an updated framework and methodology that can be used to guide modern public
participation efforts. Like the ladders of Arnstein and Connor, the IAP2 spectrum outlines
increasing levels of public participation (from first “Informing” to finally “Empowering”), each
of which involve different participation goals, “promises to the public” (ranging from “we will
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keep you informed” to “we will implement what you decide”), and techniques for incorporating
public input at each level, such as fact sheets, web sites, workshops, focus groups, and citizen
advisory committees (International Association for Public Participation, 2007). The frameworks
and methods provided by participatory research, such as the IAP2 spectrum and the use of
visualizations to educate the public on complex plans, are invaluable tools for fostering,
formulating, and successfully executing public participation efforts in the field of city planning
and beyond.
Participatory Planning in Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem
Researchers have explored public participation theory and methods in contexts outside of
the United States, where different challenges exist for both citizens and governments. Cities in
various nations throughout the world—including Israel and Palestine—have experienced
explosive growth due to rapid rural to urban migration over the last few decades, creating great
demand for services, utilities, and housing. Choguill (1996) argues that the governments of such
nations may be unable or unwilling to meet these demands; thus, a community or group must
practice “self-help” or “community mutual-help”, contributing their own time, labor, and money
to reach their mutual objectives—ideally, with strategic outside assistance, such as international
aid funds.
Several planning professionals and researchers in Israel and Palestine have recognized
the potential of participatory methods to mitigate the region’s unique planning issues; others
have insisted that public participation cannot succeed in Israel until basic democratic rights (such
as full public representation and equal distribution of decision-making power) are achieved
(Alfasi, 2003). Shmueli and Kipnis (1998) applied participatory planning theory among a mixed
Arab and Jewish community, with the objective of identifying the basic needs and wants of two
distinct minority communities, formulating solutions as a group, and determining who the
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citizens felt was the best equipped to deal with the community’s problems. As hypothesized, the
researchers found that the problems and needs articulated by members of the different minority
groups were a direct reflection of their social status within the community and focused on their
immediate experiences. For instance, recently immigrated Russian Jews sought greater
assimilation and employment opportunities within Israeli society, while the Arab participants
focused on issues of a geopolitical nature, such as land and territory, social equality, and
representation in government, rather than material concerns like employment. The result was a
proposed plan that not only took the community’s physical characteristics, demographics, urban
design, and economic considerations into account, but also included citizen input and
suggestions for development that would take these inputs into account. The researchers
concluded that “people welcome the opportunity to be heard”, taking the participants’
enthusiasm to share their views and needs as a validation of the participatory process in itself.
Shmeuli (2008) also explored how framing—“a cognitive process whereby individuals
and groups filter their perceptions, interpretations, and understandings of complex situations in
ways consistent with their own...world views and experiences”—can play an important role in
analyzing and mitigating environmental conflicts, such as land use disputes, resource
competition, and the siting of noxious facilities, in the context of Israel. In general, framing is a
useful tool for understanding and managing relationships between humans and their
environment. Using three environmental disputes in Israel as case studies, Shmueli exhibited that
Arabs (whether Israeli or Palestinian) and Israeli Jews frame the same issue in different ways,
which must be taken into account when authorities work to resolve these issues. It is of crucial
importance that disputants work to gain a greater understanding and respect of each other’s’
perspectives, in order to reach sustainable and mutually-beneficial solutions. In working toward
such solutions in Israel and Palestine, some research suggests that the involvement of larger
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organizations, such as NGOs, may be required to ensure adequate, cohesive representation of a
population’s goals and needs, and to facilitate the transfer of power from a government to its
citizens (Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2013). Altogether, theoretical and practical research on
participatory planning has demonstrated that such a process has great potential to mitigate the
planning and development issues of Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem. The addition of quantitative
tools, such as GIS, could also lend a component of objective, unbiased data to support research
conclusions, planning efforts, and the resulting development schemes.
GIS (Geographic Information System) and PGIS (Participatory GIS) Methods
The advancement of Geographic Information System (GIS) technology since the 1980s
has had a revolutionary effect on myriad business and governance processes, including city
planning, resource extraction (mining, drilling), climate research, environmental conservation,
and transportation and logistics. Data with any connection to a geographic location can be
mapped and analyzed, enabling the discovery and further analysis of spatial trends. For years,
GIS software was expensive and accessible only to those geographers or geospatial scientists
with years of specialized training, restricting the technology’s use and insights to a select few. In
recent years, however, the widespread availability of easy-to-use geospatial technologies that
require very little to no training, such as inexpensive GPS tools and online mapping tools, such
as Google Maps, has empowered citizens, businesses, and governments to shape spatial analysis
methods and tools to meet their needs, enabling data-driven decisions for a variety of
applications and solutions. Such a combination of GIS and participatory methods is referred to as
a Participatory Geographic Information System (PGIS) (Dunn, 2007) or Public Participation
Geographic Information System (PPGIS) (Sieber, 2006). The advent of online GIS tools that are
open to the public has also enabled planners to seek input from the citizens who will be affected
by a plan or initiative (Obermeyer, 1998; Kingston et al., 2000; Schlossberg & Shuford, 2005).
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When it comes to more day-to-day issues of urban life, such as potholes, crime, dangerous
intersections, or noise complaints, easy-to-use online geospatial tools—often run on the Google
Maps platform—enable members of the public to report issues or incidents to governments for
further evaluation and mitigation; citizens can then track the status of their complaint and
progress of a solution from the same platform, fostering official accountability and a more
engaged public (Blečić et al., 2014). Input from such platforms can also be transferred to a more
robust GIS program, such as ArcGIS, for more detailed analysis and record-keeping. Within the
context of planning, and particularly when it comes to planning in a contested environment like
Jerusalem, the addition of the objective analysis and results that GIS provides (with the proper
methodology to reduce or eliminate bias) can be an invaluable tool throughout the planning
process, including exploratory surveys, construction siting, and infrastructural development.
Plans and development initiatives can be developed based on the objective reality on the ground,
rather than anecdotal evidence, partisan opinion, or biased special interests. In Palestine, a
combination of perception assessment through surveys and GIS analysis has successfully been
implemented to enable the siting of needs-based parks in Ramallah (Thawaba, 2014). Overall,
the addition of GIS and PGIS/PPGIS tools to planning and other official processes fosters highquality, comprehensive decisions that are driven by data rather than opinion, while
simultaneously enabling governments to aggregate input from large numbers of stakeholders
from different backgrounds and with different needs. GIS can also be a useful tool for creating
random sampling schemes within certain geographic or spatial parameters. The use of such datadriven tools will be invaluable in mitigating Jerusalem’s myriad planning and development
issues, ensuring inclusive planning decisions that benefit all residents, regardless of ethnicity,
religion, or politics.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
This research seeks to compare and find commonalities between the environmental
perceptions and attitudes of the diverse residents of Jerusalem, a divided city. This was achieved
primarily through the distribution of survey questionnaires to respondents representing a wide
variety of cultural, religious, economic, and demographic backgrounds. The research as a whole,
including the design of the survey instrument, was guided and given context by a review of
previous research on environmental perception and attitudes, as well as theories of urban
planning and development initiatives (particularly in areas dealing with religious or ethnic
conflict).
Survey questionnaire techniques are crucial for such a study, providing an
operationalized method for quantifying and analyzing the imperceptible phenomena of
perceptions and attitudes. Such techniques are commonplace in research on perception, behavior,
environmental psychology, and planning (Balram & Dragicevic, 2005; Drori & Yuchtman-Yaar,
2002; Paradise, 2005; Schiff, 1970; Thawaba, 2014). The link that questionnaire surveys provide
between psychological phenomena and quantifiable data makes such surveys of great value to
geography, a field which has faced criticism—both internal and external—for its perceived lack
of quantitative methods and results. As Matthews notes, “Nothing is wrong with a qualitative
statement, but it will carry more weight if it is possible to make a statement quantitatively…to
convey unbiased, objective information” (1981). Such objective information is particularly
important in the context of Jerusalem, where discussions, processes, and decisions are easily
complicated by conflicting subjective views of national and religious identity, cultural traditions,
and land ownership and use.
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1. Study Population
During the summer of 2012, 225 respondents completed a survey instrument designed to
assess environmental perceptions perception of Jerusalem’s growing urban landscape, as well as
attitudes toward current growth and the planning processes that drive it. Respondents included
Israeli citizens, Palestinians (classified as “permanent residents”, the legal status for those living
in Jerusalem who have refused Israeli citizenship), and foreign non-citizens/non-residents, all of
whom had lived, worked, or attended school in Jerusalem for more than one year. If a potential
respondent indicated that they did not live, work, or attend school in Jerusalem, or had done so
for less than one year, the interview was discontinued. Depending on the preference of the
respondent, the written survey was self-administered in Arabic, English, or Hebrew.
2. Survey Design
The survey consisted of three sections. The first section, containing ten questions,
assessed the demographics of the respondent (age, sex, religious affiliation, level of education,
sector of employment, and annual income), the type of environment in which they grew up and
were socialized (urban, suburban, or rural), and the length of their residence or employment in
Jerusalem; the latter question was to provide an idea of the respondent’s familiarity with the
Jerusalem cityscape. Respondents had the option of naming their place of socialization
(childhood environment or hometown) and their current neighborhood but, because the focus of
the study was not the spatial correlation of environmental perceptions and attitudes, it was not
required. This section also assessed the respondent’s primary source of transportation and their
primary source for news and other information, in order to assess their level of connectivity
within the physical urban environment and the wider world of information.
The second section consisted of 10 statements regarding Jerusalem and the phenomena
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within it. Respondents indicated their level of agreement or disagreement with these statements
on a seven-point bipolar scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, with an option
to indicate “not sure”. These responses were used to assess the respondent’s perception of
Jerusalem’s urban environment, as well as their attitudes towards the process of urban growth
and the current urban development initiatives under the auspices of the Jerusalem municipality.
These scaled responses enabled the assignment of a numerical value for each respondent’s
experience with and opinion of various subjects, which could then be used in descriptive
statistical analyses.
The final section of the survey instrument asked respondents to rank ten urban issues
from 1 to 10, with 1 being the “most important” and 10 being the “least important” in their
opinion; that is, which elements of Jerusalem’s urban environment they felt were in need of more
or less attention (i.e. funding) from the municipal or national government. This section was
designed to enable the assessment of the priorities and environmental values of each respondent.
The choices provided for ranking, in alphabetical order, were: Aesthetic/Cultural Development
and Renovation (museums, libraries, public art, monuments, etc.); Environmental Cleanup and
Protection; Green Space and Recreational Space (parks, gardens, sports facilities, etc.);
Healthcare Facilities and Provision; Housing Development, Renovation, and Maintenance;
Industrial and Commercial Development; Public Transportation, Streets, and Accessibility;
Religious Development and Renovation (churches, mosques, synagogues, religious programs,
etc.); Security (police, military, firefighters, and other emergency services); and Utility Provision
(water, electricity, waste management, etc.). The qualifications of each category included above
were also included with the survey question.
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3. Procedures
This research followed a purposive maximum variation sampling method, in which a
wide variety of people were chosen to be surveyed and interviewed based on the judgement of
the researcher in the field. Maximum variation sampling is useful in research that seeks to
understand “how a phenomenon is seen and understood among different people, in different
settings” (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). Purposive, non-probability sampling methods are not
immune to researcher bias; however, for this exploratory research, it was decided that a
maximum variation sampling methodology would be sufficient. Random sampling was deemed
too cost and labor-intensive to conduct; in addition, a comprehensive list of the populations of
both East and West Jerusalem, which would enable such random sampling, was unavailable.
Each interview was conducted in a public space by the primary researcher, with durations
ranging from less than five minutes to over an hour. The average interview time was estimated to
be around twenty minutes. Potential respondents were approached in public, communal spaces
throughout East and West Jerusalem, based on their perceived openness to participating in such a
survey. Unless the respondent asked the researcher to record their answers, the survey was selfadministered. The survey portion of the interaction was prefaced with a succinct verbal
explanation of the research and its motivations, in English or Arabic. As the respondent filled out
the survey and/or after the survey was completed, the respondent was encouraged to share more
in-depth insight into their experience in Jerusalem through a one-on-one interview with the
researcher. In these cases, the researcher let the respondent take the lead; the conversation was
allowed to develop organically, based on what the respondent desired to discuss or share. These
insights were either recorded by the researcher (in English) or written by the respondent on the
survey instrument (in their choice of language). These personal notes, unencumbered by the
structure of predetermined multiple choice answers or Likert scales, enriched the researcher’s
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understanding of the respondent’s real perspective of urban growth, planning, development,
and—above all—life in the city. Selected interview excerpts can be read in Appendix C (Data
Tables).
Respondents were surveyed mostly in Jerusalem’s active urban core, surrounding the
centralized Old City. Notable survey sites included: Hebrew University’s Mt. Scopus and Givat
Ram campuses; Malha Mall, one of Israel’s largest and most popular malls, whose patrons
include Israelis, Palestinians, and tourists; Independence Park, Jerusalem’s second-largest
municipal park; shops, markets, and restaurants throughout the Armenian, Christian, Jewish, and
Muslim quarters of the Old City; Zion Square; King David, Jaffa, and King George Streets in
West Jerusalem; Salah ad Din, Sultan Suleiman, and Derech Shchem Streets in East Jerusalem;
and East Jerusalem’s Bab a-Zahara and Wadi al-Joz neighborhoods (Figure 4.1.). Thirty-four
respondents completed their survey through the online Survey Monkey platform. The location of
online respondents was verified using their IP address, as recorded by the survey platform.
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Figure 4.1. Map of General Survey Locations in the Jerusalem Municipality (Created by the
author).
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4. Assumptions
Several assumptions about this research and the resulting data must be noted. First, given
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ongoing and constantly evolving—for better or worse—it is
crucial to state that the field work for this research was conducted in the Summer of 2012, a
relatively quiet period in the history of the conflict. During the research timeframe, the most
notable political activity in Jerusalem was a protest over the privatization of the city’s light rail
line; the researcher, an American, was free to travel to and from Ramallah in the West Bank
without restriction. Because the survey component of the research was conducted during in this
context, it is possible that results would differ if the survey was conducted during a period of
active, violent conflict or civil unrest.
The survey was self-administered in the respondent’s chosen language; thus, it was
assumed that respondents fully understood the questions asked. In addition, given that the
majority of survey questions inquired about personal beliefs and past experiences—an
unobservable trait—it was assumed that all respondents answered truthfully. It was also assumed
that all respondents had some degree of familiarity with the process of completing a
questionnaire.
Finally, not only when distributing the survey questionnaires but throughout the entire
research period, it was assumed that each respondent identified themselves as being within one
of three distinct sociopolitical groups: citizens of the State of Israel; Palestinian “permanent
residents” or citizens of the State of Palestine; and foreigners who identify as citizens of another
state, although they might also identify as Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Arab, etc. A survey
question explicitly requesting a respondent to self-identify as Israeli or Palestinian was
intentionally omitted from the questionnaire, in an attempt to avoid negative confrontations or
political debate. Therefore, it is assumed that if a respondent completed the survey in Hebrew,
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and identified as Jewish, they identify as Israeli; conversely, if a respondent completed the
survey in Arabic and identified as Muslim or Christian, it was assumed that they identify as
Palestinian. All of these assumptions, and the final one in particular, are not immune to criticism.
5. Analysis
Each survey was given a unique numerical identifier ranging from 1-225. Responses
were translated to English by third parties (with Hebrew surveys translated by an Israeli citizen
living in the United States, and Arabic surveys translated by a Palestinian citizen of Ramallah)
and entered into an Excel spreadsheet. The data was analyzed in Excel and SPSS Statistics, using
descriptive statistics and cross tabular analysis. The respondent’s neighborhood of residence and
the survey areas were mapped using Esri’s ArcMap software. Graphs and visualizations were
created using Excel.
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V. RESULTS
1. Demographics
A total of 225 respondents completed a self-administered survey in Arabic, English, or
Hebrew; the language of the survey was chosen by the respondent. One-hundred twenty two
respondents (54%) chose Hebrew, 92 chose Arabic (41%), and 11 respondents (5%) chose to
complete the survey in English. The majority of English-speaking respondents were recent
immigrants or foreign students studying at Hebrew University for an extended period; one
exception was an older Israeli—a Bosnian survivor of the Siege of Sarajevo—who requested that
the surveyor record his responses.
Eighty-one female respondents (36%) and 144 male respondents (64%) indicated their
age within a series of ranges. The majority fell within the 16-25 (n=89 or 39.6%) and 26-35
range (n=81 or 36%). Twenty-four respondents (10. 7%) were in the 36-45 range, 17 (7.5%) in
the 46-55 range, and 11 (4.9%) in the 56-65 range. Only 3 respondents (1.3%) were over the age
of 66. Respondents’ age, language, and sex are summarized in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Respondent Age Group, Language, and Sex (Created by the author)
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Respondents were asked to indicate their religious affiliation or lack thereof. A little over
half (52%, n=117) identified as Jewish; three Jewish respondents also identified as Atheist. Only
one Jewish respondent, a man in the 36-45 age range, identified as Haredi. Eighty-nine
respondents (39.6%) identified as Muslim and 5 (2.2%) as Christian. Those who identified as
Atheist alone made up 6.7% (n=11) of respondents. Three respondents indicated their religious
affiliation as “Other”: one respondent identified as Buddhist, while another stated his religion
was “Love”.
Over 90% of respondents who chose to complete the survey in Hebrew identified as
Jewish, and 95% of those who completed the survey in Arabic identified as Muslim (Figure
5.2.). Although Jerusalem is home to a significant Christian Arab population, only 2 Arabicspeaking respondents identified as Christian. English-speakers identified as Jewish (n=6),
Christian (n=3), or Other (“Atheist”) (n=2).

Figure 5.2. Respondent Language and Religious Affiliation (Created by the author)
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2. Education and Employment
The survey asked respondents to indicate their highest level of education; there was the
option “None” to indicate a lack of formal education. A total of 3 respondents (1.3%) indicated
that they had no formal education and 7 respondents (3.1%) had a primary-level education.
Sixty-one respondents (27.1%) had completed a secondary education (high school) and 48
(21.3%) had spent some time at a university. Seventy-five respondents (33.3%) had completed a
Bachelor’s degree, 24 (10.8%) had completed a Master’s degree, and 7 (3.1%) held a Doctorate
(Figure 5.3.).

Figure 5.3. Respondent Level of Education as Percentage of Total, and Respondent Language
and Sex as a Percentage of Each Level of Education (Created by the author)
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Respondents were asked to identify their sector of employment or indicate if they were
unemployed. The majority of respondents were either students (29.3%, n=66) or worked in the
Service and Retail industry (23.6%, n=53). Twenty respondents (8.9%) worked in the tourism
industry. A total of 18 respondents (8%) indicated they were unemployed. A wide variety of
occupations were indicated by the remaining respondents (Figure 5.4.).

Figure 5.4. Respondent Employment Sector, as Percentage of All Respondents (Created by the
author)

Respondents indicated their annual salary in New Israeli Shekel (NIS) within one equal
interval income range. More than half of respondents (n=124 or 55.1%) made less than 50,000
NIS (about $14,000) annually. Fifty respondents (22.2%) made between 51,000 and 149,000 NIS
($14,500 to $42,000); 7 respondents (3.1%) made between 150,000 and 249,000 NIS ($42,200 to
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$70,000); 2 respondents (.9%) made between 250,000 and 349,000 NIS ($70,400 to $98,000);
and one respondent made more than 550,000 NIS (around $155,000). No respondents fell within
the 450,000-549,000 NIS range (Figure 5.5.).

Figure 5.5. Respondent Annual Income in New Israel Shekel (NIS) and Language (Created by
the author)

3. Environment
Over half of respondents (n=108) had been a resident of Jerusalem for more than 20
years, and over a quarter were short-term residents, with 27% (n=61) having resided in Jerusalem
for less than 5 years. Another 12% (n=27) had been residents for 16-20 years, 6.2% (n=14) for
11-15 years, and 6.7% (n=15) for 6-10 years. Respondents had the option of writing the name of
their current neighborhood; 154 (68.4%) chose to do so. Forty-seven Jerusalem neighborhoods
were indicated with varying frequency. In order to gain further perspective on their experience,
respondents were also questioned about the type of place in which they had been raised. The
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overwhelming majority (n=170 or 76%) indicated they had grown up in an urban environment,
while 13% (n=30) grew up in suburbs and 11% (n=25) grew up in a rural environment.
4. Transportation
Respondents were questioned about their means of transportation and movement
throughout the city. Public transportation was the most common form of transportation, with
36% of all respondents (n=81) indicating Jerusalem’s tram and bus system as their sole method
of transportation; 45.3% (n=102) said they use public transportation in combination with another
method. The second most-common form of transportation was car, which 33.8% of respondents
(n=76) said was their primary method; for 36.9% (n=83) cars were used in combination with
other methods. Simply walking was the sole method of mobility for 11.6% of respondents
(n=26). A small portion of respondents claimed to use only a bike to get around (6.7%, or n=15)
or in combination with other methods (8%, or n=18). Other responses included “scooter”, “roller
skates”, and “hitchhiking” (Figure 5.6.).
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Figure 5.6. Respondent Method of Transportation, by Number of Respondents Using Method
Alone and in Combination with Other Methods (Created by the author).

Transportation methods differed among different groups. More Arabic speakers listed a
car as their sole source of transportation (42% of language group, n=39) than did Hebrew
speakers (27% of language group, n=33). A similar trend occurred when cars were considered in
combination with other methods: 46% of Arabic speakers versus 32% of Hebrew speakers listed
a car as one method among others utilized. Biking was also more common among Hebrew
speakers (12% of language group, n=14) than Arabic speakers (4% of language group, n=4).
Public transportation as the sole source of transportation was more common among those in the
16-25 and 56-65 age groups than in those in other age groups, with 47% (n=42) and 55% (n=6),
respectively.
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5. Information and Media
Respondents were questioned not only about their physical mobility and connectivity
within the city, but also about their connectivity to news and information. Out of 225 total
respondents, 52.4% (n=118) indicated the Internet as their sole source for news and other
information; 77% of all respondents (n=173) indicated the Internet as one information source
used in combination with other media. The second most-utilized medium was television, which
32% of all respondents (n=74) indicated as a source of information in combination with other
media; only 12% (n=27) claimed television was their sole information source. Newspapers were
the third most-popular information source, with 14% of respondents (n=36) using them in
combination with other media and 2.2% (n=5) as their sole information source. Approximately
10% (n=24) of respondents use radio as a source of information, but less than 2% (n=4) indicated
radio as their sole media source. Magazines were the least common responses, with 2% (n=4) of
respondents indicating them as an information source at all; no respondents indicated magazines
as their sole source for information. Other responses, written in by respondents, included
“friends”, “trade”, and “books”. Information transfer that could be called “word of mouth”
(“friends”, “hearsay”, etc.) was a source of information for 5 respondents. Three respondents
indicated that they didn’t read or listen to news in any form, with one Israeli claiming, “I’m not
interested. I’m young, I can’t help it”. Respondent information sources are summarized in Figure
5.7.
The primary source of information for Arabic-speakers and Hebrew-speakers differed.
While 24% (n=22) of Arabic-speakers indicated they used television as their primary source of
information, only 4% of Hebrew-speakers (n=5) indicated the same. About 63% of Hebrewspeakers (n=77) indicated the Internet as their primary source for information and other news,
compared to 37% of Arabic-speakers (n=34). The Internet is used in combination with other
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media by 60% (n=55) of Arabic speaking respondents, compared with 86% (n=105) of Hebrew
speaking respondents.
Preference for different sources of information also differed greatly by age group. Use of
the Internet as a source for information (either alone or in combination with other media)
decreased steadily with age. While 84% (n=75) of respondents aged 16-25 indicated they used in
the Internet in combination with other media, and 62% (n=55) indicated they used the Internet
alone, 80% (n=65) of members of the 26-35 age group indicated they used the Internet with other
media and 56% (n=45) used the Internet alone; for the 36-45 age group these numbers decreased
further to 58% and 46%, respectively, and the trend continued with each successively-older age
group. Among older age groups, television, newspapers, and radio were more prevalent news
and information media than the Internet.

Figure 5.7. Respondent Sources of Information, by Number of Respondents Using Source Alone
and in Combination with Other Sources (Created by the author).
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6. Likert Scale Responses: Environmental Perceptions and Attitudes toward Cooperation
Likert scales (Montello & Sutton, 2006) were designed to indicate the respondent’s
attitudes toward various aspects of Jerusalem’s urban environment, such as traffic, crime,
pollution, and access to water and other utilities; in addition, residents were also asked if they
believed cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians was necessary to solve issues in the urban
environment. After reading a series of ten statements, respondents indicated the direction
(positive or negative) and magnitude (strength) of their agreement with each of those statements;
respondents could answer “not sure” to any of the questions. Broaching a wide range of topics
through the Likert scale questions encouraged respondents to expound further on issues that
struck them as particularly important. The questions evoked candid views on the effects of the
current geopolitical conflict on the city’s growth, development, and livability.


Statement 1: I have adequate and reliable access to essential utilities and services
(including water, electricity, waste management, streets, and housing).
A majority of respondents (64%, n=143) agreed with this statement to some extent, while

29% (n=66) disagreed and 6.7% (n=15) were unsure. The results varied depending on the
language and religion of the respondent. Arabic-speakers and Muslims were more likely than
Hebrew-speakers and Jews to disagree that their access to essential utilities and services was
adequate and reliable. While 54% of Arabic-speakers disagreed with the statement to some
degree, only 12% of Hebrew-speakers disagreed. Conversely, while 80% of Hebrew-speakers
agreed that they had adequate access, only 40% of Arabic-speakers agreed. Most Englishspeakers (82%) agreed with the statement to some degree (Figure 5.7.). Comparable trends were
found when comparing the responses of Jewish and Muslim respondents. Most Jewish
Jerusalemites (81%, n=95) agreed that they had adequate access to services and utilities, but less
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than half (40%, n=35) of Muslim Jerusalemites agreed. All Christian respondents agreed their
access was adequate.

Figure 5.8. Respondent Agreement with Statement 1, “I have adequate and reliable access to
essential utilities and services”, by Language (Created by the author).

Men were slightly more likely than women to disagree that their access to essential
utilities and services was adequate (33% of men disagreed compared to 23% of women).
Disagreement with the statement increased with length of residence. The data did not indicate a
correlation between a respondent’s sentiment regarding access to essential services, and the
factors of age, annual income, level of education, or employment sector.


Statement 2: Jerusalem is accessible and easy to navigate.
Jerusalemites were equally likely to agree or disagree (to some extent) that their city was

accessible and easy to navigate; 44% percent of respondents (n=98) agreed, 44% (n=99)
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disagreed, and 12% (n=28) were unsure. Magnitude of agreement differed greatly by direction;
while only 14 respondents (6%) agreed strongly with the statement, 40 respondents (18%)
disagreed strongly. Respondents who use a car for transportation (either alone or in combination
with other methods) were slightly more likely to disagree that Jerusalem is accessible and easy to
navigate (54% disagree vs. 40% agree), as were respondents who use a bike (50% disagree vs.
45%). Public transportation users were not only more likely to agree with Statement 2 (47%
agree vs. 36% disagree), but were also more likely to express uncertainty about Jerusalem’s
accessibility than car and bike users (17%, 6%, and 6%, respectively). There did not appear to be
a strong correlation between length of residence and opinion of Jerusalem’s accessibility.
Among Arabic-speakers, 45% of respondents (n=41) indicated some level of agreement
and 53% (n=49) indicated disagreement; among those who disagreed with the statement, 31 said
they disagreed “strongly”. Among Hebrew-speakers, 43% (n=53) indicated agreement and 37%
(45) indicated disagreement. Only 2 Arabic-speaking respondents (2%) indicated that they were
unsure if Jerusalem was accessible and easy to navigate, while 24 (20%) Hebrew-speakers
indicated uncertainty. The trends are similar when comparing responses between Jews and
Muslims.


Statement 3: Jerusalem’s growth has caused environmental problems (air pollution,
water scarcity, etc.).
A large number of respondents (n=58) indicated uncertainty about the impact of urban

growth on Jerusalem’s natural environment. However, almost half of respondents (n=102)
agreed that the city’s growth has caused environmental issues. Similar numbers of Arabic- and
Hebrew-speakers agreed on the negative effects of growth on the environment (n=41, 49% and
n=55, 45%, respectively), as did 6 out of 11 English-speakers. While 41% of Arabic-speakers
disagreed that there were growth-related problems (n= 36), only 22% of Hebrew-speakers
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disagreed (n=27). A greater percentage of Hebrew-speakers expressed uncertainty (“not sure”)
about the negative environmental effects of urban growth than Arabic-speakers (32% vs. 16%).
Respondents of all age groups—except those aged 36-45—were more likely to agree with
Statement 1 than disagree. Men were slightly more likely than women to agree that growth had
caused environmental issues. A greater percentage of women expressed uncertainty about the
statement (33% of women vs. 22% of men).


Statement 4: Water scarcity is a problem in Jerusalem.
A small majority of respondents (47%) disagreed that water scarcity is a problem in

Jerusalem, compared with 35% agreeing and 18% expressing uncertainty. 40% of Arabicspeakers agreed with the statement, compared to 29% of Hebrew-speakers. Respondents
originating from rural areas were more likely to agree that water scarcity was a problem (13
respondents vs. five disagreeing and seven unsure). Equal numbers of short-term residents (1-5
years) agreed and disagreed. No significant correlation was found between agreement with
Statement 2 and age, sex, education, or income.


Statement 5. Air pollution is a problem in Jerusalem
Over half of Jerusalemites surveyed (54%) agreed that air pollution is a problem in

Jerusalem; 20% were unsure and 26% disagreed. Women were slightly more likely than men to
agree that air pollution is an issue in Jerusalem (58% of women agreeing to some extent vs. 51%
of men).


Statement 6. Overcrowding is a problem in Jerusalem.
The majority of respondents (69%) agreed that overcrowding is a problem in Jerusalem,

versus 20% who disagreed and 11% who were unsure. Seventy-eight percent of Arabic-speakers
agreed with Statement 6, compared to 61% of Hebrew-speakers.
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Statement 7. Unemployment is a problem in Jerusalem.
A majority of respondents (67%) agreed that unemployment is a problem in Jerusalem.

More respondents expressed uncertainty than disagreed with the statement (19% vs. 14%).
Arabic-speakers were more likely to agree than Hebrew and English speakers (80% vs. 60% and
46%, respectively).


Statement 8. Crime is a problem in Jerusalem.
A slight majority of respondents (46%) indicated that they believe crime is a problem in

Jerusalem, compared to 35% who disagreed and 20% who were unsure. Arabic-speakers and
Muslims were more likely to agree with Statement 8 than Hebrew-speakers and Jews.
Respondents who had been residents for more than 15 years were more likely to agree than
disagree that crime is a problem, while the opposite was true of those who had been a resident
for 15 years or less. Respondents above the age of 35 were more likely to agree that crime is an
issue in Jerusalem than younger respondents. The data did not reveal a relationship between
agreement with Statement 8 and sex, income, level of education, or employment sector.


Statement 9. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has altered my access to essential utilities
and services.
A slight majority of respondents agreed, to some extent, that their access to essential

utilities and services has been altered by the conflict: 43% agreed, 39% disagreed, and 18% were
unsure. Arabic-speaking respondents were more likely to say that the conflict has altered their
access to essential utilities and services than English- and Hebrew-speaking respondents (Figure
5.8.). Christians and Muslims were also more likely to agree than Jews and others.
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Figure 5.9. Respondent Agreement with Statement 9, “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has altered
my access to essential utilities and services”, by Language (Created by the author)

Respondents who had lived in Jerusalem for more than 10 years were more likely to
agree that the conflict had altered their access to essential services, but the data showed no
relationship between agreement with Statement 10 and sex, income, or level of education.


Statement 10. In order to solve urban problems, cooperation between Israelis and
Palestinians is necessary.
A majority of respondents agreed that compromise is necessary to solve Jerusalem’s

problems, with 57% (n=127) indicating agreement to some extent. A quarter of respondents
(n=57) disagreed to some extent and the sizable remainder—41 respondents or 18%—indicated
uncertainty (Figure 5.9.).

139

Figure 5.10. Respondent Agreement with Statement 10, “In order to solve urban problems,
cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is necessary”, by Language (Created by the author)
A majority in agreement was found across all language, religious, age, and education
groups. When responses were compared to length of residence, it was found that a majority of
respondents in each residence length group agreed, except for residents of 11-15 years. Older
respondents were more likely to agree that cooperation was necessary than respondents in
younger age groups.
7. Ranking of Urban Issues
Respondents were asked to rank ten common issues of urban planning and development
from 1 to 10, with a rank of 1 indicating the highest priority, and a rank of 10 indicating the
lowest priority in their opinion. Utility provision was ranked first most frequently, while
religious development was ranked last by almost half of respondents (Table 5.1.).
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Table 5.1. Number of Times an Issue was Ranked Most Important (1st), Least Important (10th), in
the Top 5, or in the Bottom 5 (Largest Value in Each Column in Bold for Emphasis)
# of Times
in Top 5

# of Times
Ranked First

# of Times
in Bottom 5

# of Times
Ranked Last

Aesthetic/Cultural

44

7

86

33

Environment

69

14

33

2

Green/Recreational
Space

67

10

39

8

Healthcare

116

32

23

5

Housing

93

26

31

4

Industry/Commercial
Development

71

8

36

12

Public Transportation,
Streets, Accessibility

105

20

17

5

Religious Development

36

7

106

70

Security

97

20

31

14

Utility Provision

106

42

16

4

Issue

A significant number of Arabic- and Hebrew-speakers ranked utility provision highly;
however, while the former prioritized housing, the latter focused on healthcare and security
(Figure 5.10.). Hebrew-speakers ranked the environment and public transportation first more
than Arabic-speakers. English-speakers focused on public transportation and healthcare.
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Figure 5.11. First Ranked Issue, by Respondent Language Group

8. Key Results


Fifty-seven percent of respondents agreed that cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians
is necessary to resolve issues in Jerusalem’s urban environment.



Utility provision, housing, healthcare, public transportation, and security were ranked most
important by the majority of respondents; religious development, aesthetic/cultural
development, green/recreational space, and industrial/commercial development were ranked
least important.
o More Arabic-speakers ranked Housing as a priority than Hebrew-speakers.
o More Hebrew-speakers ranked Healthcare as a priority than Arabic-speakers.



Notable discrepancies existed between urban experiences of Hebrew-speakers and Arabicspeakers, and between Jews and Muslims.
o Large discrepancy between amount of Israelis (less) vs. Palestinians (more) who
said their access to essential utilities and services has been altered by the conflict.



Hebrew-speakers answered “Not Sure” more than Arabic-speakers when asked about issues
of access and environmental quality.



Concerns about car traffic, transportation accessibility, unemployment, and utility provision
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were shared by Arabic and Hebrew-speakers.


Car and bike users were more likely to disagree that Jerusalem is accessible and easy to
navigate.



Cars were more utilized by Arabic-speakers, while Hebrew-speakers were more likely to use
public transportation.



The Internet was a frequently utilized source for news and information among Jerusalemites,
with 174 respondents (77%) indicating they used in the Internet in combination with other
media and 118 respondents (52.4%) indicating they used the Internet alone.
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VI. DISCUSSION
This study utilized a survey questionnaire to capture data on environmental perceptions
and attitudes toward urban development among Jerusalemites, for the purpose of comparing
worldviews among religious, social, and demographic groups. A total of 225 respondents were
surveyed. The study population for this exploratory research was relatively small, but revealed
some key insights about the experiences of modern Jerusalemites.
1. Key Findings
A Likert scale portion of the survey sought to capture and quantify environmental
perceptions and attitudes towards Jerusalem’s growth and development. It was hypothesized that
respondents who identified as opposites in the city’s most common bifurcations (Jewish-Muslim,
Israeli-Palestinian) would show disagreement on key measures and indicate vastly different
urban experiences; resulting data showed that Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites do, in fact,
have widely different experiences within the city. These differences are largely an effect of the
biased planning and development schemes implemented by the Israeli municipal government
which, in short, systematically favor Jewish Jerusalemites at the expense of non-Jewish
Jerusalemites. However, it was also found that several issues were shared by Israelis and
Palestinians in Jerusalem. The most notable shared issues revolved around transportation and
city accessibility, housing, utility provision, environmental pollution, and unemployment. The
revelation of such shared issues provides a focus point for future research.
In addition, when asked if they felt that cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians was
necessary to solve the city’s development issues, a majority of respondents (57%) agreed,
indicating potential willingness between the two main populations to cooperate and work
together to improve their shared city—despite the fact that they are often put at odds in the media
and popular opinion. Whether the indication that they are willing to cooperate would translate
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into real-world action, is another matter. A more rigorous survey would need to be performed to
gauge the potential of real-world cooperative efforts, explicitly asking respondents not only if
they would be willing to cooperate with other populations, but what actions they would be
willing to take to foster and follow through with such efforts.
A sizable majority of Jerusalemite respondents, across different age, sex, religious, and
socioeconomic groups, use the Internet as a source of news and information. Considering the
widespread global use of the Internet for communication, information, and recreation, this result
is not surprising; however, it has important implications for communication between
governments and citizens. Government and non-governmental initiatives that seek citizen
participation may find great success utilizing the Internet to contact and engage citizens of
certain age and cultural groups. However, care would need to be taken to also utilize methods
that connect with groups that do not utilize the Internet as frequently or at all, such as older age
groups and the Haredi population, the latter of which eschews many aspects of modern
technology in favor of a more traditional lifestyle.
It was found that Arabic-speakers were more likely to use a car as their primary method
of transportation, as opposed to public transportation, which was more common among Hebrewspeakers. It is possible that this trend is due to an unwillingness or hesitation among Arabs in
Jerusalem to use the light rail line or bus system in West Jerusalem, which may be perceived as
an Israeli system or symbol of Israeli domination of the city landscape. Further investigation of
Arab Jerusalemite motivations to drive instead of utilize public transportation, may reveal greater
insight into whether such a decision is politically or culturally-motivated, is affected by Arab
perception of public transportation accessibility (i.e. Arabs feel unwelcome or unsafe when
utilizing public transportation), or otherwise.
The majority of respondents had lived in Jerusalem for either more than 20 years or less
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than 5 years. Sizable populations at the disparate ends of the scale enabled distinctive
comparisons of environmental perceptions and attitudes between long- and short-term residents.
2. Areas for Improvement
Although the findings of this research are promising, certain aspects of the survey and the
resulting data are not without issue. Some segments of Israeli and Palestinian society are
relatively over-represented; namely: students and retail workers; respondents between the ages of
18-35; and men. The former two over-representations are a direct result of the locations in which
the survey was conducted. The campuses of Hebrew University and the markets of the Old City
were focal points for survey distribution, given the communal, public nature of these areas and
the general willingness of members of these communities to participate in the survey. As a result,
a sizable portion of the survey population consists of students (~30%) and those employed in the
retail and service industries (~25%). In addition, the vast majority (~76%) of respondents were
under the age of 35.
The paucity of female respondents (36.4% of all respondents) is highly regrettable.
Christian and Muslim women were particularly absent; 65% of female respondents were Jewish,
while Muslim women comprised only 25% of female respondents. Older Muslim women were
particularly underrepresented, with 85% of Muslim women who completed the survey being age
35 or under. The paucity of female Muslim respondents can partially be attributed to prevailing
cultural norms regarding the behavior of women in public spaces. There were several instances
in which the survey instrument would be offered to a potential female Muslim respondent, only
for her to refuse and defer to her male companion; sometimes, even if the woman agreed to
complete the survey, some would still ask their male companion for assistance or guidance
before answering certain questions. One accommodating male Muslim respondent graciously
offered to take copies of the survey and distribute them to his female family members in their
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home; such connections between public and private spaces in Jerusalem are invaluable. In future
research that utilizes survey methods in such populations, special care should be taken to ensure
that less visible and less vocal segments of society are not excluded from the survey population.
Any legitimate discussion of environmental perception among women in Jerusalem would
require greater numbers of women in general, and comparable samples of women from the city’s
various sociopolitical and religious groups. Like any other population, women are not a
monolith; perceptions of Jerusalem’s environment will differ greatly among female
Jerusalemites—whether Bedouin, Christian, Druze, Jewish, Muslim, Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, etc. In
order to make any defensible comparisons between such groups, a larger female population is
necessary.
Another common issue with the survey was language accessibility. In Jerusalem the
power and diversity of languages cannot be underestimated. Although the survey was available
in three languages (Arabic, English, and Hebrew) this was found to be inadequate, much to the
surprise and regret of the researcher. The linguistic diversity of Jerusalemites—and the
abundance of residents both young and old with absolutely no knowledge of Israel’s two official
languages nor of English—warrants the translation of such a survey into a variety of other
languages, so that all segments of Jerusalem’s population might be included in future research on
environmental attitudes and perceptions. Languages required for this endeavor would include:
Amharic, for the Ethiopian Jewish community; Russian, for immigrants from the former Soviet
Union; and Yiddish, for the Haredi community. Furthermore, given that Israel has gained many
citizens from Western Europe and South America, translation of the survey into French, German,
Italian, and Spanish could also be beneficial. In fact, the researcher encountered one older Jewish
resident who could only speak French and another who spoke only Uzbek.
In light of these issues with the research design and methods, there are several aspects of
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the survey that could be improved for more reliable and valuable results:


Larger, more inclusive survey population, as opposed to certain populations being overrepresented (e.g. 16-25 age group, students, men) within a relatively small population of
respondents. This can be partially achieved by conducting the survey in a denser, more
focused area, and by using less time- and labor-intensive methods (e.g. conducting the survey
over the Internet or phone, as opposed to approaching respondents on the street). In the
context of Jerusalem, future surveys could ensure inclusion of more female respondents by
setting quotas for respondent demographic groups or following culturally-sensitive methods
of arranging interactions with female respondents (such as organizing interviews in private
spaces). In addition, certain populations within the Israeli and Palestinian communities
(Ethiopian Jews, Haredi Jews, Bedouin Arabs, Bahá'ís) were entirely absent from the survey
population; inclusion of such groups, which are noted for their insularity, would require
assistance from members of those communities to breach barriers of language and culture.
Inclusion of these groups would result in a richer and more in-depth assessment of planning
and development issues in Jerusalem, and would be well worth the added effort of
connecting with and surveying/interviewing such groups.



In-depth interviews with key stakeholders, such as local planners, public figures, clan
leaders, academics, law enforcement, and religious leaders, in order to gain deeper insight
into the issues highlighted by an exploratory survey, and how those issues affect the city’s
various populations. Again, special care would need to be taken to ensure inclusion of views
from many different segments of Jerusalem society, not only the ones that are the most
visible and accessible to outsiders.



More focused line of questioning. This research, being exploratory in nature, casts a wide
net. Respondents were questioned on a wide range of topics; combined with a relatively
small survey population, this unfocused line of questioning resulted in unfocused results.
Trends are observable but few, if any, are concrete. However, this survey did illuminate
certain issues as being shared, narrowing the focus for future research along the same vein. In
future research, the use of an initial pilot or exploratory survey over a wide study area could
help provide focus, both thematically and geographically, and enable the creation and
implementation of a survey that focuses on f



Incorporating spatial data collection and GIS analysis into multiple steps of the survey
process, which would enable more objective and bias-free study site location and spatial
sampling, aid in data collection and quality, and provide greater insight through geospatial
analysis. The various demographics, perceptions, and attitudes captured through the survey
could be linked to locations, enabling the comparison of responses across space and
illuminating any location-based trends for further study. The use of GIS could also enable
effective random sampling using various spatial and demographic parameters.



Improved survey design, including improved instructions, clearer wording, and a more
localized “flow” for a multicultural and multilingual population. The wording of some
questions was confusing for some respondents. One question that confused quite a few
respondents was the question of annual income. The concept of quantifying income by year
was unknown to most people, both Israeli and Palestinian, for whom the concept of income
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by month was more familiar. Indeed, it was noted multiple times that some respondents,
when they reached the question on annual income, would begin to count on their fingers or
look into the distance as they conducted mental math. This flaw in survey design is a slight
cultural difference, but perhaps an important one to note when designing survey
questionnaires for use in Israel, Palestine, and potentially other Middle Eastern nations. This
could be aided by pilot testing of the survey instrument among the study population, which
was not performed for this exploratory round of research. In any case, redesigning the survey
so that respondents are not forced to perform mathematics would be beneficial for all
involved. Overall, an improved survey instrument could be achieved through stricter
adherence to established survey design methods and administrative organization, as outlined
by the Total Design Method (Dillman et al., 1984). Special design and analytical
consideration must also be made for any surveys conducted online (Dillman & Bowker,
2001). Some research also suggests that positioning demographic questions at the end of the
survey, rather than the beginning, can improve survey results within politically or ethnicallycharged contexts; such design enables the respondent to answer without explicitly
considering their affiliation with any one group. The data gathered from the demographic
section of the survey could also be improved by asking whether a respondent is a citizen,
permanent resident, or long-term visitor in Jerusalem, which has great impact on their level
of civic involvement (voting, taxes), social standing, freedom of movement through the city
and surrounding region.


Objective terminology to describe various phenomena in Jerusalem’s urban environment, as
opposed to terms that might have different meanings for different populations. For instance,
the generalized use of the terms “overcrowding” and “crime”, without any clear, quantified
explanation of what the terms denote, may mean something very different to a wealthy
Russian Jew and an impoverished Ethiopian Jew, despite the fact that they are both Jews
living in Jerusalem. Similar research that seeks insights into environmental perception among
various populations in a diverse, multicultural population, should take special care to ensure
inclusivity across cultures, classes, and education levels, and to utilize objective terminology
within a survey questionnaire or respondent communication.



Probability sampling method, such as systematic or cluster (area) random sampling, would
enhance the scalability and representativeness of the sample population, and greatly reduce
the risk of any potential researcher bias. Random probability sampling would also enable
more concrete generalizations about the wider population, based on the sample population.



“Forced choice” format for all questions, including no option for “nonresponse” on any
question, particularly those utilizing a Likert scale. There was also a notable issue with the
survey’s final section, the ranking of urban concerns. Respondents were asked to rank ten
concerns from 1 to 10 (1 being the highest concern and 10 being the lowest), but the
instructions did not indicate that each number was to be used only one time. Thus, many
respondents, feeling that two or more things were of equal importance and value, applied the
same ranking to multiple choices. This problem would be easily remedied by including the
instruction that each number may be used only once within the ranking scheme, which would
force the respondent to indicate precisely which concern outranks another.



Greater control over the survey instrument, achieved through administration of the survey
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by the researcher in English or in the respondent’s primary language (unaided or through a
translator), as opposed to self-administration by the respondent. This would not only allow
the researcher to ensure a higher quality of responses (no unvoiced confusion over wording
and no skipped questions, for instance) but would also engage the respondent more
thoroughly, ideally leading to greater insight into the respondent’s experience and reasoning
for their views.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS
This research utilized survey methods to divulge data on environmental perceptions,
attitudes, and world views among Jerusalem’s different cultural, religious, and socioeconomic
groups. These data were used to compare and contrast responses between these groups, with the
ultimate goal of exploring how different residents experience Jerusalem’s urban landscape and
finding shared issues that create potential for cooperative efforts. A combination of questionnaire
surveys, participatory planning theory, and geospatial technologies was advanced as a
methodology for fairly and objectively mitigating planning issues for all populations in
Jerusalem. Related previous research compared attitudes within certain demographic groups or
between residents of different cities in Jerusalem, Israel, and Palestine, used survey methods to
gauge public opinions on various urban development issues, and utilized geospatial analysis to
address and explore these issues in Jerusalem and the surrounding area; research that compared
perceptions between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem focused on high school students, and
did not advance suggestions for how insights into differences in perception could be utilized to
mitigate the city’s currently biased planning and development trends, and spatial segregation.
This research explored a combination of survey, participatory planning, and GIS methods to find
shared issues between groups in Jerusalem, in order to pursue shared solutions through
cooperative efforts.
Jerusalem was chosen as the focus of this research for its unique history, religious
importance, multiculturalism, and environment of conflict. Such an environment is ideal for the
comparison of world views across diverse groups. The allure of Jerusalem has drawn multitudes
from across the globe, from varied cultural and religious traditions, political and social systems,
and stages of economic development. The celebrated diversity of the city’s residents has fostered
a unique urban environment, but not without conflict. Differences in religion, ethnicity, and
151

political ideology, not only in the capital but throughout Israel, Palestine, and the Levant, have
led to one of the most grueling conflicts in modern history. This research was motivated by a
recognition of the vital importance of exploring potential methods of cooperation and novel
solutions to the conflict.
Considering the well-publicized, increasingly documented, and, at times, sensationalized
conflict between Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites over land, political autonomy, and control
of holy sites, it was originally assumed that differences in perception and experience between
respondents who identified with either of these two groups would be stark, and their views
irreconcilable. In reality, although the results did suggest that Israelis, Palestinians, and other
residents do experience the city differently as a result of their social status (Israeli citizen vs.
Palestinian permanent resident or foreign long-term visitor) it was found that certain issues—
specifically transportation accessibility, utility provision, and housing—were common across
various groups. Despite the different lenses through which they perceive reality and the different
treatment they receive from the governing authorities, Jerusalemites share and experience the
same spaces, and experience similar problems as a result. Residents experiencing similar
problems may also seek similar solutions and, based on the sample population, may be open to
intergroup cooperation to solve local shared issues. This research advances the potential of
utilizing subjective stakeholder views and objective scientific tools—the qualitative and the
quantitative—to create and execute a Jerusalem planning initiative that is data-driven, inclusive,
and sensitive to the needs of all populations, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or political
affiliation.
1. Research Conclusions
Based on past research and the key findings of this research, several conclusions are
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advanced for further study:


Jerusalemites welcome the opportunity to share their experiences in the urban
environment and their attitudes towards planning and development issues in their city.
Survey methods can be employed effectively in Jerusalem, in order to quantify resident
experiences and attitudes for further analysis and discussion.



Jerusalemites across different ethnic and socioeconomic groups believe that cooperation
between Israelis and Palestinians is a necessary component of successful, sustainable
solutions to urban issues, such as housing availability, provision of essential utilities and
services, environmental degradation, and transportation accessibility.



Pockets of Israeli and Palestinian society—which already interact peacefully on a daily
basis—are ready to work with “the other side” in Jerusalem; they must be given the
resources and forum to do so. Participatory planning initiatives could enable and guide
such efforts and ensure inclusivity.



The most pressing issues for Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites are issues of utility
provision, housing availability, transportation accessibility and efficiency,
unemployment, and overcrowding. These shared issues provide a basis for greater, more
focused exploration into how such shared issues might foster shared, cooperative efforts.



Planning that utilizes a combination of survey questionnaires, GIS analysis, and inclusive
public participation is a viable method for mitigating Jerusalem’s unique urban planning
and development issues. These methods would enable the incorporation of both
objective, data-driven decisions and subjective resident experiences—both equallyimportant aspects of planning—into development initiatives that are beneficial to all
segments of Jerusalem society.

These key conclusions are encouraging. Given the interdependence of Jerusalem’s Israeli and
Palestinian populations, and what seems to be a willingness and readiness to cooperate among
certain segments of those populations, a focused research initiative that seeks to determine
specific avenues for cooperation, could find success in Jerusalem. Various quantitative tools,
including survey questionnaires and GIS, could be both in an exploratory capacity (to determine
the pockets of society, the areas of Jerusalem most open to cooperation, and the spatial trend of
issues experienced by respondents), a fieldwork capacity (spatial planning for the shared
initiative), and an analysis and presentation capacity (enabling data-driven decisions by both
researchers and stakeholders involved in the project).
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2. Future Research
There is great potential for similar research that utilizes a more robust survey method and
larger sample size in a smaller, more cohesive area, such as two neighborhoods on the East-West
Jerusalem border or Israeli-Palestinian border towns. If a significant amount of residents from
the two communities were found to share a certain key issue, and to be amenable to cooperative
efforts to solve that issue, the findings could be used to initiate and support a realistic joint
planning effort. Methods of participatory and cooperative planning that have led to positive
results could be contextualized and implemented. The project could be as small as a shared
garden or a monument of significance to the participating populations: the most important part
would be the effect of something shared on relations between those involved. Engaging in a
shared effort, with a shared result and shared pride in their accomplishment, would empower
participants to engage in cooperation in other areas of life, and potentially encourage others to do
the same.
It is difficult to say if such efforts would face greater challenges in cosmopolitan
Jerusalem, where tensions and stakes are high and building restrictions abound, or smaller, more
homogenous border towns, where the military has greater control. Approval of cooperative
efforts may not be as strong in rural areas as it was observed to be in the city. An initial
exploratory survey could be deployed in several potential sites, in order to gauge residents’
interest in engaging in such research and collaborative activity; GIS could be used to aid study
site location, spatial sampling of survey populations, analysis of the exploratory and primary
results, and planning efforts throughout the entire process. The use of GIS methods would add an
objective, data-driven, visual component to the process.
Ultimately, the most crucial aspect of comprehensive planning initiatives in Jerusalem is
equal consideration and inclusion of the perspectives and needs of all stakeholders. This research
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has demonstrated that such inclusion can be achieved by: (i) employing participatory planning
theory and practice as a guide for empowering populations that have historically been excluded
from the planning process, thereby enriching the resulting policies; (ii) utilizing survey methods
to measure and assess stakeholder perceptions, thereby illuminating opportunities for
collaboration and conflict resolution; and (iii) incorporating GIS and other geospatial
technologies to enable objectivity and support data-driven conclusions. Successful results of such
an effort would encourage cooperative, comprehensive city planning and promote efforts to
create policies that benefit and improve the quality of life of Jerusalem residents.
All Jerusalemites, regardless of ethnicity, religion, social status, or any other
categorization, deserve the opportunity to express their needs and goals for the governance,
planning, development, and growth of their city. All Jerusalemites must be empowered to
practice such expression, in order to demand and pursue initiatives that will benefit their
communities. The Jerusalem municipal and Israeli state authorities, eschewing any destructive
ethnic bias, must encourage and enable such citizen expression and empowerment by actively
seeking public input from all corners of society, providing the forums and tools for such
expression, and ensuring that all Jerusalemites feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for
their shared home. A cooperative, inclusive, progressive vision for the future of Jerusalem,
which ensures the prosperity, security, and advancement of all Jerusalemites, is long overdue and
can wait no longer.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Survey

Figure 9.1. English copy of questionnaire survey used in Jerusalem
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Figure 9.1. English copy of questionnaire survey used in Jerusalem, continued
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B. Research Compliance

Figure 9.2. Research Compliance
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C. Data Tables
Table 9.1. Selected interview excerpts, by language/religion of respondent and topic of
discussion
Language

Religion

Topic of
Discussion

Comment

Hebrew

Judaism

Israeli-Palestinian
Cooperation

It is very hard to be Ultra-Orthodox.
People hate us... I am very radical in my
opinions, but [the Palestinians] have been
here for hundreds and hundreds of years—
why should they leave? They have a right
to be here.

Hebrew

Judaism

Israeli-Palestinian
Cooperation

There are no Palestinians in Jerusalem.

Arabic

Islam

Israel-Palestinian
Cooperation

I do not care who you are, Jewish or
Muslim. All I want to do is live my life
with my family, in the city where I was
born.

Arabic

Islam

Israel-Palestinian
Cooperation

Jerusalem is dying! I strongly disagree,
with the biggest “X”.

Israeli-Palestinian
Cooperation

The solution to conflict is reconciling
differences. We need parents to educate
and raise their children well. We have
young men with good ability and minds,
university educated, but they’re
dishwashers and store clerks.

Arabic

Hebrew

Islam

Judaism

A city should be a city. Buildings now,
Transportation and with private parking, encourage people to
Housing
be isolated, but the street is where the city
lives.

Arabic

Islam

Utility Provision,
Housing, Green
Space, and
Cultural
Renovation

Arabic

Islam

Income

There is a huge difference between roads
and trash collection in East and West.
Housing, green spaces, culture: we don't
have these.
The cost of living is too high, but we make
so little. It doesn't equal out.
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Development is needed in Arab areas, but
not in Jewish ones because they are already
good.

Arabic

Islam

Housing and
Green Space

Arabic

Islam

Utility Provision

What is needed is to develop all services,
and the most important one is sovereignty
and to remove all racist elements.

Islam

Utility Provision
and Cultural
Renovation

I live in an Arabic area, and I can feel that
there is a huge gap between Arabic areas
and Jewish ones, concerning cultural,
political, and social issues.
The system is patched, rather than planned.
We need comprehensive planning from
start to finish, A to Z. [There is] a lack of
synergy between government and
entrepreneurial activity and residents'
needs. Since they put in the tram, business
owners in the area [Jaffa Road] have seen a
50% drop in business due to less access by
buses, cars, and taxis. They have to rely
solely on foot traffic... Having such a large
distance between stations literally destroys
businesses. A better solution is probably
long lines to serve people from far away
areas and neighborhoods, but on Jaffa
Street we need something more localized.
We need more frequent stops in the City
Center.

Arabic

Hebrew

Judaism

Transportation

Hebrew

Other

Utility Provision

English

Judaism

Transportation

Arabic

Islam

Security

Water is especially important.
Cramming the narrow streets with trams
and double buses is a crime against history.
Our [transportation system] is bad, theirs
[Arabs] is worse.
They [the police] do not come for Arabs.
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D. Photos

Figure 9.3. Palestinian men playing backgammon in the Old City’s Muslim Quarter (Photo by
the author).

Figure 9.4. Israeli men meeting at a coffee shop on West Jerusalem’s Jaffa Street (Photo by the
author).
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Figure 9.5. A street in East Jerusalem, near the Damascus Gate (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.6. The streetcar route along Jaffa Street in West Jerusalem (Photo by the author).

Figure 9.7. Haredi man riding his bike down Jaffa Street (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.8. Protestors at a demonstration against the privatization of Jerusalem’s Light Rail Line
(Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.9. Separation barrier north of Jerusalem, at the Qalandia Checkpoint (Photo by the
author).

Figure 9.10. Graffiti depicting Palestinian politician Yasser Arafat, on the inside of separation
barrier at Qalandia Checkpoint (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.11. Tire barricade erected by Palestinians inside Qalandia Checkpoint (Photo by the
author).
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Figure 9.12. Palestinian children in the Old City’s Muslim Quarter (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.13. Israeli children playing ball in the Old City’s Jewish Quarter (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.14. Market street in the Old City’s Muslim Quarter (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.15. Market street in the Muslim Quarter during prayers (Photo by the author).
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Figure 9.16. Residential street in the Old City’s Armenian Quarter (Photo by the author).
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